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 This dissertation confirms war as the zenith of aesthetic experience and 
demonstrates the pragmatic nature of war through explication of John Dewey’s 
aesthetic philosophy. Likewise, the coherency of Carl von Clausewitz’s 
philosophy parallels Dewey as it too leads to complete development, or 
flourishing, of the individual in a complex, ever-changing world. Von 
Clausewitz’s sets his philosophy in the context of war, but his philosophy 
transcends that milieu. The timelessness of the General’s philosophical concepts 
guarantees the appropriateness of these concepts in today’s inconstant world.  
To exemplify this point, this paper applied von Clausewitz’s concepts to the 
range of contemporary wars in which the demands on modern warriors are 
often perceived as qualitatively different from demands placed on individuals in 
the armies of the early 1800s. This perception is shown to lack credibility and, 
even though the methods and technologies of war are in continuous flux while 
the basic nature of war remains unchanged, the germane nature of the General’s 
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philosophy to contemporary times remains unsullied and follows logically. 
Rather than simply asserting that the concepts of these two philosophers are 
apropos in the contemporary context of war, this dissertation concludes by 
contending that modern military thinkers employ the Clausewitzian philosophy, 
as synthesized by John Boyd, as a basis for fighting in today’s contemporary 
environment. As an exemplar, the current doctrine of the United States Marine 
Corps is offered as a template of the philosophy of von Clausewitz and, by 
extension, Dewey. Modern war, once established as an archetype of the 
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INTRODUCTION: ESTABLISHING A PHILOSOPHY  
FOR THE NATURE OF WAR 
On War, Book I, Chapter IV 
General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) 
 
“OF DANGER IN WAR” 
 
 Usually before we have learnt what danger really is we form 
an idea of it which is rather attractive than repulsive. In the 
intoxication of enthusiasm, to fall upon the enemy at the 
charge—who cares then about bullets and men falling? The eyes 
shut for a moment, to throw oneself against cold death, uncertain 
whether we or another shall escape him, and all this close to the 
golden aim of victory, close to the rich fruit which ambition 
thirsts for—can this be difficult? It will not be difficult, and still 
less will it appear so. But such moments, which, however, are not 
the work of a single pulse-beat as is supposed, but rather like 
doctors' draughts, must be taken diluted and spoilt by mixture 
with time—such moments, we say, are but few. 
 Let us accompany the novice to the battlefield. As we 
approach, the thunder of the cannon becoming plainer and 
plainer is soon followed by the howling of shot, which attracts the 
attention of the inexperienced. Balls begin to strike the ground 
close to us, before and behind. We hasten to the hill where stands 
the General and his numerous Staff. Here the close striking of the 
cannon balls and the bursting of shells is so frequent that the 
seriousness of life makes itself visible through the youthful picture 
of imagination. Suddenly some one known to us falls—a shell 
makes its way into the crowd and causes some involuntary 
movements; we begin to feel that we are no longer perfectly at 
ease and collected, even the bravest is at least to some degree 
confused. Now, a step further into the battle which is raging 











increases  the  confusion.  From  the  General  of  Division  to  the 
Brigadier.  He,  a  man  of  acknowledged  bravery,  keeps  carefully 
behind  a  rising  ground,  a  house,  or  a  tree—a  sure  sign  of 
increasing danger. Grape rattles on the roofs of the houses and in 
the  fields;  cannon  balls  howl  over  us,  and  plough  the  air  in  all 
directions, and soon there is a frequent whistling of musket balls; 
a  step  further  towards  the  troops,  to  that  sturdy  Infantry which 
for hours has maintained its firmness under this heavy fire; here 




pity,  at  the  sight  of  the  maimed  and  fallen.  The  young  soldier 
cannot  reach  any  of  these  different  strata  of  danger,  without 
feeling  that  the  light  of  reason  does  not move  here  in  the  same 
medium,  that  it  is  not  refracted  in  the  same  manner  as  in 
speculative  contemplation.  Indeed,  he  must  be  a  very 
extraordinary  man  who,  under  these  impressions  for  the  first 
time,  does  not  lose  the  power  of  making  any  instantaneous 
decisions.  It  is  true  that  habit  soon  blunts  such  impressions;  in 
half­an­hour we begin to be more or less indifferent to all that is 
going on around us:  but an ordinary  character never attains  to 
complete coolness, and the natural elasticity of mind; and so we 




be  if all  the effects produced  in this resistant medium are not to 
fall far short of that which, in the student's chamber, may appear 
only the ordinary standard. 
  Danger  in war  belongs  to  its  friction;  a  correct  idea  of  it  is 






The narrative of world history can be conceived as a narrative of war. War defines cultures and individuals. Countless books and treatises deal with, inter alia, not  only  war’s  history  but  also  war’s  politics,  theory,  economics  and  sociology. Little  has  been  written  on  the  philosophy  of  war’s  nature  and  what  that  nature entails  for  the  commanders  and  those who develop  into or  aspire  to  top military leadership positions. Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz addresses this  issue  in his classic work, On War (Vom Krieg). Conceptually, his  ideas are of great  interest for  the  military  and  should  be  of  immense  value  for  both  the  self‐actualized individual  and  the philosopher. Michael Howard  gives  the  reader  a  flavor  for  the General’s  philosophical  sensibilities  and  how  those  understandings  informed  his approach to the philosophy of war.i    Immanuel Kant was only one of the many Prussian writers who from 1780 onwards were arguing that  if only the affairs of states were in the hands of rational, humane men, the world might  enjoy  perpetual  peace.  It  was  the  dominant  view  in Prussian  university  and  intellectual  circles  until  the catastrophe at Jena shocked them into political awareness and set  on  foot  the  new  nationalist  movement  that  was  to  have such momentous consequences. …   Nevertheless the belief was becoming widespread that war in the hands of experts could be carried out with such skill and moderation  as  to  be  virtually  bloodless.  Military  thinkers sought for rational principles based on hard quantifiable data that  might  reduce  the  conduct  of  war  to  a  branch  of  the natural  sciences,  a  rational  activity  from  which  the  play  of chance and uncertainty had been entirely eliminated. …   But  this  search  for  scientific  certainty  in  military  affairs was  taking  place  at  a  time  when  thinkers  concerned  with other areas of human activity were beginning to question the whole idea of scientific certainty, a Newtonian universe whose objective reality was governed by  forces and principles quite external to man. The idea of the British philosophers Berkeley 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and  Hume  that  man  did  not  passively  observe  and  absorb knowledge, but rather by the process of observation created it and moulded  the world  through  his  own  consciousness,  had taken deep hold in Germany. Clausewitz did not have to read the works  of  Kant  (and  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  did)  to become  familiar with  these  ideas which  formed  the  basis  of Kant’s  philosophy.  …  The  young  Clausewitz  would  have encountered such ideas as these wherever he turned … at the War College where Kant’s pupil Kiesewetter was expounding Kantian philosophy, and in the intellectual circles in which he moved  in  Berlin.  His  interest  in  education  brought  him  in touch  with  the  view  of  such  writers  as  Pestalozzi  that education  was  not  a  matter  of  imparting  knowledge  but  of using  knowledge  to  develop  the  human  personality  towards its  perfect  fulfillment.  His  studies  in  aesthetic  theory  taught him  that  the  artist  did  not  succeed  simply  by  learning  and applying  a  given  set  of  rules,  but  rather  those  rules  had significance  only  as  indications  of  what  great  artists  had actually done, and had to be modified as the  innovations and perceptions of  new generations  enriched  the  comprehension of  their subject. All art, all  thought (for as Clausewitz himself expressed it, all  thought  is art) was a creative activity, not an imitative  or  derivative  one.  And  the  same  applied  with particular force to the conduct of war. (13‐14)  Von  Clausewitz’s  philosophical  sophistication  is  evident  in  On  War.  His philosophy,  as  this  dissertation  will  contend,  is  a  pragmatic  one  and  can  be viewed as an emergent and evolving version of John Dewey’s conceptualization of the aesthetic.   Many  read  von  Clausewitz’s  magnum  opus  but  few  fully  appreciate  the richness of his philosophical sensibilities. He wrote during the early part of the 19th  century  so,  not  surprisingly,  his  historical  and  political  understandings reflect  the  conditions  of  the  age.  Consequently,  some  historians,  political functionaries, military leaders, and philosophers claimed the ideas and concepts 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espoused by  the General  are dated  and do not  apply  in  the modern world.  In that sense, they are asserting that modernity has passed by the times of which von Clausewitz wrote and that newer concepts and philosophies are needed to deal  with  the  exigencies  of  war  in  today’s  world  of  computers,  modern  jet aircraft,  nuclear  weapons,  and  world‐wide,  instant  communication.  Others, including  this  writer,  hold  a  quite  different  view,  namely,  that  the  General’s philosophy is both timely and timeless. His views are thick with lessons for the contemporary  individual—whether  military  or  civilian—and  represent  a sophisticated  understanding  of  the  pragmatic  demands  on  philosophy  if  that philosophy  is  to  have meaning  in  an unpredictable,  ever‐changing,  precarious world. This dissertation contends von Clausewitz’s philosophical understanding is not only germane in today’s unstable political and military environment, but also his demand for the individual to be able to function well in the real world provides  the  template  for  a  pragmatic  philosophy  later  epitomized  in  the writings  of  American  philosopher  John  Dewey.  More  specifically,  von Clausewitz’s  conceptual  requirements  for  developing  the  military  leader  and commander  epitomize  Dewey’s  philosophical  understanding  of  the  aesthetic.  The purpose of this dissertation is threefold.  First, through an explication of Dewey’s  philosophy  of  the  aesthetic,  to  show  von  Clausewitz’s  philosophy exemplifies  a  fully  coherent  view  leading  to  complete  development,  or flourishing,  of  the  individual  in  a  complex,  ever‐changing  world.  Von Clausewitz’s milieu is war, but his philosophy transcends that context. Second, 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contra  some  military  commentators  who  label  von  Clausewitz’s  ideas  as outdated,  the  General’s  philosophical  concepts  are  shown  to  be  as  relevant today  as when  he  first  penned  them.    To  solidify  this  point,  von  Clausewitz’s concepts  will  be  applied  to  the  range  of  contemporary  wars  in  which  the demands  on  modern  warriors  are  often  perceived  as  qualitatively  different from  the demands placed on  the  individuals  in  the armies of  the early 1800s. The claim  is  then made that even though the methods and  technologies of war are  in  continuous  flux  the  nature  of  war  remains  unchanged.  Finally,  once demonstrated that the nature of war is temporally stable , the relevance of the von Clausewitzian and Deweyan pragmatic philosophy to contemporary war is then logically asserted.   The framework for this analysis will be built on John Dewey’s philosophy of the  aesthetic.  Dewey’s  philosophy  centers  on  the  role  of  experience  in  the development  of  the  individual.  A  person who  fully  engages  in  the world—the 
live  creature,  in  Dewey’s  parlance—offers  a  lens  through  which  to  view  von Clausewitz’s  philosophy.  This  especially  holds  insofar  as  that  philosophy demands a certain kind of existential status for the General’s model of the fully involved commander—the military genius.   The  foundation  for  the  framework  builds,  first,  on  an  understanding  and explication  of  Dewey’s  philosophy  of  experience  and  the  attendant  concepts central  to one’s complete  involvement with  the world. Dewey’s understanding of  the  aesthetic  demands  total  engagement  of  the  individual  with  the 
7 
 
environment.  The  nature  of  this  relation  of  man  to  his  or  her  environment creates and cements a given experience as the basis for future experiences or, if the engagement  is  less  than total,  the potential  for meaningful  future action  is mitigated  or  lost.  The  aesthetic  takes  on  a  certain  form  for  undergoing  an experience  in  which  the  individual  is  immersed  in  the  environment  and  is changed  by  that  environment.  At  the  same  time,  the  environment  undergoes change  by  the  actions  of  the  individual.  The  process  is  continuous  until  the attainment  of  a  stable  condition,  which  then  acts  as  a  bedding  for  new experiences.   A second arc of  the  framework  is  the philosophy of von Clausewitz as  that philosophy pertains to making the military genius. Von Clausewitz’s conceptual philosophy developed the concept of military genius  in order to winnow those aesthetic,  ethical  and  practical  qualities  needed  to  take  part  in  the  existential milieu  of  the  successful  leader  and  commander.  The  appropriate  qualitative nature of his or her experiences  in combat—and the  individual’s participation in the aspects of war as those considerations pertain to the political objectives of  the  state  (or  the  political  entity  responsible  for  hostilities)—produces  the genius.  A  full  interpretation  and  elucidation  of  the  General’s  philosophy  is drawn so as to establish the integral connection with the pragmatism of Dewey. At  base,  the  aesthetics  of  Dewey  and  the  proper  experience  of  war  as  von Clausewitz  conceives  of  those  meaningful  experiences  are  philosophies  that describe  the  real  world  and  the  players’  interactions  and  relations  with  the 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environment.  The  connection  between  the  two  philosophies  is  so  strong  that when both are pared to the core, each can be seen as a mirror of or parallel to the other. The  third aspect of  the  framework consequently examines common threads of each philosophy and establishes this tight connection between both philosophers.  The  nexus  leaves  little  conceptual  disparity  between  the  two. Specifically,  the  threads  examined  are:  (1)  the  aesthetic,  (2)  continuity,  (3) uncertainty and friction; the organism, (4) theory and practice (or the abstract and the real), (5) art and science, (6) existence as a social construct, and (7) the 
live  creature  and  the military  genius.  Both  philosophers  individually  consider and analyze these threads. This dissertation unites them into a coherent whole. At the center of each philosophy remains a similar construct  for the complete, integrated individual.     Finally, applying the Deweyan overlay to von Clausewitz’s philosophy, this discourse addresses the question whether von Clausewitz’s philosophical view of leadership continues to be pertinent in today’s world, especially as applied to contemporary warfare. A current synthesis of the ideas of the two philosophers establishes  the  relevance of  the Dewey/von Clausewitz view  to  contemporary war. This synthesis emerges as a philosophy of the nature of war developed in the  late  twentieth  century  by  John  Boyd.  Boyd’s  philosophy  incorporates  the experiential underpinnings of both von Clausewitz and Dewey.     Like  both  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz,  Boyd  developed  a  conceptual framework  for  thinking  as  well  as  a  creative  synthesis  derived  from  the 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individual’s  experience  with  the  environment.  While  couched  in  terms somewhat  different  from  those  of  either  Dewey  or  von  Clausewitz,  Boyd addressed most of the same issues faced by the two philosophers. Additionally, Boyd  incorporated  the  concepts  of  creative  synthesis—akin  to  Dewey’s aesthetic and von Clausewitz’s “inner eye”—to develop a “complete” philosophy for war and leadership. Boyd,  like von Clausewitz, adamantly asserted that his philosophy is not a theory of war but, rather, a philosophy of how to think about war.  Once  established  as  an  “incorporation”  of  von  Clausewitz’s  and  Dewey’s philosophy, Boyd’s concepts of war are examined relative to their pertinence to contemporary war.   To address the relevance of any philosophy to modern war, one must define the  scope  of  war  that  may  be  considered  “contemporary”  or  “modern.”  The range  of  wars  being  fought  today—and  those  that  may  be  conceived  by  the world’s most creative military thinkers—covers vast conceptual ground. Ideally, to  logically  claim  relevance  for  any  philosophy  in  modern  war  requires  that some common element  inhere  in every conceivable type of contemporary war.  After  examining  a  subset  of  various  types  of  modern  wars,  this  treatise concludes  the  nature  of  war  in  general  remains  unchanged  from  antiquity. Consequently,  we  can  logically  assert  modern  war  does  not  represent  a conceptual paradigm shift but, rather, recognizes that war today represents an evolutionary progression that retains its basic nature throughout the process of development. The applicability of the philosophies of Dewey and von Clausewitz 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to  that  basic,  unchanging  nature  of  war  remains  as  the  final  query  to  be answered  in  order  to  determine  whether  those  philosophies  fit  today’s contemporary wars.   Boyd  synthesized  many  of  the  philosophical  concepts  of  Dewey  and  von Clausewitz  in  two  major  works,  “Destruction  and  Creation”  and  “Patterns  of Conflict.”  After  Boyd’s  philosophical  syntheses  are  proven  as  significant incorporations  of  the  concepts  of  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz,  the  link  from Boyd’s philosophy to a practical and applied use in the arena of actual modern warfare must be substantiated. Consequently,  the claim that  the philosophy of Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz  applies  appropriately  to  modern  contemporary warfare can be logically asserted.    This  dissertation  argues  that  the  Deweyan/Clausewitzian  philosophy,  via Boyd’s  syntheses,  constitutes  the  foundation  for  The  United  States  Marine Corps’  (USMC)  warfighting  philosophy  in  the  twenty‐first  century.  The  USMC warfighting  philosophy  manifest  in  the  Corps’  primary  doctrinal  document builds upon conceptual ideas concerning the nature of war rather than on rules for how to fight. Using the USMC warfighting philosophy as an exemplar of the practical application of the use of philosophy in modern wars, and having shown the  derivation  of  this  pragmatic  philosophy  from  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz (via  Boyd),  the  conclusion  that  the  philosophy  of  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz pertains to contemporary warfare becomes clear. 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EXPERIENCE AS BEDDING FOR THE AESTHETIC     This  chapter  explicates  John  Dewey’s  concept  of  experience  as  the foundation  for  understanding  the  individual’s  place  in  the  world.    This foundation is the bedrock necessary to later build a Deweyan retrospective on the core concepts of Carl von Clausewitz. Those concepts pertain to the making of the complete military leader—or the military genius, as von Clausewitz refers to  that  leader.  The  goal  in  this  explication  of  Dewey’s  experiential understanding  is  to  set  the  foundation  for  a  later  demonstration  that  von Clausewitz’s  philosophical  conception  of war  and  the military  genius  presage Dewey’s philosophy and much of philosophical pragmatism in general.   Various  themes  in  Dewey’s  philosophy will  come  to  bear  on  the  concepts espoused  by  von  Clausewitz;  however,  the  common  idea  central  to  both men when considering the full moral, aesthetic and philosophical development of the individual is understanding the primacy of experience. Keeping the centrality of that  understanding  in  the  forefront,  in  order  to  make  the  philosophical connection  between Dewey  and  von Clausewitz,  experience  as  understood  by each philosopher must be made fully explicit and illuminated. Once experience, as understood by both men, is appreciated and apprehended, the common core that their philosophies share can be further developed. For Dewey, experience, properly understood, is the essential and defining property of the live creature, 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a person fully engaged in life and fulfillment. Experience is central to his ideas on education and art. The nature of experience defines the aesthetic.    This explication of the Deweyan philosophy of experience will focus on three specific  aspects  of  his  concept.  These  are:  (1)  the  role  of  “experience  as pedagogical,”  (McDermott, 1981: 421)  (2) experience  in an ever‐changing and unstable world, and (3) experience as the bedrock of the aesthetic. While Dewey has written much on the concept of experience, these three core ideas define the centrality  of  experience  in  making  the  person  the  live  creature.  To  the  point more directly, not only do these three aspects clearly define Dewey’s concept of experience  in  his  philosophy  and  our  lives  but  also  these  very  same  three aspects are  the  foundation of von Clausewitz’s understanding of experience  in making  the  fully  developed  commander,  or  military  genius,  as  he  calls  that commander.   The aesthetic,  for Dewey,  is rooted  in  the experience of  the everyday. That experience is dependent on, or inextricably linked to, the environment and the individual’s reaction and place within that environment. The interaction of the individual  and  the environment  is pedagogical  in nature and what  constitutes the  individual’s  “education.”    Much  of  Dewey’s  discussion  of  experience’s educational nature  is directed at  the development of  the child;  this discussion results  in  a  paradigm  for  von  Clausewitz’s  mandates  concerning  the development  of  the  complete  officer.  Additionally,  Dewey  understands experience—the  very  bedrock  of  our  existence—to  take place  in  a  precarious 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environment  fraught  with  the  unknown.  We  must  function  in  a  world  of probabilities and uncertainties. This concept is critical to determining how well each of us can place ourselves in the objective environment in which we dwell.  As  well,  Dewey’s  understanding  of  art  and  the  aesthetic  can  be  seen  as  a template  that  incorporates,  and  parallels,  von  Clausewitz’s  understanding  of war  as  art.  Before  expositing  the  role  of  experience  as  the  bedding  for  the aesthetic,  an  understanding  of  experience  as  pedagogical  will  demonstrate experience’s pivotal  role  in  the development of  the  fully engaged  individual—the  person  who  learns  and  incorporates  life’s  lessons  into  a  seamless  and continuous  thread  from  past  experiences  to  future  opportunities.  Likewise, appreciating  the  fact  the  environment  is  “unknowable,”  uncertain  and improbable  is necessary  if we are  to understand how meaningful  experiences lead to understanding future, new and novel situations. 
Experience as Pedagogical   In Experience and Education, Dewey describes the contrasts he sees between “traditional”  education  and  “progressive”  education.  (These  terms  can  be thought of, respectively, as “old” and “new” education.) For the purposes of this dissertation,  the  prescriptions  Dewey  offers  for  fixing  the  shortcomings  of traditional education are not the major concern. Rather, his conceptions of the nature of experience as pedagogical  acts as a  surrogate  for understanding  the development  of  not  only  the  fully  engaged  live  creature  but  also  the military 
genius  of  von  Clausewitz.  Dewey  argues  that  understanding  the  nature  of 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experience  allows  an  educator  to  develop  a  meaningful  educational  system based  on  the  experiences  of  the  student.  Similarly,  every  individual  who engages,  experientially,  in  the appropriate way with his/her environment will gain, to the maximum extent possible, the fruits of that experience. Meaningful experience  is  an  intensely  interactive  process.  The  pedagogic  quality  of  an experience is directly correlated with the way that experience is sustained.   Dewey,  while  contrasting  traditional  education  to  the  “new”  progressive education, claims that the “subject‐matter” of traditional education is to impart information and skills that have been determined to be of importance by others in  the  past.  Schools  have  developed  rules  of  behavior  and  have  striven  to inculcate  habits  that,  in  turn,  generate  actions  that  adhere  to  these  rules  of conduct.  School  organization  is  built  on  a  pattern  that  is  markedly  different from  other  social  institutions.  (LW13:  5)  Noting  these  concepts  is  of  some import because they mark the school as an institution based on ideas rooted in the  past, which  leads  to  a  system  that  does  not  foster  curiosity  and  behavior that  is  not  expansive  or  future  oriented.  To  put  this  into  modern  colloquial parlance, the student is not prepared to “think outside the box” or to use his/her educational  experiences  to  build  effectively  for  a  future  environment.  For  the purposes  of  this  dissertation,  the  exposition  of Dewey’s  experiential  demands for the newer, progressive education also will allow for a clearer understanding of  the  experiential  demands  that  von  Clausewitz  will  require  of  the  effective military commander. 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 Dewey  describes  the  need  for  the  appropriate,  or  meaningful,  kind  of experiences  as  being  embedded  in  an  “experiential  continuum.”  (LW13;  17) Within  this  continuum,  experiences  have  a  wide  range  of  pedagogical  values and this variability in the educative quality of the experience demands that one be  able  to  discriminate  based  on  the  internal  “value”  of  any  and  each experience. The principle of continuity of experience is what gives us a template with  which  to  discriminate  among  experiences  concerning  the  pedagogical “standing” of each. This principle, or the ability to discriminate, rests on the idea of habit. Per Dewey,  The  basic  characteristic  of  habit  is  that  every  experience enacted  and  undergone  modifies  the  one  who  acts  and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of subsequent experiences. The principle of habit so understood obviously goes deeper than the ordinary conception  of  a  habit  as  a  more  or  less  fixed  way  of  doing things,  although  it  includes  the  latter  as  one  of  its  special cases. It covers the formulation of attitudes that are emotional and  intellectual;  it  covers  our  basic  sensitivities  and ways  of meeting and responding  to all  the conditions which we meet in living. From this point of view, the principle of continuity of experience  means  that  every  experience  both  takes  up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after.” (LW13: 18‐19)  Viewed  in  this way, continuity assures  that each experience borrows  from the corpus of all previous experiences and sets a bedding  for each and every new experience. Simply put, the past opens the gates to the future and the nature of the habits developed in the individual determine the  likely gates to be opened as the future conditions of life present themselves. 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The  principle  of  continuity  does  not,  in  and  of  itself,  guarantee  the “goodness”  of  experience  in  determining  our  future  actions.  The  fact  of experiential continuity does not offer conclusivity that the pedagogical outcome of  experiences  will  be  positive.  Dewey  offers  the  example  of  a  burglar  who learns to become an expert at conducting his nefarious activities by undergoing continued experiences in the criminal arts. The educative process is continuous and occurs regardless of the moral nature of the experience itself. Nevertheless, not all experiences have the same qualitative value regarding the foundation for appreciating  (that  is,  gaining  the  maximum  from)  future  experiences. Experiences, to effectively form the bedding for the future, must be allowed to ferment and excite those tentacles that can grasp the possibilities embedded in any new or novel experiences.    As indicated in the above quote from Dewey, a process denotes what actions are  requisite  for  an  individual  to  gain  the  most  from  any  experience.  The process  requires  continual  engagement  from  the  experiencer  and  this engagement takes the form of constant interplay of the individual’s actions and the effects of the environment of that experience. Dewey tells us this interplay is the  reciprocal  relation  of  “acts”  and  “undergoing.”  While  the  terminology changes somewhat  in his  later writings,  this process can be viewed a constant cycle of  the  individual’s actions as  those actions affect  the environment of  the experience  and  the  “feedback”  of  the  environment  on  the  individual.  This feedback sets a new environment that requires new engagement, or acts, by the 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process with the classical interpretations of experience as simply the reception of sense data from the environment, Dewey offers, “Moreover, every experience influences  in  some  degree  the  objective  conditions  under  which  further experiences  are  had.”  (LW13:  20,  emphasis  added)  This  means  that  the environment  is  not  an  objective  reality  in  which  the  individual  operates  but, rather, the environment is determined and interpreted by the prior experiences of the individual.    For example, a child who learns to speak has a new facility and  new  desire.  But  he  has  also  widened  the  external conditions of subsequent learning. When he learns to read, he similarly opens up a new environment. If a person decides to become a teacher, lawyer, physician, or stockbroker, when he executes  his  intention  he  thereby  necessarily  determines  to some  extent  the  environment  in  which  he  will  act  in  the future.  He  has  rendered  himself  more  sensitive  and responsive  to  certain  conditions,  and  relatively  immune  to those things about him that would have been stimuli if he had made another choice. (LW13: 20)  Not only do major life choices—to become a professor or a military officer—and actions—learning to read or play an instrument—affect the environment but so too do the entire stock of previous experience undergone in one’s life. Previous experience need not be specific to the current experience at hand but may still be  critical  to  the  way  the  present  experience  is  undergone.  For  example,  we commonly hear that the value of sport is not necessarily that one become expert 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in his or her chosen sport. Rather, the claim is made that the value gleaned from participation in athletic endeavor is  in the development of  leadership abilities, ability to work as a group or team, and the enhancement of character. Whether or  not  this  is  actually  the  case  may  be  the  cause  for  some  debate  but, nonetheless, little doubt exists participation in an activity such as sport enables one to view the ever changing character of one’s surroundings differently than if one had spent his or her entire life in the confines of a library simply reading the rules  of  the  game.  Being  in  the  world  requires  active  participation  and  that participation does, indeed, shape the environment in which the individual acts. As Dewey describes, “But, while the principle of continuity applies in some way in every case, the quality of the present experience influences the way in which the principle applies.” (LW13: 20)   Returning  to  the problem of whether or not  an  experience  is  educative or mis‐educative,  the  principle  of  continuity  is  always  determinative  in  that  all experience  determines  the  nature  of  how  the  environment  interacts with  the individual in future experience. For example, war consists in the physical sense in  a  series  of  combat  actions.  Two  individuals who  experience  combat  in  the same military  campaigns  interact with  the  environment  in  distinctly  different manners.  Assuming no previous  combat  experience  for  these  two  individuals, the initial experience for each may very well be drastically disparate because of how he or she reacts with the dangerous and rapidly changing environment in which he or  she  is  thrust. One  individual  could  find  the  entire milieu  exciting 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and  filled with  opportunity while  the  other may  find  nothing  but  danger  and overriding  fear.  The  first  individual  may  find  the  experience  as  a  chance  for personal  growth  and  use  what  is  learned  as  a  perch  from  which  to  view  all future  combat.  The  second  individual  might  find  the  entire  environment  so limiting that permanent damage is done—for example, he or she might become victim  of  war  related  tensions  and  anxieties  as  post‐traumatic  stress syndrome—wherein the ability to use previous experiences to positively affect future experience  is  lost. This example  intends to show that any experience  in itself  is  not  determinative  of  the  educative  or  mis‐educative  value  of  that experience. Rather, the value of an experience is inherent in how the individual and the environment interact with one another or, to use Dewey’s descriptors, how  the action  and  the undergoing  participate and  change one another  in  the experience. Regardless of whether the change in the individual can be viewed as positive or negative, the principle of continuity remains operative in the sense that  new  experiences,  as  incorporated  into  the  individual’s  entire  set  of  life’s prior  experiences,  are  dispositive  of  how  future  experiences will  be  engaged. Dewey sums up this concept as follows: …There  is  no  paradox  in  the  fact  that  the  principle  of continuity of experience may operate so as  to  leave a person arrested on a low plane of development, in a way which limits later  capacity  for  growth.  …  On  the  other  hand,  if  an experience  arouses  curiosity,  strengthens  initiative,  and  sets up desires and purposes that are sufficiently intense to carry a person  over  dead  places  in  the  future,  continuity works  in  a different way. Every experience is a moving force. Its value can 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be judged only on the ground of what it moves toward and into. (LW13: 20‐21, emphasis added)    Dewey,  while  discussing  the  role  of  the  teacher  in  relation  to  the  pupil, develops the concept of maturity and how experience relates to the process of educating  the  young.    His  concept  is  important  because  within  this  relation there are important parallels with what will later be shown to be central to von Clausewitz’s  claim  regarding  the  role  of  experience  in  training  an  army.  The critical  idea  is  that  the  educator,  be  she  a  teacher  or  a  coach  or  the  general leading an army,  is  in a position of understanding the experience of the young under her tutelage in a way that the young actually undergoing the experience might not be able to appreciate. If this is the case, then Dewey believes that the duty of the educator must see in which way the experience is driving the pupil (or  the  athlete  or  the  young  officer).  This  mature  understanding  becomes critical  in  organizing  the  experiences  of  the  neophyte  in  order  to  allow  the maximum  gain  from  insights  gained  through  a  life  of  experiences  by  the educator, coach, or commander. Dewey maintains that any educator who fails to realize  this  duty  to  direct  the  experiences  of  those who  have  not  yet  had  the requisite experiences in life is an act of disloyalty in two ways. “The educator is false  to  the  understanding  that  he  should  have  obtained  from  his  own  past experience.  He  is  also  unfaithful  to  the  fact  that  all  human  experience  is 
ultimately  social:  that  it  involves  contact  and  communication.”  (LW13:  21, emphasis added) In other words, those who are responsible for others with less 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experience have a duty to guide their charges based on their understanding of their  own  experiences.  Of  significant  import  in  Dewey’s  demand  for  using experience  as  pedagogical  bedding  is  the  concept  of  the  social  nature  of experience.  Not  only  is  this  social  aspect  critical  for  understanding  Dewey’s concept of experience but also von Clausewitz too will claim that war itself is a social  act.  This  social  nature  of  experience  is  one  of  several  key  ideas  that inextricably tie the two philosophers together.   Dewey  explains  the  social  nature  of  experience  by  again  claiming  that experience is not simply a matter of sense data impinging on the individual that then  results  in  a  certain  internal  state  of  affairs  within  the  mind  of  the  one having the experience. This view of experience, perhaps one that John Locke or David  Hume  might  espouse,  lacks  the  interactive  nature  of  experience  that Dewey  demands  if  an  experience  is  to  have meaning  for  the  individual.  Since every genuine experience requires and intimate interaction between individual and the objective environment, that interaction must in some way change both the individual and the objective environment. Conceptually, Dewey is making a claim  somewhat  similar Heisenberg’s Uncertainty  Principle.  The  simple  act  of measurement  adds  uncertainty  to  that  measurement;  likewise,  the  fact  that experience demands interaction with an objective environment will change the conditions of  that  environment. Experience,  therefore, demands more  than an internal  state  of  mind;  experience  requires  both  objective  (external) environment and internal conditions in the experiencer. Dewey calls the linkage 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of the internal with the external a situation. “The statement that individuals live in  a world means,  in  the  concrete,  that  they  live  in  a  series  of  situations. And when  it  is  said  that  they  live  in  these situations … (i)t means, once more,  that interaction  is  going  on  between  an  individual  and  objects  and  other  persons. The conceptions of situation  and  interaction  are  inseparable  from each other.” (LW13: 25)   Situations, conceptually, are at the heart of the idea of experience as a social interaction.  If  genuine  and meaningful  experience puts  the  individual  into  the objective environment of the outside world,  then that environment  is not only occupied by others but is a product of all the experiences of the community, be that  community  local  or  world‐wide.  Dewey  explains  the  social  nature  of experience thus: An experience is always what it is because a transaction taking place  between  and  individual  and  what,  at  the  time, constitutes  his  environment,  whether  the  latter  consists  of persons with whom he  is  talking  about  some  topic  or  event, the subject  talked about being also a part of  the situation; of the  toys with which he  is playing;  the book he  is  reading  (in which his environing conditions at the time may be England or ancient Greece or an imaginary region); or the materials of an experiment  he  is  performing.  The  environment,  in  other words,  is  whatever  conditions  interact  with  personal  needs, desires,  purposes,  and  capacities  to  create  the  experience which is had. Even when a person builds a castle in the air he is  interacting  with  objects  which  he  constructs  in  his  fancy. (LW13: 25)  This  transactional nature of experience, or  the  interaction of  the  internal with the external, places each individual in the world in an active sense. Being in the 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world puts each individual, perforce,  in the objective environment not only by him or herself but in the objective environment of all other individuals engaged in  the  act  of  experiencing.  Since  that  environment  is  instrumental  in  the interaction  endemic  to  all meaningful  experience,  all  genuine  and meaningful experience takes place in a social environment. On a gross scale, this is clearly evident  to  the most  casual  observer.  Our  environment  is  incontrovertibly  the product of  the  experiences of  others within our  social milieu. Roads,  airports, symphonies, books, pets, the Internet, corn on the cob, chitchat with friends, the Super  Bowl,  are  all  social  constructs.  One  can  hardly  imagine  any  experience without a social interaction of some sort. A non‐social experience would require us  to  live as hermits  in  the wilderness but,  even  then, our social world would exist in light of our existence within nature, the flora and the fauna.   The social nature of experience allows the educator  to appropriately guide those entrusted to his or her care. This idea applies as well to von Clausewitz’s demands  for  training  an  army,  but  we  should  not  leave  the  discussion  of Dewey’s concept of the social nature of experience without some understanding of  how  he  understands  the  social  role  of  the  educator.  Since  continuity  and interaction  are  conceptually  intertwined  in  all  situations  within  experience, what  the  individual has gained  from any given experience  lays  the  foundation for  interpreting and undergoing  future experience. Hence, when an  individual faces any new situation, he or she comes with a predetermined foundation for engaging  the  new  experience.  Dewey  says,  “The  individual,  who  enters  as  a 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factor  into  it  (the new situation),  is what he  is at a given  time.”  (LW13: 26)  If this  is  the  case,  the  educator  must  accept  the  individual  as  he  or  she  is  and cannot  legitimately  expect  to  have  the  student  react  to  new  situations  in  any way  that  is  inconsistent  with  all  of  his  or  her  prior  experiences.  What  the educator can do is to regulate, as much as possible, the objective environment of the situation to foster new and desired experiences in the subject so the body of experiences of  the student now  incorporates  the present experience  in such a way as to build a fresh set of experiences which better enable the individual to cope with future situations which may arise. Per Dewey,   As  has  already  been  noted,  the  phrase  “objective conditions”  covers  a wide  range.  It  includes what  is  done by the  educator  and  the  way  in  which  it  is  done,  not  only  the words  spoken  but  also  the  tone  of  voice  in  which  they  are spoken.  It  includes equipment, books, apparatus,  toys, games played.  It  includes  the  materials  with  which  an  individual interacts, and, most import of all, the total social set‐up of the situations in which a person is engaged. (LW13: 26)  While  Dewey  is  addressing  his  remarks  to  the  construct  of  an  academic education for elementary and secondary school children, the extension to adult training is evident. Regardless of age or maturity of the learner, the social aspect of all  life’s experiences  is central. Since, as Dewey demonstrated,  the objective environment  is  “objective”  only  insofar  as  that  environment  has  been determined by social forces, then the pedagogic power of experience, at least to some  extent,  results  from  society  and  the  social  imprint  on  the  environment. The  educator,  because  of  his  or  her  ability  to  affect  the  social  impact  on  the 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environment, has a duty and responsibility for selecting the objective conditions that are most appropriate to allow the learner to benefit from all and any new situation. This allows  for  the effective operation of  the principle of  continuity. As Dewey describes this responsibility of  the educator to set  the conditions of the objective environment,    It  is  no  reflection  upon  the  nutritive  quality  of  beefsteak that  it  is  not  fed  to  infants.  It  is  not  an  invidious  reflection upon trigonometry that we do not teach it  in the first or fifth grade of school. It is not the subject per se that is educative or that is conducive to growth. There is no subject that is in and of  itself, or without regard to the stage of growth attained by the  learner,  such  that  inherent  educational  value  can  be attributed to it. Failure to take into account adaptation to the needs and capacities of individuals was the source of the idea that  certain  subjects  and  certain  methods  are  intrinsically cultural or intrinsically good for mental discipline. There is no such thing as educational value in the abstract. (LW13: 27)   Simply  put,  for  experiences  to  be  meaningful  and  have  pedagogic  value, situations must  be  undergone  in  an  environment  appropriate  for  the  desired education  to occur. More often  than not,  the educator, be he or  she a  teacher, coach or general, sets that environment.   Dewey is quick to point out that in his or her proper role the educator does not impose on the student from the outside. External control is not the goal of an educational process but, rather, the educator must use his or her experience to gauge the tendencies and habits of the learner so as to set an atmosphere that is  “conducive  to  growth.”  Dewey  claims  this  is  a  very  difficult  task  for  the educator because ultimately the conditions for learning should be based on the 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experiences  of  the  learner.  Hence,  if  the  teacher  or  coach  or  general  is  to properly  set  the  conditions  for  learning,  then  he  or  she  must  understand, experientially, what  is happening  in the minds of  the  learner. This can best be done  effectively  if  the  educator  has  actually  had  the  appropriate  meaningful experiences  personally.  As  will  be  shown,  failure  to  appreciate  the  need  for having a base of appropriate meaningful experiences, can lead to a reliance on theory rather than on an understanding the lessons of lived experience. For von Clausewitz, this failure of appreciation for experience can only lead to disaster in war.   Dewey notes that a common pedagogical fallacy is to assume that a person learns  only  that which he  is  studying  at  any  given  time. More  important  than any subject matter is the concept of “collateral learning.” This collateral learning is  not  about  subject  matter  but,  rather,  is  a  type  of  learning  in  which  new attitudes are developed. Most  important,  these new attitudes, be  they  likes or dislikes  regarding  the  subject,  lead  to  how  new  situations  are  experienced. These attitudes are what determine the pedagogic quality of future experiences and are endemic to how any given experience will fit within the continuum of all experiences. For Dewey, the most  important of these collateral attitudes is the inculcation  of  the  desire  to  go  on  learning  throughout  all  future  experiences, indeed,  throughout  life. The pedagogic quality of  experience  is determined by the way  in which  the  individual  interacts with  his  or  her  environment.  If  the desire to learn is strong, the interaction of the individual with the environment 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Or affair. The present affects  the  future anyway. The persons who  should  have  some  idea  of  the  connection  between  the two are those who have achieved maturity. Accordingly, upon them devolves the responsibility for instituting the conditions for the kind of present experience, which has a favorable effect upon the future. Education as growth or maturity should be an ever‐present process. (LW13: 30)   Dewey’s general pedagogic construct transcends the structured learning milieu, which not  only  existed  in his  time but  also  still  exists,  in  the main,  today. His radical  departure  from  the  traditional  modes  of  “teaching”  may  not  seem  as radical as many suppose when one realizes that, in a nascent sense, his theories were presaged almost a century earlier by an obscure Prussian staff officer.  
Experience and Nature   Dewey,  in  Experience  and  Nature,  introduces  another  important  aspect  of experience  that  is  not  specifically  directed  at  the  pedagogical  nature  of  an individual’s  interaction with  the  environment  but,  rather,  deals with  how  the interaction takes place in an ever changing, dynamic context. In an introduction to the second chapter, “Existence as Precarious and Stable,” John J. McDermott put the idea of the unknown and unexpected in experience in perspective.   In  this  second  chapter  of  Experience  an  Nature,  Dewey fleshes out his notion of ordinary experience by virtue of his 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concentration  on  the  ‘precarious.’  He  states  that  “man  finds himself  living  in an aleatory world; his  existence  involves,  to put  it  baldly,  a  gamble.  The  world  is  a  scene  of  risk;  it  is uncertain,  unstable,  uncannily  unstable.”  Dewey  then contends that with few exceptions, traditional philosophy has been  unable  or  unwilling  to  deal  adequately  with  the precarious,  the  ambiguous,  or  the  contingent  aspects  of experience,  preferring  to  dismiss  them  or  buy  them  off  by overarching  classificatory  systems.  But  however  clever  the dialectic  or  imposing  the  system,  philosophy  must  never forget that “incompleteness and precariousness is a trait that must be given footing of the same rank as the finished and the fixed.” (1981: 277)  The significance of the aleatory nature of the environment requires a thorough understanding  if  Dewey’s  concept  of  experience  is  to  be  fully  appreciated.  As cited  earlier,  the  unpredictable  and  apparent  randomness  of  nature will  be  a critical  component  of  von Clausewitz’s  demand  for  coping with  the  situations and experiences of war. Hence, if the nexus between the two philosophers is to become clear, Dewey’s claim that our existential status depends on a “gamble” with nature must be fully explored.   Dewey  states,  “A  feature  of  existence  which  is  emphasized  by  cultural phenomena is the precarious and the perilous. … The sacred and the accursed are potentialities of the same situation; and there is no category of things which has not  embodied  the  sacred and  the  accursed; persons, words,  places,  times, directions  in  space,  stones,  winds,  animals,  stars.”  (LW1:  42)  From  this encompassing sphere of the uncertain and the unstable come all of our beliefs, understandings, morals, and dispositions. Yet, as Dewey so aptly discerns, come the  “potentialities”  and  possibilities  for  experiences  to  make  our  existence 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either  better,  or  more  ill,  suited  for  partaking  of  the  offerings  of  future experiences.  “While  unknown  consequences  flowing  from  the  past  dog  the present, the future is even more unknown and perilous; the present by that fact is  ominous.  If  unknown  forces  that  decide  future destiny  can be placated,  the man  who  will  not  study  the  methods  of  securing  their  favor  is  incredibly flippant.” (LW1: 44) While Dewey’s statement is directed at the creation of gods by man, from the need to assuage the fear of living in a continually perilous and unexplainable  environment,  he  extends  this  thought  by  noting  that  the environment  in  which  all  people  live  is  shaped  by  their  predecessors  in  that culture  or  society.  If  an  individual  is  to  function  in  any  culturally  formed environment  then  that  individual  must  understand  the  social  nature  of  the environment.  Only  with  this  appropriate  understanding  can  the  vagaries  of present  experience  be mined  to  the  benefit  of  the  individual  who must  cope with yet further and, perhaps, new and novel experiences.    Philosophically,  Dewey  maintains,  the  importance  of  the  precarious,  the unexpected,  and  the unknown has been  relegated  to a metaphysically  inferior position in a misguided attempt at wisdom. The assertion is that, with some few exceptions—he  cites Heraclitus  and Henri  Bergson  and,  perhaps  should  have, acknowledged  William  James—philosophy  has  historically  been  rooted  in  a search for an absolute and unchanging reality. The fear and superstitions of the ancients  have  not  been  assuaged within modern  “civilization”  but,  rather,  the 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claim is that contemporary men and women merely “substituted sophistication for superstition.” Dewey explains,   But the sophistication is often as irrational and as much at the mercy of words as the superstition it replaces. Our magical safeguard  against  the  uncertain  character  of  the  world  is  to deny  the  existence  of  chance,  to  mumble  universal  and necessary law, the ubiquity of cause and effect, the uniformity of  nature,  universal  progress,  and  the  inherent  rationality  of the  universe.  These  magic  formulae  borrow  their  potency from conditions that are not magical. Through science we have secured  a  degree  of  power  of  prediction  and  of  control; through tools, machinery and an accompanying technique we have made the world more comfortable to our needs, a more secure  abode.  We  have  heaped  up  riches  and  means  of comfort  between  ourselves  and  the  risks  of  the  world.  We have professionalized amusement as an agency of escape and forgetfulness. But when all is said and done, the fundamentally 
hazardous  character  of  our  world  is  not  seriously  modified, 
much less eliminated. (LW1: 45, emphasis added)  That we believe the immutable and the stable not only compose the preferred condition for mankind but also, in fact, constitutes the actual condition in which we live may be regarded as one of man’s major misconceptions of the world. We are awash in “isms,” which attempt to negate, minimize or ignore the precarious nature  of  our  objective  environment.  These  “isms”  allow  us  to  pretend  the uncertainties of the world are not real or that we can ignore these uncertainties with some impunity. Dewey cites the problem of evil as a prime example of this concept.  Goods  are  taken  to  be  the  norm  and  evils  fall  outside  that  norm  as things  that do not  fit within  “the real order of  things.”  (LW1: 45) We  take  the goods  that we  receive as evidence of  rewards  for  something well deserved or earned.  The  evils  are  considered  to  be  accidents. While  acknowledgement  of 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evils with goods gives  rise  to philosophical musings,  the  fact  remains  that  the uncertain, unstable,  unforeseeable, precarious and ever mutable nature of  the environment is the required boundary in which all experience must take place. Dewey clearly saw this chaotic environment as a necessity for experience. Also, this  concept  is  crucial  for  von  Clausewitz  and  is  the  fulcrum  upon which  his concept of experience is also balanced.   The very fact of this unstable world is, Dewey claims, the fundamental basis of  philosophy. After  citing  a  litany of  apparently  contradictory philosophies— for example,  spiritualism/materialism,  absolutism/relativistic phenomenalism, transcendentalism/positivism,  rationalism/sensationalism,  idealism/realism, subjectivism/bald  objectivism—he  claims  the  basis  of  all  philosophies  are rooted  in  a  common  premise.  All  of  these  philosophies,  as  disparate  as  they might  seem  on  the  surface,  are  “recipes  for  denying  to  the  universe  the character of contingency which  it possesses so  integrally  that  its denial  leaves the reflecting mind without a clew, and puts subsequent philosophising at  the mercy of temperament, interest and local surroundings.” (LW1: 46) If this is so, then  humans,  it  would  seem,  are  bent  on making  the  stable  prevail  over  the unstable. This stability allows the world to become predictable and secure. Even those who—Dewey mentions Hegel  and Bergson—have a  “philosophy of  flux” end up by making flux a eulogistic predicate. However, viewed this way, Dewey claims change (or flux) “is not, as it is in experience, a call to effort, a challenge to  investigation,  a  potential  doom  of  disaster  and  death.”  (LW1:  49‐50)  The 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attempt to make the uncertain into something stable and assured is to commit, according  to  Dewey,  the  philosophic  fallacy.  “It  supplies  the  formula  of  the technique by which  thinkers have relegated  the uncertain and unfinished  into an  invidious  state  of  unreal  being, while  they  have  systematically  exalted  the assured and complete to the rank of true Being.” (LW1: 51)    Gregory F. Pappas explains the fallacy more fully,   Dewey  thought  that  the general  failure  to be empirical  in philosophy  amounted  to  a  failure  to  acknowledge  primary experience  as  the  non‐cognitive  context  of  philosophical inquiry.  Philosophers  often  denied  the  practical  experiential context  of  their  own  investigations  and  took  the  products  of their  inquiries  to  replace  experience  as  it  is  lived. Philosophers have not only failed to let their own inquiries be guided by and returned to context but they have also defended notions  of  thinking  as  devoid  of  all  context.  Hence,  Dewey concludes  that  “the  most  pervasive  fallacy  of  philosophic thinking goes back  to neglect of  context” This general  failure was  so  common  in  philosophy  that  he  calls  it  “the philosophical fallacy”    The  philosophical  fallacy  became  Dewey’s  main  tool  of criticism  in  different  areas  of  philosophy,  and  he  discovered many  different  ways  that  philosophers  made  the  same fundamental  mistake.  But  he  never  clearly  set  forth  in  a systematic way  the  various  formulations  and  versions  of  the fallacy. I will sort out four different versions of the fallacy and show  how  they  generate  the  truncated  view  of  experience inherited by non‐empirical ethics. (26)  Most certainly, von Clausewitz did not fall prey to the philosophical fallacy. For him, meaningfully undergone experience requires empirical exposure to events in war or intense, realistic training. A “truncated view of experience” could only be the inevitable result of understanding of war gained by theory or study. 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 Our existential nature requires knowledge of existence and, philosophically, this  requires  philosophers  to  have  a  “pretention”  to  knowledge.  “Hence  they transmute  the  imaginative perception of  the  stably  good  into  a definition  and description  of  true  reality  in  contrast  with  a  lower  and  specious  existence, which,  being  precarious  and  incomplete,  alone  involves  us  in  the  necessity  of choice  and  active  struggle.”  (LW1:  51)  This  is  the  connection  with  the requirement of meaningful experience, namely,  that all meaningful experience is  a  continuing  reciprocal  interaction  of  the  individual  with  the  objective environment. If this is true of experience, then no interaction can occur with an immutable, stable environment. Such an environment  is not capable of change and the requisite interplay between the experiencer and his or her environment becomes moot. The attempt to create a universal reality results from the need to remove the uncertain and unstable from actual existence. Dewey depicts this as an attempt to remove the “very traits which generate philosophic reflection and which give point and bearing to its conclusions.” (LW1: 51) Further,   In  briefest  formula,  “reality”  becomes  what  we  wish existence to be, after we have analyzed its defects and decided upon  what  would  remove  them,  “reality”  is  what  existence would  be  if  our  reasonably  justified  preferences  were  so completely established  in nature as  to exhaust and define  its entire  being  and  thereby  render  search  and  struggle unnecessary.  What  is  left  over,  (and  since  trouble,  struggle, conflict,  and  error  still  empirically  exist,  something  is  left over) being excluded by definition from full reality is assigned to  a  grade  or  order  of  being  which  is  asserted  to  be metaphysically inferior; an order variously called appearance, illusion,  mortal  mind,  or  the  merely  empirical,  against  what really  and  truly  is.  Then  the  problem  of  metaphysics  alters: 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instead  of  being  a  detection  and  description  of  the  generic traits  of  existence,  it  becomes  an  endeavor  to  adjust  or reconcile  to  each  other  two  separate  realms  of  being. Empirically we have what we started with: the mixture of the precarious  and  problematic  with  the  assured  and  complete. But a classificatory device, based on desire and elaborated in reflective imagination, has been introduced by which the two traits are torn apart, one of them being labeled reality and the other appearance. The genuinely moral problem of mitigating and  regulating  the  troublesome  factor by  active  employment of the stable factor drops out of sight. The dialectic problem of logical  reconciliation  of  two  notions  has  taken  place.  (LW1: 51‐52)  Attempts to reconcile the two separate realms of being insinuate a moral sense that  the  stable  and  immutable  occupies  a  superior  position  to  the  precarious and  mutable.  This  amounts  to  a  denial  of  the  value  of  the  uncertain  and problematic.  However,  both  existentially  and  experientially,  the  unstable  is what  gives  each  meaning.  The  denial  most  frequently  takes  the  form  of  a bifurcation into a supposed “true” realm of being—stable and immutable—and the  lower  and  less  “real”  realm  of  illusion  and  insignificance  occupied  by  the uncertain  and  problematic.  Dewey  says  this  construct  does  not  recognize  the actual  environment,  or  nature,  of  the  world.  That  nature  is  a  combination  of both stability and instability and “Its plaintive recognition of our experience as finite  and  temporal,  as  full  of  error,  conflict  and  contradiction,  is  an acknowledgment of  the precarious uncertainty of  the objects  and  connections that  constitute  nature  as  it  emerges  in  history.”  (LW1:  55)  He  continues  to explain that the human desire for order and harmony lead us to value the stable and  to  try  to  create  stability  from  the  discordant  character  of  nature.  We 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humans  appear  to  do  this  quite  well  but  in  so  doing  we  create  an  “absolute experience”  that  is accepted as  “perfect and good” and, ultimately, as  the only real  component  of  our  experience.  “The  experienced  occurrences,  which  give poignancy  and  pertinency  to  the  longing  for  a  better world,  the  experimental endeavors and plans which make possible actual betterments within the objects of  actual  experience,  are  thus  swept  out  of  real  Being  into  a  limbo  of appearances.” (LW1: 56)   To  gain  the  most  from  experience,  that  is  to  have  an  actual  meaningful experience,  both  the  stable  and  the  unstable  must  be  viewed  as  the  unity making the environment.  The  union  of  the  hazardous  and  the  stable,  of  the incomplete  and  the  recurrent,  is  the  condition  of  all experienced  satisfaction  as  truly  as  of  our  predicaments  and problems. While it is the source of ignorance, error and failure of  expectation,  it  is  the  source  of  delight  which  fulfillment brings. For if there were nothing in the way, if there were no deviations and resistances, fulfillment would be at once, and in so being would fulfill nothing, but merely be.  It would not be in  connection  with  desire  or  satisfaction.  Moreover  when  a fulfillment  comes  and  is  pronounced  good,  it  is  judged  good, distinguished  and  asserted,  simply  because  it  is  in  jeopardy, because  it  occurs  amid  indifferent  and  divergent  things. Because  of  this  mixture  of  the  regular  and  that  which  cuts across  stability,  a  good  object  once  experienced  acquires  an ideal  quality  and  attracts  demand  and  effort  to  itself.  A particular  ideal  may  be  an  illusion,  but  having  ideals  is  no illusion. It embodies features of existence. (LW1: 57)  The very fact the environment is unstable is what gives existential meaning to  all  experience.  Were  the  world  simply  stable,  mankind  would  not  be permitted  ideals.  The  world  would  simply  exist  as  an  unchanging 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environment and nature would simply exist without offering the chance for interaction.  Looking  back  to  the  discussion  of  experience  as  pedagogical, education would simply revert to learning whatever “facts” of nature are to be had. The growth of self through interaction with a changing environment would  be  precluded  and  the  opportunity  to  have  ideals  thwarted.  The jeopardy  required  to  pronounce  something  good  would  not  exist.  The demand and effort needed to make an experience approach the ideal needed for  self‐growth  could  not  occur.  Dewey  goes  farther  and  says  the  ideal nature of experience only occurs retrospectively as brought  forth  in  “prior conflict”  and  prospectively  as  they  contrast  with  the  forces  that  work  for their  destruction.  (LW1:  57‐58)  Here  we  see  a  new  explanation  for  the earlier declaration of experience as a continuum; the earlier experiences—taken  as  a  body—constitute  the  ability  and  the  effectiveness  with  which future experiences are undergone. This continuity could not exist in a solely stable  world.    While  noting  that  nature  as  precarious  is  the  font  of  all trouble,  the  shaky,  parlous,  and  unsettled  universe  is  also  the  sufficient condition  of  a  meaningful  experience.  Only  these  experiences  can  give individuals  any  real  existential  status.  If  the  universe  were  completely stable, we would simply be. Growth and ideals could not flourish.   A final point that must be considered in Dewey’s concept of experience in nature  is  the  place  and  role  of  thought  and  reflection  in  the  experiential scheme. Reflection, as will be demonstrated later,  is a critical aspect of von 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Clausewitz’s  philosophy  and,  consequently,  understanding  Dewey’s conception is required if the eventual nexus between the two philosophers is  to be appreciated. Continuing the dichotomy between the stable and the precarious,  Dewey  contrasts  the  grouping  of  “unity,  permanence,  (or  ‘the eternal’), completeness and rational thought” with “multiplicity, change and the  temporal,  the  partial,  defective,  sense  and  desire.”  (LW1:  60)  While noting this as a philosophically violent separation, he extracts the concept of thought and unity from the dichotomy. Reflection, he notes, arises from the uncertain  and  problematic—not  from  the  stable  and  secure.  The  aim  of reflection  is  to  gain  clarity  and  insight  from  the  miasma  of  chance, uncertainty,  and  chaos.  To  pull  order  from  disorder  one  must  not  see reflection as an aim or ideal but, rather, as something practically attainable through effort and mental application. Thought and reflection might garner unity from disorganization but the unity does not come without the “work” of  interaction  with  the  objective  environment.  Reflective  inquiry,  or  the rational, for Dewey, is the attempt to work for this unity out of the uncertain and problematic presented in each experience. In his introduction to Essays 
in  Experimental  Logic,  Dewey  encapsulates  this  view;  “Every  reflective knowledge, in other words, has a specific task which is set by a concrete and empirical  situation,  so  that  it  can  perform  that  task  only  by  detecting  and remaining  faithful  to  the  conditions  in  the  situation  in which  the difficulty arises, while  its      purpose  is  a  reorganization of  its  factors  in  order  to  get 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unity.”  (MW10; 327) Reflection  is what gives us what we understand  from experience.   When the goal of an organized totality is reached, relations between the disparate  elements  of  the  objective  environment  are  made  to  cohere  not only  among  themselves  but  also  with  the  relations  garnered  in  previous experience.  The  object  of  organizing  these  disparate  elements  is  to  set  a stage for the antecedent as a starting point  in  future experiences. Thought, or  the  attempt  at  organizing  the  disparate,  necessitates  a  reflective mode which  involves  “doubt,  inquiry  and  hypothesis,  because  it  sets  out  from  a subject‐matter  conditioned  by  sense,  a  fact  which  proves  that  thought, intellect, is not pure in man, but restricted by an animal organism that is but one part linked with other parts, of nature.” (LW1: 60)    At  base,  humans  strive  to  obtain  “meaning”  from  the  environment—extract an organized world from a world of turmoil and tumult. This attempt requires reflection, which in turn is only possible because of the uncertainty and  the  unpredictable  in  each  interaction  with  nature.  These  interactions comprise the totality of our experiences, which, in turn, is the starting point of  all  future  experience.  This  continuity,  discussed  in  detail  earlier, necessitates  the  problematic  and  unstable  if  an  individual  is  to  grow  and obtain  the good  from  an  experience.  The  issues  of  life  and  philosophy  are inextricably  linked  to  the  relations  we  can make  between  the  guaranteed 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and the unknown—the stable and the unstable. Dewey explains this relation and the application to the existential—the issue of living.   (L)ove of wisdom which  is philosophy,  is  concerned with choice  and  administration  of  their  proportioned  union. Structure  and  process,  substance  and  accident,  matter  and energy,  permanence  and  flux,  one  and many,  continuity  and discreteness,  tradition  and  innovation,  rational  will  and impelling  desires,  proof  and  discovery,  the  actual  and  the possible,  are  names  given  to  various  phases  of  their conjunction, and the issue of living depends upon the art with which these things are adjusted to each other. (LW1: 67)  
Art as Experience     The  aesthetic  is  a  function  of  experience  and  the  way  experience  is undergone. Modern man has removed  the aesthetic experience  from the act of living  and  instead made  the  aesthetic  a  quality  that  inheres  in  objects  of  art, music,  literature,  and  the  like.    This  notion  is  wrong‐headed,  according  to Dewey, and he attempts  to recover the aesthetic as an experiential continuum that is part and parcel of the very act of living. He begins this recovery with an explication  of  the  aesthetic  as  experienced  through  art.  This  recovery,  when complete, should make manifest the role of the aesthetic in the everyday and re‐establish what is meant by being alive in the world.   Art,  for Dewey,  is a natural phenomenon  that demand’s participation  from the  viewer  as  well  as  the  artist.  When  cut  off  from  the  human  endeavor  of undergoing and achieving, man relegates what is then still referred to as “art” to the  realm  of  theory—fit  only  for  the  critic.  To  understand  art,  one  needs  to understand ordinary experience. The aesthetic,  as Dewey says, must begin  “in 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the raw” (AE: 3) or in the world of the experiences of the everyday. Individuals are only carried forward, he says citing Coleridge, by “the journey itself.” (AE: 4) Early  man,  according  to  Dewey,  experienced  the  aesthetic  in  all  activities necessary to live. That is, all experience led to an appreciation of the factors of the  everyday,  which  could  ensure  survival.  Each  experience  undergone,  if properly understood, gave footing to the ability to understand new experiences as they arose in novel and challenging conditions. Being attuned to the signals and nuances of nature was requisite if one was to survive. Life, effectively, was lived in the aesthetic mode; life not only became art, life was art. For most, in the “modern” world,  this  is  no  longer  the  case  as  humanity  has  become  removed from  the demands of  survival  and mankind  lives  in  relative ease  in  “civilized” societies.  For  much  of  today’s  art,  most  individuals  are  removed  from  the participatory  function  of  appreciation  and  now  are  dependent  on  outside, extraneous conditions for supposed aesthetic experiences.    The  social  purpose  of  art  has  thus  lost  its  meaning  for  humankind  and modern  man  becomes  dependent  on  theory.  Theory  (re  art)  separates  the individual from “real” experience. The problem has become one of determining how  to  reclaim  the continuity necessary  to  truly have meaningful experiences and recapture the aesthetic in the very act of living.  Art has been removed from the environment of survival—the realm of living—to be put in a category apart from  life. Museums  are  built  and  art  can  only  be  viewed  from  afar  in  certain lighting  conditions and  from certain angles. Concert halls  are  constructed and 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the  “great  symphonies” are admired  in  solitude and with hushed silence. This amounts to erecting walls around the work at hand and militates against having a  full  and,  perhaps,  intense  experience  with  the  work.  Art  has  become inaccessible  and,  for  many,  art  is  replaced  by  what  is  accessible.  What  is substituted and often taken to be art are the sensational and the vulgar. While Dewey  cites  certain  comic  strips,  jazz  and  the  movies  as  examples  of  this lessening  of  art  in  its  various  forms,  perhaps  today  he would  offer  television reality  shows  and  the  tell‐all  newspaper  exploits  of  entertainment  celebrities. Dewey did acknowledge the aesthetic, and he even enjoyed and appreciated, in the  comics,  jazz  and  movies.  The  “lessening”  of  art  as  a  response  to  mass culture,  however,  attenuates  the  opportunities  for,  and  the  richness  of,  true aesthetic experience.   The point  is not necessarily  that museums and concert halls per se are  the cause of this diminution of art as an aesthetic endeavor but, rather, that art itself has  been  removed  from  the  ordinary  “objects  and  scenes”  of  everyday  living. Critics,  and  their  theories  of  art,  are  now  needed  to  tell  the  masses  what  is “good” and what is “bad.” “The times when select and distinguished objects are closely  connected  with  the  products  of  usual  vocations  are  the  times  when appreciation of  the  former  is most rife and most keen. When, because of  their remoteness, the objects acknowledged by the cultivated to be works of fine art seem anemic to the mass of people, esthetic hunger is  likely to seek the cheap and  the  vulgar.”  (AE:  4) When  theory  replaces  the  aesthetic,  a  gulf  is  created 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between art  and  the ordinary.  Separation makes  aesthetic  appreciation of  the ordinary  difficult.  “Confusion  of  values  enters  to  accentuate  the  separation. Adventitious matters, like the pleasure of collecting, of exhibiting, of ownership and display, simulate esthetic values. Criticism is affected.” (AE: 8)    Dewey’s purpose is not to argue what constitutes the  “good” or “bad” in art or  to  bemoan  the  separation  that  has  taken  place.  Rather,  he  wants  to make clear that isolating art from the everyday—putting the aesthetic in a position of remoteness—is  not  a manifestation  of  any  particular  subject matter  or  form. Instead,  he  wants  to  make  clear  that  the  aesthetic  is  lost  because  we  have become  disconnected  from  certain modes  and methods  of  experiencing. What Dewey requires for the aesthetic experience is that the experience be part of the very act of living. The remoteness he decries is due to the transient nature of the experience that  is had when the “art”  is removed from the environment of the everyday. Theory assumes  the aesthetic  is endemic  in  the nature of  the work; Michelangelo’s  David  or  Beethoven’s  Pastoral  Symphony  is  aesthetic  in  itself. Dewey  claims  this  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  the  case.  Only  the  interaction  of  the creator with the work or the interaction of the one experiencing the work with the  work  can  create  the  aesthetic.  Experience  with  the  object  creates  the aesthetic. “If artistic and esthetic quality is implicit in every normal experience,” Dewey asks, “how shall we explain how and why it so generally fails to become explicit? Why is it to multitudes art seems to be an importation from a foreign country and the esthetic to be a synonym for something artificial?” (AE: 11) The 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answer to this question will help in understanding why there are so few of what von Clausewitz will call the military genius.   “The nature of experience is determined by the essential conditions of life.” (AE: 12) Experience is not an event that happens in life but, rather, experiences properly understood are  inextricably bound  to  each  individual  because of  the individual’s  interaction with  life. Our  destiny  is  bound up  in  our  interchanges with  the  environment.  This  interchange  occurs  inter  alia  in  an  ever‐changing milieu  of  uncertainty,  probabilistic  shifts,  resistance  to  effort,  and  quality  of previous  germane  experiences. When  the  individual  can  discern  some  sort  of order from this quixotic environment, he or she is beginning to see the aesthetic in the experience. The experience does not occur in isolation but is dependent on all previous experiences as well as the environment. “The career and destiny of  a  living  being  are  bound  up  with  interchanges  with  its  environment,  not externally but in the most intimate way.” (AE: 12)    Life  is  a  series  of  phases  in  which  the  organism  tries  to  reach  some accommodation with the environment either through sustained effort or some “happy  chance.”  (AE:  12)  To  encapsulate  Dewey’s  concept,  if  the  life  of  the organism is to be enhanced, then the interaction with the environment must not return  the  being  to  its  original  state  but must  leave  it  in  a  new  and  enriched state.  This  is  only  possible  if  the  interaction  has  been  reached  by  struggling through the resistances thrown up by the environment. If the resistance of the environment  cannot  be  conquered,  the  individual  does  not  progress  and 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proceeds  on  the  slow  road  to  death—either  physical  or  psychological  and mental.  Temporary  alienation  with  the  environment  leads  to  growth  and permanent alienation leads to estrangement with the surroundings and, at least figuratively, death.  (AE: 12‐13)   Therefore,  the meaningful  experiential  event  is  but  part  of  a  rhythm  that leads, through consistent interaction with the environment to a consummation of the event. Consummation, or equilibrium, is not to be understood as finality. This  consummation  is  not  an  “end”  but,  rather,  a  foundation  for  new experiences and a new beginning. Consummated experiences become grist  for future experiences and new environments.  Here  in  germ  are  balance  and  harmony  attained  through rhythm.  Equilibrium  comes  about  not  mechanically  and inertly  but  out  of,  and  because  of,  tension.  …  There  is  in nature, even below the level of life, something more than mere flux  and  change.  Form  is  arrived  at whenever  a  stable,  even though moving, equilibrium is reached. Changes interlock and sustain  one  another.  Whenever  there  is  coherence  there  is endurance. Order is not imposed from without but is made out of the relations of harmonious interactions that energies bear to  one  another.  Because  it  is  active  (not  anything  static because  foreign  to  what  goes  on)  order  itself  develops.  It comes  to  include  within  its  balanced  movement  a  greater variety of changes. (AE: 13)  When this order, or consummation, is reached, after periods of tension, disorder and  disruption,  the  beginning  of  the  aesthetic  is  at  hand.  The  aesthetic  is  the intimate  connection of  the  subject with  the  environment.  In  the process,  both subject and environment undergo mutual change until the aesthetic experience reaches  consummation.  This  consummated  aesthetic  experience,  however,  is 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but a nascent stage for future experiences and is the bedrock upon which future understandings will build.   Only through this continuing, meaningful rhythm of the individual in and of the environment can one claim to be truly alive—or be a live creature as Dewey refers  to  the person who has complete  interactions with  the environment and takes part in the aesthetic. Only the live creature is capable of having the kind of experiences  necessary  for  fulfillment  and  learning.  Potency  is  in  the  struggle. The rhythm occurs through a continuous cycle of tension with the environment that  is  only  resolved  through  intense  connection  and  change  in  both  the individual and the surroundings. Dewey characterizes the rhythm as “… loss of integration  with  environment  and  recovery  of  union  …  its  conditions  are material out of which (man) forms purpose.” (AE: 14) Emotion results from the nascent  or  full‐blown  break  and  emotion  is  what  is  necessary  to  give  rise  to reflection. This discord and the concordant emotion that are induced transform this emotion into interest that, in turn, engenders new harmony.    Discord is not shunned but should be embraced if the individual is to grow. The  tension  and  resistance  offered  by  the  environment  are  critical  if  the experience is going to produce a new basis for further growth. Through tension and resistance new potentials are created. Dewey likens this to the intellectual pursuits of  the  scientist wherein  solutions  to  scientific problems  set  the  stage for  further  investigation.  The  difference  between  this  intellectual  pursuit  and the  aesthetic  is  a matter  of where  one  places  the  emphasis  in  the  interaction 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between the experiencer and the environment. Both the scientist and the artist think  when  acting  with  the  environment.  “The  (scientist)  has  his  esthetic moment when his ideas cease to be mere ideas and become corporate meanings of objects. The artist has his problems and thinks as he works.  But his thought is  more  immediately  embodied  in  the  object.  Because  of  the  comparative remoteness of his end, the scientific worker operates with symbols, words and mathematical signs. The artist does his thinking in the very qualitative media he works in, and the terms lie so close to the object that he is producing that they merge directly into it.” (AE: 15) This is not to say that scientific experiences are unaesthetic. However, the repetition of experiments and the testing of materials do  not  require  the  intimate  environmental  interaction  of  the  aesthetic.  New grounds  are  not  set,  necessarily,  for  future  experiences.  Conversely  the “paradigm  shifts”  posited  by  Thomas  Kuhn,  certainly  represent  the  aesthetic experience required by Dewey’s understanding.   For  the  live  creature,  past  experiences  are  foundational  to  constantly remaking  him/herself.  “To  be  fully  alive,  the  future  is  not  ominous  but  a promise;  it  surrounds  the  present  like  a  halo.”  (AE:  17)  The  future  becomes happily  anticipatory  because  of  the  possibilities  at  hand.  Dewey  posits  that  a stable world or a world of steady state flux offers no chance at the aesthetic. The aesthetic  is  only  possible  because  the  actual  world  is  “a  combination  of movement and culmination, of breaks and re‐unions, …”  (AE: 16) Life  is  at  its most  intense when  the  discord  of  the  environment  is  brought  into  a  state  of 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harmony,  or  consummation.  Dewey  claims  this  harmony,  to  be  meaningful, must  be made  on  an  objective  basis  for  if  the  harmony  is  had  any  other way then the “harmony” is  illusory. He goes as far to say that in extreme cases this can lead to insanity. (AE: 16) The recent rampage in Tucson bears witness to the potency  of  Dewey’s  demand  for  an  objective  basis  for  obtaining  harmony  in experience. A consummation, correctly experienced, then leads to the beginning of a new relation with the environment. This new relation is the platform for all new experiences. “Only when the past ceases to trouble and anticipations of the future  are  not  perturbing  is  a  being wholly  united with  his  environment  and therefore  fully  alive.  Art  celebrates  with  peculiar  intensity  the  moments  in which the past reinforces the present and in which the future is a quickening of what now is.” (AE: 17)   Time  and  space  are  critical  to  the  experience.  Essentially  both  time  and space comprise the organizing media of experience. Space is not just a void that is  “out  there”  and  filled  with  the  components  to  which  the  individual  reacts. Space is a complete and enclosed environ in which the multiplicity of doings and undergoing  that  comprise  an  experience  occur.  From  this  milieu  the  live creature emerges. Time is the organizing medium for change and growth. This change  and  growth  give  periods,  breaks  and  gaps  that  signify  the  changes  of disruption  and  harmony  inherent  in  the  experience.  Time  allows  the completeness  of  experience  to  become  the  beginnings  of  new  experience  and development.  “When a  flash of  lightning  illumines a dark  landscape,  there  is a 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momentary recognition of objects. But the recognition is not itself a mere point in time. It is the focal culmination of long, slow processes of maturation. It is the manifestation of the continuity of an ordered temporal experience in a sudden discrete instant of climax.” (AE: 24)    The aesthetic is extrinsic to the object at hand and is simply a function of the individual’s experiential history with  the object. One’s perception of an object, event or idea determines the aesthetic value of that object, event or idea. Proper perception requires an integrated experience of the individual with the object, event or idea. Perception transcends the simple act of recognition. Recognition is, often, an  isolated sense disconnected  from previous experience. Perception brings  the  past  into  the  present  and  adds  richness  to  the  current  experience. This  “expansion”  of  present  experience  translates  the  continuity  of  external time into an organizing principle of the experiential continuum. This organizing principle is the ability of man to consciously understand the relations of cause and effect  in nature or  the relation of means and consequences of our actions with the environment.   Dewey  states,  “Art  is  the  living  and  concrete  proof  that man  is  capable  of restoring  consciously,  and  thus  on  the  plane  of  meaning,  the  union  of  sense, need,  impulse and action characteristic of  the  live creature.”  (AE: 26) Further, he claims art is the culmination of human intellectual accomplishment and that science then is the “handmaiden” of the arts. This is crucial to understanding the role  of  meaningful  interactions  with  the  environment  when  one  truly  has  an 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experience  and  is  one  with  the  world.  This  relation  of  art  and  science  is fundamental also to von Clausewitz’s understanding of the nature of war. As the next  chapter  illustrates,  war—if  viewed  through  a  Deweyan  lens—is  an exemplar of the aesthetic or as the paradigm of art.    As  David  Hildebrand  has  noted,  seen  through  the  lens  of  history, philosophers  viewed  experience  narrowly  as  mere  sensation  or  as  internal perceptions  available  only  to  the  individual.  Viewed  this  way,  some philosophers,  such  as  Plato  and  Descartes,  tended  to  view  this  ever‐changing flux of sensation as something either untrustworthy or unsuitable for any kind of metaphysical  understanding. Other  philosophers,  such  as  Locke  and Hume, found  value  in  this  concept  of  experience  because  they  felt  this  offered  some chance  to  view  experience  as  something  empirical  and  objective.  Both  views, however,  led  to  puzzles  that  seemed  ultimately  unsolvable—for  example, whether  there  exists  an  external world,  other minds,  or  free will. Dewey  sees these  historical  views  of  experience  as  mistaken  and  entirely  untenable  for solving  the  practical  problems  of  living  or  taking  one’s  place  in  the  world. (Hildebrand,  35)  Consequently,  Dewey  understands  that  a  meaningful conception of  experience must put  the  individual  into his/her proper place  in the world—as an  integral part of  the environment and an active player  in  the interaction between mankind and nature. This view is foundational if we are to be  alive  in  the world. Only  such  a  live  creature  is  capable  of  experiencing  the 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aesthetic in the ordinary, normal course of living. Only the integrated individual can interact with the environment in such a way as to have an experience.   For  Dewey,  a  vast  difference  exists  between  experiencing  something  and having  an  experience.  “Oftentimes,  however,  the  experience  had  is  inchoate. Things are experienced but not  in such a way  that  they are composed  into an experience.” (AE: 36) The former simply requires sense data to be felt while the latter  demands  interaction  between  the  individual  and  the  environment  on  a continuing, rhythmic,  integral and dynamic basis. This cycle continues until no further change is manifest. Only at this point does one attain fulfillment. Often experience does not lead to the final end for which the experience was initiated. Reaching  fulfillment  or  consummation  can  only  be  reached  through  a continuing  process  of  interaction  of  the  individual  with  the  objective environment.  This  consummation  then  is  the  foundation  for  having  new experiences.    The  consummation does not denote  a  closing of  experience but, rather, a starting point from which to initiate a new experience.    An experience  is distinct  from simply having sensations or  inputs  from the environment.  The  vitality  of an  experience  is  expressed  in  our  vocabulary  by recalling  the specificity of  the event or giving  that experience a specific name. We describe that meal, or that storm, or that symphony as opposed to saying “I had a meal”  (or was  caught  in a  storm or went  to  the  symphony). One might experience  a  rainstorm  but  being  in  New  Orleans  when  Hurricane  Katrina arrives is an experience. Dewey amplifies, 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 In an experience,  flow is  from something to something. … The  enduring whole  is  diversified  by  successive  phases  that are  emphases  of  its  varied  colors.  …  Because  of  continuous merging,  there  are  no  holes, mechanical  junctions,  and  dead centers when we have an experience. There are pauses, places of  rest,  but  they  punctuate  and  define  the  quality  of movement.  They  sum  up  what  has  been  undergone  and prevent  its  dissipation  and  idle  evaporation.    Continued acceleration  is  breathless  and  prevents  parts  from  gaining distinction. (AE: 38)   In an experience the experiencer fully engaged in a continuing interaction with the  objective  environment.  Not  until  consummation—the  starting  point  for future experience—can one claim to have had an experience.   Dewey notes that this cycle, which is determinative of the aesthetic quality of  an experience, does not  simply apply  to  the  fine and practical  arts but also applies  to  thinking.  The  process  of  interaction  with  ideas  of  thought  (the intellectual environment) and drawing a meaningful and valid conclusion (the consummation) is a parallel process with aesthetic appreciation of the everyday arts—both  fine  and  practical.  Engagement  is  critical  for  an  experience.  The mundane, general disengagement, lack of curiosity, humdrum repetition and the like  are  all  enemies  of  the  aesthetic.  These  states  of  being  stunt  the  aesthetic growth of  the  individual and stop  the maturation process.  “(A)n  experience of thinking has its own esthetic quality. It differs from those experiences that are acknowledged to be esthetic, but only in materials. The material of the fine arts consist of qualities;  that of  experience having  intellectual  conclusion are  signs and  symbols  having  no  intrinsic  quality  of  their  own,  but  standing  for  things 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that may  in another experience be qualitatively experienced. The difference  is enormous and one reason why intellectual art will never be popular as music is popular.” (AE: 39)   Meaningful  experience,  necessary  for  growth  and  engagement  with  the environment, must be constant regardless of the pain or pleasure involved, but pain  or  pleasure  in  isolation  are  not  determinants  of  the  aesthetic.  These emotions  require  space  and  time within  an  experience  and  inevitably  lead  to maturation  of  the  individual.  An  experience  is  the  pattern  of  doing  and undergoing until  consummation  is  reached.  The pattern,  the process,  the  flow, not the emotion felt, determines the aesthetic. The doing and undergoing must be in balance for the aesthetic. The balanced relationship between the doing and undergoing, the individual and the environment, the arrival at a consummatory state  are  what  make  the  aesthetic.  This  continual  interplay  of  doing  and undergoing is a tension, which continues until seemingly all that can be gained from  the  rhythmic  “give  and  take”  has  been  gleaned.  However,  this  apparent stasis only lasts until the environment changes or the individual has integrated the experience into a vast set of previous experiences. The groundwork is then set  for  new  experiences.  True  stasis  is  conceptually  unavailable  in  the continuum of  experience. Once an  experience  is  concluded,  the bedding  is  set for future experience.   The artist and the viewer must always think in terms of the relationship of the environmental qualities to the individual. Passion (not to be confused with 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emotion)  can  destroy  this  relationship  and  render  the  balance  such  that  an experience  escapes  the  hands  of  the  individual.  Control  of  an  experience  is  a function of understanding and attaining the requisite balance of the doing and undergoing.   While  passion  can  destroy  the  chance  for  an  experience,  emotion  is  a requisite  for  that  experience.  While  earlier,  and  even  many  current, philosophers  prize  the  controlling  function  of  reason  as  the  overriding condition for understanding our experiences, Dewey claims that emotions offer every bit as much to the undergoing and doing inherent in an experience if that experience  is  to  offer  any  meaning  at  all.  Dewey  sees  emotion  as  a  fellow traveler with habit, which, as will be shown elsewhere, is also indispensible to the continuing nature of experience. Emotion is a reaction to, and in consonance with,  the  undergoing  and  doing  that  defines  the  continuity  of  an  experience. This  reaction  then  is  a  response  that  allows  the  individual  to  be  in  a synchronous mode with the condition present in the experience itself. Emotion is the result of the unknowns that present themselves in the experiential milieu. In Human Nature and Conduct Dewey explains, Habit  is  energy  organized  in  certain  channels.  When interfered  with,  it  swells  as  resentment  and  as  an  avenging force. To  say  that  all will be obeyed,  that  custom makes  law, that nomos  is  lord  of  all,  is  after  all  only  to  say  that  habit  is habit. Emotion is a perturbation from clash or failure of habit, and  reflection,  roughly  speaking,  is  the  painful  effort  of disturbed habits to readjust themselves. (MW14: 54) 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Hildebrand characterizes Dewey’s understanding of emotion in experience, “As with other  constituents  of mental  life, Dewey  is  reconstructing  emotion  along transactional  lines  and  opposing  the  longstanding  prejudice  against  the ‘subjectivity’ of emotions.” (Hildebrand: 27) Emotion, then, is not something to be avoided or “conquered” but, rather, emotion is not only integral to meaning in experience but is to be welcomed and understood as a major component that makes an experience essential to a fully developed life.   Experience is often attenuated or abandoned by perceived obstacles present in the objective environment. These causes of interference with the individual’s relation to the environment thwart the requisite cycle of doing and undergoing necessary for the aesthetic. Dewey says this interference may be excess on the side of doing or excess of receptivity, or the undergoing.  Zeal for doing, lust for action, leaves many a person, especially in this hurried and impatient human environment in which we live, with experience of an almost incredible paucity, all on the surface.  No  one  experience  has  a  chance  to  complete  itself because  something else  is  entered upon  so  speedily. What  is called experience becomes so dispersed and miscellaneous as hardly  to  deserve  the  name.  Resistance  is  treated  as  an obstruction  to  be  beaten  down,  not  as  an  invitation  to reflection.  An  individual  comes  to  seek,  unconsciously  even more than by deliberate choice, situations in which he can do the most things in the shortest time. (AE: 46)  Resistance, or perceived obstructions, is the basis for an experience not, as is often  surmised,  reasons  to  cut  short an experience. The  resistance  is what gives  the  aesthetic meaning.  By  ignoring  the  positive  lessons  of  resistance the experiencer may decide to cut short the experience. Thus will he or she 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miss  the  lessons  of  the  experience  and  end  up  stuck  in  the morass  of  the past. No new ground is broken and nothing is set  for future experience. As Dewey  characterizes  this mode  of  behavior,  he  “… does  not  perfect  a  new vision  in  his  process  of  doing,  he  acts mechanically  and  repeats  some  old model like a blueprint in his mind. … The real work of the artist is to build up an  experience  that  is  coherent  in  perception  while  moving  with  coherent change in its development.” (AE: 52) This concept is critical to Dewey’s view of  experience  and  also  to  von Clausewitz  and his  concept  of  experience  in war.   A  fuller  understanding  of  Dewey’s  “precarious  and  perilous”  nature  of experience  becomes  essential  if  we  are  to  eventually  gain  insight  into  von Clausewitz’s  conceptual  basis  of  experience  garnered  in  the  arena  of war  and combat. This understanding builds on these concepts with special emphasis on those, which pertain to von Clausewitz’s understanding of war and the military genius.  Von  Clausewitz’s  conception  of  war,  the  role  of  experience,  and  the military genius is the subject of the ensuing chapter.   A closing quote from Dewey regarding experience makes an apt analogy of experience with an army. He notes, Experiencing  like  breathing  is  a  rhythm  of  intakings  and outgivings. Their succession is punctuated and made a rhythm by  existence  of  intervals,  periods  in  which  one  phase  is ceasing and  the other  inchoate and preparing. … As with  the advance  of  an  army,  all  gains  from  what  has  already  been effected are periodically consolidated, and ways with a view to what is to be done next. If we move too rapidly, we get away 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THE PHILOSOPHICAL AMBIENCE OF VON CLAUSEWITZ’S “ON WAR” It  would  be  an  immense  service  to  teach  the  art  of  war entirely by historical examples, as Fenquières proposed to do; but  it  would  be  full  work  for  the  whole  life  of  a man,  if  we reflect that he who undertakes it must first qualify himself for the  task  by  a  long  personal  experience  in  actual  war.  (OW: 237)    Carl von Clausewitz, renowned as a military thinker, is remembered in many ways—as an historian, strategist, tactician, educator and military leader. He was also a philosopher, arguably the only true philosopher of war. As a philosopher, a profession von Clausewitz does not claim for himself, his ideas, couched in the context  of  politics  and  the military,  easily  transcend  a  single  activity  and  are germane  to  all  undertakings  that  can  lead  to  individual  attainment  and flourishing.  As  the  above  quote  indicates,  von  Clausewitz  places  supreme emphasis on  the concept of experience and  the  indispensability of experience, correctly  understood,  in  the  development  of  a  military  leader.  This  chapter explicates  and  expands  the  General’s  understanding  of,  and  demands  on, experience  and  the  centrality  of  experience  in  developing  the  person  of consummate  capability.  The  “ultimate”  military  leader  is  an  individual  who grasps  the  most  subtle  nuances  of,  and  successfully  prosecutes,  war  at  the highest levels. Von Clausewitz refers to that leader as the commander‐in‐chief, or a military genius. Once his  conception of experience  is  fully articulated,  the stage  is  set  to  undertake  a  comparison  with  John  Dewey’s  understanding  of 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experience. The goal  is to show that von Clausewitz had a complex, yet subtle, understanding  of  experience  that  presaged  that  of  Dewey  and  which  can  be understood  conceptually  as  a nascent  version of what  a  century  later became the bedrock of American pragmatism.    In an unpublished manuscript on the theory of war, written a decade and a half prior to the publication of his magnum opus, On War, von Clausewitz plainly states the necessity of experience in developing an understanding and intimacy with war. He says,   (Theory’s)  scientific  character  consists  in  an  attempt  to investigate  the  essence  of  the  phenomena  of  war  and  to indicate the links between these phenomena and the nature of their  component  parts.  No  logical  conclusion  has  been avoided;  but  whenever  the  thread  became  too  thin  I  have preferred  to  break  it  off  and  go  back  to  the  relevant phenomena of experience. Just as some plants bear fruit only if  they  don’t  shoot  up  too  high,  so  in  the  practical  arts  the leaves  and  flowers  of  theory  must  be  pruned  and  the  plant kept  close  to  its  proper  soil—experience.    …    Analysis  and observation,  theory  and  experience  must  never  disdain  or exclude each other; on the contrary, they support each other. The propositions of this book therefore, like short spans of an arch,  base  their  axioms  on  the  secure  foundation  either  of experience  or  the  nature  of  war  as  such,  and  are  thus adequately buttressed. (HP: 61)  Two  things  should  be  noted  regarding  this  passage.  First,  even  at  this  early stage of the General’s considerations of the nature of war qua war, experience played a central role in determining war’s essence. Second, although this quote might  infer  a  near  equal  footing  for  experience  and  theory,  a  correct  limning shows the beginnings of a decided preference for experience as the determining 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factor in gaining a true understanding of war. This view certainly becomes clear in On War.    The  connection between  theory  and experience  remains  a  crucial distinction for von Clausewitz.   This  chapter  illuminates  von  Clausewitz’s  conception  of  experience  as  the defining factor in the development of the consummately accomplished warrior. As an introduction to his concepts, a concise exposition of the nature of war—as understood by  the General—will  lay  the  foundation  for  further understanding how experience develops the military genius and how experience is bedding for the practical art of war. After discussing his definition of war,  the chapter will examine  the  consummate  military  professional,  or  military  genius,  as  von Clausewitz refers to him or her. Once the reader understands the development of the military genius, the role of experience in military training is explored. This exploration  links  experience  with  the  moral  qualities  of  both  the  army  and commander.  The  object  is  to  gain  insight  into how experience  is  foundational for  learning.  Finally,  the  chapter  examines  war  as  art  and  science.  Von Clausewitz’s  conception  of  both  art  and  science  laid  a  foundation  for understanding war that runs parallel with Dewey’s understanding of experience as the determinant of the aesthetic.   Prior to beginning the explication of the General’s concepts, we must note he did not consider On War to be a completed work. He died an untimely death at the early age of fifty‐one years. Von Clausewitz, in a note written a year prior to his death, stated quite clearly he only considered the first chapter of Book I to 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be  complete.  (HP:  70) On War—even  if  viewed  simply  as  a draft—is  a  robust work  that  clearly  informs  the  reader  of  the  grand  concepts  that  the  General thought necessary  for  the development of  the  consummate  leader and  for  the successful prosecution of a victorious war. Those concepts will rest squarely on the correct understanding of experience. 
What Is War? 
  For  von  Clausewitz,  war  is  a  duel. War  is  a  grand  duel made  up  of many smaller  duels  (the  individual  engagements  or  battles).  War  always  entails violence (the means) seeking to gain compulsory submission of the enemy (the end). Succinctly put, “War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” (HP:  75)  Physical  force,  or  violence,  is  the  means  of  conducting  war.  The ultimate  object,  or  the  end,  of  war  is  to  impose  our  will  on  the  enemy.  The enemy nation must be put in a position in which no power remains with which that  nation  can  lessen  the  victor’s  ability  to  impose  its  will.  The  military requirement  to  render  the  enemy  powerless  is  a  requisite  condition  for  the imposition of  the victorious  state’s will  on  the defeated enemy. Thus, military victory  becomes  a  necessary  condition—although,  perhaps,  not  a  sufficient condition—for the victors to be able to compel their will on the defeated nation. This understanding is the basis for the oft quoted view of von Clausewitz that, “war  is nothing but  the continuation of policy with other means.”  (HP: 69) As war is a proxy for a political goal, the utmost force necessary to gain submission is permissible to accomplish the objective and the fact “civilized” nations engage 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in  war  does  not  mitigate  the  requirement  of  destroying  the  enemy.  Von Clausewitz  cautions  that  trying  to  avoid  bloodshed,  out  of  a  spirit  of benevolence, leads to the worst errors in war. To try to hide the “real nature” of war is counter to one’s own interests and deflects the army from accomplishing the mission.  This  is  not  to  say  that  bloodshed  should be unwontedly pursued but, rather, the harshness and brutality of war must be accepted if the military and political objectives are to be attained. If civilized societies are less cruel and destructive than those “less civilized,” the differences are the results of societal world‐views and communal understandings by the nations involved. That said, von Clausewitz mandates, in order to attain victory, the army must always seek to use the maximum force necessary to render the enemy forces powerless. For the “civilized” nation, any attenuation of maximum force can only be warranted because experience has taught that such mitigation is effective in obtaining the desired objective.   The demand for maximal use of  force  leads to an  important concept  in the understanding  of  war.  If  to  achieve  victory  an  army  should  employ  the maximum force available, war would lead to an extreme in all cases. That is,  if each side must respond to the actions of the other and employ enough force to destroy  their  respective  opponent,  a  cycle  of  escalation  arises  in  which  all available forces must be used. This applies not only to strength in numbers, or available  manpower  and  materiel,  but  also  to  the  will  of  the  enemy.  Von Clausewitz  emphasizes  that  gauging  the  enemy’s  physical  strength  is  difficult 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but gauging their strength of will  is even more difficult. The strength of will  is every  bit  as  important  as  the  order  of  battle  on  each  side  and  must  be understood  in  order  to  properly  know  the  strength  of  one’s  adversary.  The strength  of  the  army,  physically,  is  on  a  par  with  the  political  and  military strength  of  will.  In  contemporary  times,  the  importance  of  strength  of  will, relative  to  the  physical  strength  of  the  military  forces,  is  best  exemplified  in America’s  recent  war  in  Vietnam  and  the  current  wars  fought  as  a  result  of terror.  In  these  cases  the  side  with  the  weakest  military  strength  effectively engaged powers superior in manpower and resources. This can be attributed to a  strong  (or  perhaps  stronger)  strength  of  will  on  the  part  of  the  physically weaker  side.  An  adequate  response  to  such  powerful  determination  demands responses that, in the absolute, must drive toward an extreme.   Similarly,  the  demand  to  disarm  the  enemy  so  that  enemy  is  forced  to comply with the will of the victor requires the enemy to be in a permanent state of  oppression  so  no  opportunity  to  defy  the  will  of  the  victor  exists.  The condition of defeat must be permanent and cannot be of a fleeting or temporary nature. Any condition remaining that allows the enemy to defy the victor’s will could result in a resumption or reinstatement of the conditions that led initially to  the  war.  Worse,  a  resumption  of  actual  hostilities  might  occur.  History  is replete with examples of such occurrences. Perhaps the most obvious example is the conditions of surrender after World War I, which allowed the Axis powers to  reconstitute  their  military  and  political  forces  that,  in  a  relatively  short 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period, led to the hostilities of World War II. Since the imposition of the state’s will on  their opponent  is  the goal of both  sides  in  the war, a  tendency  toward extremes is evident.    A final factor, “the utmost use of power,” also leads, in the abstract, each side to extremes. The “utmost use of power” means more than simply the strength of the  army  or  its  strength  of  will  cited  earlier.  The  General  acknowledges  that civilized nations do, and must, continually improve their methods and means of combat in order to exploit all available opportunities of destroying the enemy. This quest  for ever‐improving destructive power, often  through  technology,  is another  factor  that  leads  to  war  seeking  an  extreme.  Von  Clausewitz  cites gunpowder as an invention that pushed warfare to the extreme of the maximum use  of  power.  Today,  we  might  cite  nuclear  weapons  or  terror  tactics  as examples of “advances” that lead to such extremes.   Von Clausewitz describes such wars  in the abstract, or that war which will inevitably  lead  to  and  be  fought  in  the  extremes,  as  an  absolute  or  unlimited war. Wars, he  claims,  fought  at  the extremes are only possible  in  the abstract sense.  iiHe further notes that such a war could only be  fought  if an army were engaged  against  an  opponent  that  responded  as  predicted.  An  opponent who responded as theory might predict or as expected during the planning phases of the  war  would  make  war  predictable.  War  in  the  abstract  is,  however, impossible. The General notes, war is fought in the real world and, as such, war is  fought against  living,  reactive  forces  that do not behave  in accordance with 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theory.  Real  war  constitutes  engagements  between  armies  (combatants)  that react to each other as living organisms. Reactions are completely unpredictable as  each  side  acts  and  reacts  relative  to  the  opponent’s  actions.  This unpredictable nature of  all wars  limits  the ability of  each  side  to  carry on  the war  in  the manner  that  pure  theory might  dictate.  Abstract war  of  inevitable extremes, therefore, becomes impossible.     Absolute, or unlimited, war could be possible von Clausewitz notes, “(a) … if war  were  an  isolated  act,  occurring  suddenly  and  not  produced  by  previous events in the political world; (b) it consisted of a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones; (c) the decision achieved was complete and perfect in itself, uninfluenced by any previous estimate of  the political situation  it would bring about.” (HP: 78) The General immediately proceeds to discuss why none of the conditions that might, in the abstract, allow for an absolute war could obtain in practice.    For  the purposes of  this dissertation,  several  factors, which militate against absolute (abstract) war, are germane to what will eventually be shown to  be  central  to  the  experiential  requirements  of  the military  genius.  As  von Clausewitz  explains,  war  can  never  be  an  isolated  act  because  neither  side’s opponent  is  an  abstract  entity.  Not  only  is  assessing  the  power  of  physical resistance problematic, but even  the strength of  the enemy’s will  is  subject  to external  conditions  and  cannot  be  understood  in  the  abstract.  Each  side  can only  react  to  what  the  other  side  does  and  no  plan  can  be  carried  out  in  an absolute sense. Likewise, no war can be fought in a “single blow” or in a set of 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parallel  blows.  Resources,  environment,  physical  terrain,  the  reaction  of  each side’s allies and other factors are such that all forces cannot be brought to bear at once to maximize the power of  the army. These “resistances” all reduce the ability of the forces to act at once and impede the effectiveness of any single act. Last,  and  perhaps  most  significant,  absolute  war  is  impossible  because  no victory  can  be  considered  final.  Defeat  may  be  a  temporary  state  that,  once conditions  become  favorable  for  the  vanquished  party,  eventually  turns  into renewed  conflict.  The  lesson  is  that  absolute  war  can  only  be  fought  in  the abstract; war in concreto is fought in the real world of uncertainty, chance, luck, and probabilities.    Von Clausewitz asserts other causes remove real war from the realm of the abstract.   There  is still another  factor  that can bring military action to a standstill: imperfect knowledge of the situation. The only situation  a  commander  can  know  fully  is  his  own;  his opponent’s he can only know from unreliable intelligence. His evaluation,  therefore,  may  be mistaken  and  can  lead  him  to suppose that the initiative lies with the enemy when in fact it remains with him. … The possibility of  inaction has a  further moderating effect on  the progress of war by diluting  it,  so  to speak,  in  time  by  delaying  danger,  and  by  increasing  the means  of  restoring  a  balance  between  the  two  sides.  The greater the tensions that have led to war, and the greater the consequent war  effort,  the  shorter  these  periods  of  inaction. Inversely,  the  weaker  the motive  for  conflict,  the  longer  the intervals  between  actions.  For  the  stronger motive  increases willpower,  and  willpower,  as  we  know,  is  always  both  an element in and the product of strength. (HP: 84‐85) 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The  will  predominates  as  the  main  motivating  factor  in  determining  victory. Inaction and interruptions of activity further remove war from the “realm of the absolute”  and  makes  success  in  war  dependent  on  a  “matter  of  assessing probabilities.”  (HP:  85)  As  war  veers  from  the  absolute  (theoretical)  to  the “real,”  the  commander  must  react  based  on  his  or  her  assessment  of probabilities.  The  military  leader  is  now  dependent  on  the  ability  to  infer correct  actions  based  on  understanding  the  “truths”  in  the  situation.    If assessments of probability alone were needed to determine the best actions in war  then  war,  even  though  removed  from  the  absolute,  would  still  be  an objective  endeavor.  That  is,  the  commander  best  able  to  assess  the  objective probabilities in any situation would have the distinct advantage. This objective nature  of war  is,  however,  attenuated  by  chance.  Von  Clausewitz  emphasizes that chance makes war a gamble. He characterized chance as “the very last thing that war lacks;” that is, war is rife with the unknown. Further, “No other human activity  is  so  continuously  or  universally  bound  up with  chance.  And  through the element of  chance,  guesswork and  luck  come  to play a great part  in war.” (HP:  85)  All  of  these  elements  are  inherent  in  experience  and  are  central  to preparing the commander for future actions.   Once  the  concept  of  chance  is  embedded  into  war  in  the  real  world,  von Clausewitz claims that war is now a subjective endeavor and, once the required means for fighting are understood, will appear to be nothing but a gamble. War is  fought  in a  continual milieu of danger  and danger  can only be mitigated by 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moral qualities of the individual. The highest of these moral qualities is courage. The  General  makes  clear  that  courage  is  not  inconsistent  with  correct assessment  of  probabilities  and  the  attendant  requirement  for  prudent calculation. Nonetheless, courage and its variants—boldness, rashness, reliance on good  fortune—search out  the  fortuitous,  the accidental and chance. This  is the environment  in which courage  is paramount.  In the  later discussion of  the 
military  genius  the  character  of  courage  necessary  for  the  commander  of  an army is further “ thickened.” The subjective nature of war is always at the fore and is the environment  in which the commander must act.  “We see,  therefore, how,  from  the  commencement,  the  absolute,  the mathematical  as  it  is  called, nowhere finds any sure basis in the calculations in the Art of War; and that from the outset there is a play of possibilities, probabilities, good and bad luck, which spreads about with all the coarse and fine threads of its web, and makes War of all branches of human activity the most like a gambling game.”  (OW: 117)   While  our  intellect  tells  us  to  look  for  clearness  and  certainty,  von Clausewitz says our human nature is attracted by uncertainty.  (Our nature) prefers to day‐dream in the realm of chance and  luck  rather  than  accompany  the  intellect  on  its  narrow and  tortuous  path  of  philosophical  enquiry  and  logical deduction only to arrive—hardly knowing how—in unfamiliar surroundings  where  all  the  usual  landmarks  seem  to  have disappeared. Unconfined by narrow necessity,  it  can revel  in a 
wealth of possibilities; which  inspire courage to  take wing and 
dive  into  the  element  of  daring  and  danger  like  a  fearless 





living and with moral forces. Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute,  or  certainty;  it  must  always  leave  a  margin  for uncertainty,  in  the  greatest  things  as  in  the  smallest.  With uncertainty in one scale, courage and self‐confidence must be thrown into the other to correct the balance. (HP: 86) (Italics mine)  Uncertainty  is  the  inherent  domain  of  war.    The  cauldron  of  battle  begins  to afford  the  soldier  the  necessary  experiences  to  mold  him  or  her  for  future command  and  leadership  experiences.  Yet  to  be  shown  is  how  these experiences  set  the  stage  for  the  development  of  the military  genius.  In  the passage  above,  von  Clausewitz  makes  two  important  observations  linking uncertainty  with  the  potential  offered  through  meaningful  experience.  First, uncertainty is the means of realizing “a wealth of possibilities.” Only through an environment rich in opportunities and possibilities can we weave the tapestry needed  to make  the  genius—the  person with  a  capability  for  excellence.  The other  noteworthy  concept  in  the  cited  observation  is  that war  is  fought with “living and moral forces.”  For von Clausewitz, armies are living organisms that react  and  respond,  as  would  any  living  entity;  rarely  are  these  responses predictable  or  set within  a  knowable  environment.  The  commander  can  only respond appropriately if he or she has developed the right “moral” virtues, such as  courage,  self‐reliance,  daring,  the  “inner  eye,”  and  the  like.  The  reactions, based on the moral virtues of the army and the commander, constitute what von Clausewitz  refers  to  as  “moral  forces.”  The  concept  that  the  richness  of 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possibility  and  the  development  of  moral  forces  can  only  germinate  in appropriately gained experience is next broadened and, later, detailed.   Von Clausewitz’s notion of war requires the commander‐in‐chief, the leader of  the  military  forces,  to  be  much  more  than  a  battlefield  general.  War transcends  individual  battles  and  actions  of  soldiers. War  is  the most  serious business in which peoples engage. He contends,    But war is no pastime; no mere passion for venturing and winning; no work of a  free enthusiasm:  it  is a  serious means for a serious object. All  that appearance which  it wears  from the varying hues of fortune, all that it assimilates into itself of the  oscillations  of  passion,  of  courage,  of  imagination,  of enthusiasm, are only particular properties of this means.    The  War  of  a  community—of  whole  Nations,  and particularly of civilized Nations—always starts from a political condition,  and  is  called  forth  by  a  political  motive.  It  is, therefore, a political act. (OW: 118)  The  political  nature  of war  is  important  for  the  complete  development  of  the commander. Not only must he or she know the requisite conditions  for which the war  is  being  fought  but must  ensure  the war  is  fought  for  those  political ends. Conversely, the means available for war must also shape the political ends for which the war is pursued. The fact that the political aim is paramount does not  suggest  those  aims  are  all  controlling.  The  political  aim  must  adapt  and change to suit the capabilities of not only the army but also the commanders in charge. Nevertheless, policy is the ruling factor but must accommodate military necessity  and  capability.  “We  see,  therefore,  that war  is  not merely  an  act  of policy  but  a  true  political  instrument,  a  continuation  of  political  intercourse, 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The Genius for War   Von Clausewitz conceives of the person capable of successfully commanding, directing and leading the war effort as a military genius. His introduction to the concept of “genius” is thus stated: “Any complex activity, if it is to be carried out with  any  degree  of  virtuosity,  calls  for  appropriate  gifts  of  intellect  and temperament.  If  they  are  outstanding  and  reveal  themselves  in  exceptional achievements, their possessor will be called a ‘genius’.” (HP: 100) The General is quite aware the term, genius, is often used in many ways that differ in scope and signification.  He  claims  most  uses  of  the  word  do  not  allow  for  a  true understanding of  the  essence of  genius  so he  simply  says  that he will  use  the term to mean “a very high mental capacity for certain employments.” (OW: 138) This  understanding may  appear  overly  broad  for  philosophical  dissection  but the  General  proceeds  to  develop  a  finely  tuned  explanation  of  how  a military 
genius comes to be. iii   Von Clausewitz’s use of “high mental capacity” as a signification of genius is, perhaps, misleading. Immediately after giving the reader a broad definition for genius,  he  indicates  that  this  definition  is  not  sufficient  for  defining  military genius. Trying to discuss genius in terms of “degree of talent” are not sufficient because  the entire concept cannot be measured or considered objectively. We must,  therefore,  “survey  all  those  gifts  of  mind  and  temperament  that  in 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combination  bear  on  military  activity.  These,  taken  together,  constitute  the 
essence of military genius.”  (HP: 100) The combination of  the gifts of mind and temperament  are  critical  to  the  definition  of  genius  because  no  single component—say,  intellect  or  moral  virtue  such  as  courage—sufficiently characterizes  genius.  This may  seem  counterintuitive  to  some  as we  often,  in common usage,  ascribe  genius  to  superior  intellect  or  artistic  ability.  For  von Clausewitz  this  is  insufficient.  For  true  genius,  “a  harmonious  combination  of 
elements, in which one or the other ability may predominate, but none may be in conflict  with  the  rest”  is  the  requisite  standard.  (HP”  100)  The  harmonious elements that make military genius must be understood if we are to appreciate how this genius is formed.    War,  von  Clausewitz  affirms,  is  always  conducted  in  an  environment  of danger,  physical  exertion  and  suffering,  uncertainty,  and  chance.    Danger  is endemic  in  all  war.  Consequently,  the  first  quality  of  a  warrior  is  to  exhibit courage. Courage consists of two categories, physical courage in the presence of danger to the person and moral courage or the ability to accept responsibility. (OW: 139) The first category, courage in the presence of danger is sub‐divided again into two types, indifference to danger or behavior resulting from positive motives  such as pride,  patriotism and other  enthusiasms. The General  asserts the  first  type  is  more  dependable  and  comes  from  development  of  personal habit  or  disposition.  The  second  type  results  in  more  firmness  and  is  often characterized  by  bold  behavior.  The  second  category,  courage  to  accept 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responsibility, is critical for the development of genius because that courage is what distinguishes the genius from the common soldier and warrior. This idea is developed later in this section.    War is also conducted in an environment of physical exertion and suffering. To function well during physical stress, amid suffering and pain, the leader must become  capable  of  decisive  action  under  extreme  physical,  psychological  and emotional  conditions.  Hence,  “These  will  destroy  us  unless  we  can  make ourselves indifferent to them, and for this birth or training must provide us with a certain strength of body and soul. If we do possess those qualities, then even if we have nothing but common sense to guide them we shall be well equipped for war …”  (HP: 101) Von Clausewitz claims,  that  to understand all demands  that war  imposes  on  the  individual, we must  examine  the  leader’s  “powers  of  the intellect.”  To  be  clear,  he  does  not  mean  some  metric—such  as  intelligence quotient  or  academic  accomplishment—will  enable  a  determination  of  one’s ability  to  handle  the  vagaries  of  war  but,  rather,  this  ability  is  only  gained internally  either  through  natural  gifts  of  birth  or  by  development  gained through experience.    Yet, a third aspect of the environment of war is uncertainty. Von Clausewitz asserts that three‐fourths of all considerations that determine actions in war are hidden  in  “a  fog  of  greater  or  lesser  uncertainty.”  (HP:  101)  Although  von Clausewitz never used the term “fog of war,” he most certainly put great weight on  that  concept  and  made  the  miasma  of  uncertainty  foundational  for  his 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philosophy of war and experience. To deal with constant uncertainty  requires not  a  great  intellect  but  a  “skilled  intelligence  and  discriminating  judgment,” which is developed in combat. This allows the individual to ferret out the “truth” of the situation. Intelligence per se is not to be denigrated in the military genius but  is  not  the  determinant  of  how  the  leader  deals  with  uncertainty.  Von Clausewitz says that average intelligence may fumble along and often arrive at some  truth  but,  in  the  end,  average  intelligence  results  in  “indifferent achievement.” On  the other hand, he also  tells us  that  the super‐bright, or  the academic, may also be doomed to failure because he or she becomes crippled by doubt  by  trying  to  determine  all  the  facts  necessary  for  a  quick  and  accurate decision. This will not do in the context of uncertainty.   Finally,  war  is  conducted  in  a  domain  of  chance.  “War  is  the  province  of chance.  In  no  sphere  of  human  activity  is  such  a  margin  to  be  left  for  this intruder, because none is so much in constant contact with him on all sides. He increases  the  uncertainty  of  every  circumstance,  and  deranges  the  course  of events.” (OW: 140) The commander must make timely decisions amid a swirl of uncertainty based on his or her best understanding of the appropriate factors.  Chance  makes  this  uncertainty  even  more  problematic  as  new,  but  perhaps unexpected, information comes to light. When must new plans be drawn? Does the commander have sufficient  reason  to continue with  the current plan? Von Clausewitz claims  that chance makes new  information even more problematic because  new  information  makes  the  commander  more,  not  less,  uncertain. 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Scarcely a few, if any, are capable of functioning effectively in the environment of  chance. Only  the military  genius  is  so  capable. Von Clausewitz offers,  in his analysis of the role of chance in war, an emergent description of that genius.    If  the  mind  is  to  emerge  unscathed  from  this  relentless struggle with the unforeseen,  two qualities are  indispensible: 
first,  an  intellect  that,  even  in  the  darkest  hour,  retains  some 
glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, 
the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead. The first  of  these  qualities  is  described  by  the  French  term  coup 
d’oeil; the second is determination. (HP: 102)  This description sets the stage for an exegesis of von Clausewitz’s demands on experience. Both coup d’oeil and determination are the hallmarks of the 
military genius. Both qualities result solely from appropriate and meaningful experience.   Conceptually,  coup  d’oeil  is  a  central  organizing  concept  around which the military genius can best be characterized. Today’s military might use the term  “situational  awareness”  to  describe  a  person’s  ability  to  understand what  is  happening  in  the  environment  surrounding  the  actions  of  combat. 
Coup d’oeil most  certainly  includes  that understanding of awareness but  is much more encompassing. Von Clausewitz says,  in combat,  time and space are critical and often demand “rapid and accurate decisions.” The warrior’s evaluation  of  time  and  space  refers  to  a  physical  estimation  of  the environment  or,  more  specifically,  a  visual  estimate  of  what  is  happening around  him  or  her.  This  defines  situational  awareness.  This  view  is constraining  because  the  attendant  decisions  that  depend  on  a  correct 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estimation of  the combat environment  (the  “fog of war”) are not a part of, nor are  they  included  in,  the concept of  immediate awareness. The French (read “Napoleon”) view is more inclusive. Coup d’oeil transcends the merely physical  assessment  of  the  combat  situation  and  ascends  to  the  resultant decisions  where,  at  the  highest  levels,  the  entire  war  is  apprehended  in context. Hence,  the  concept  encompasses not only  the  tactical but  also  the strategic. Coup  d’oeil,  therefore,  is  often  broadly  translated  as  “the  inward eye” (HP: 102) or “the correct judgment by eye.” (OW: 141) Von Clausewitz sums up the concept concisely as follows: “Stripped of metaphor and of the restrictions  imposed  on  it  by  the  phrase,  the  concept merely  refers  to  the quick  recognition of a  truth  that  the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.” (HP: 102)    Determination,  or  resolution,  demonstrated  in  any  given  instance  is  a sign of courage, but if shown as a consistent characteristic of the individual, that  determination becomes  a  habit  of  the mind. This  habit,  or  courage,  is not  synonymous  with  physical  courage  but,  rather,  shows  the  courage  to accept responsibility in the face of moral danger. “This has often been called 
courage d’esprit,  because  it  is  created by  the  intellect. That,  however, does not make it an act of the intellect: it is an act of temperament.” (HP: 102) Von Clausewitz  tells us  that  courage  is not an  intellectual  act because even  the most  intelligent  individuals  are  often  irresolute.  He  believes  man  is governed  by  internal  feelings  and  thought  alone  is  insufficient  for 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courageous actions. The courage demanded by the commander or genius is not the courage of his or her actions as applied to one’s self but, rather, the courage to accept responsibility for others—in the case of the commander‐in‐chief, the courage to accept responsibility for the entire war as well as the armed forces. Consequently, determination dispels doubt by a specific turn of mind. This  courage of  responsibility demands certain moral virtues and qualities that are only possible through extensive experience.    Determination  results  through  a  boldness  that  “directs”  the  will.  This will, or “cast of mind” is one that shuns hesitation, equivocation and doubt. This ability of men and women of determination to suppress fear of action and to press boldly forward is “engendered only by a mental act.” (HP: 103) By  this,  von  Clausewitz  intends  to  show  that  determination  requires reflection and only by introspection and reflection can doubt and fear to act be  overcome.  Reacting  by  reflex  does  not  constitute  determination  but rather unguided activity. Without reflection one can have no doubts, but the strong and determined individual uses the fear of not acting to reflect on and conquer  his  or  her  doubts.  The military  genius  epitomizes  the  determined leader.   Men  of  low  intelligence,  therefore,  cannot  possess determination  in  the  sense  in which we  use  the word.  They may act without hesitation  in a crisis, but  if  they do,  they act 
without  reflection,  and  a  man  who  acts  without  reflection cannot, of course, be torn by doubt. From time to time action of  this  type  may  even  be  appropriate;  but,  as  I  have  said 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before,  it  is  the average  result  that  indicates  the  existence of 
military genius. … 
  In  short,  we  believe  that  determination  proceeds  from  a special type of mind, from a strong rather than a brilliant one. We can give further proof of this interpretation by pointing to the many examples of men who show great determination as junior officers, but lose it as they rise in rank. Conscious of the need to be decisive, they also recognize the risks entailed by a 
wrong  decision;  since  they  are  unfamiliar with  the  problems now facing them, their mind loses its former incisiveness. The more  used  they  had  been  to  instant  action,  the  more  their timidity increases as they realize the dangers of the vacillation that ensnare them. (HP: 103)  Reflection is that quality that gives strength, psychologically,  to the  leader and takes  place  in  a  context  of  constant  resistance.  As  Dewey  describes,  “But experience, taken free of the restrictions imposed by the older concept, is full of inference.  There  is,  apparently,  no  conscious  experience  without  inference; reflection is native and constant.” (MW10: 6) Resistance persists and influences the  commander’s  sense  of  responsibility.  This  resistance  creates  anxiety  and tests  his  or  her  strength  of  will.  This  test  the  commander  alone  must  bear. Likewise, enemy actions directly affect the fighting forces, the men and women in  combat,  but  the  effects  of  this  action works  on  the  commander  as  a  direct result transmitted through the forces.   Von  Clausewitz  concisely  describes  this  burden  of  command  that  is  the inherent environment of the leader, the military genius. He states, It  is  the  impact  of  the  ebbing  of  moral  and  physical strength,  of  the  heart‐rending  spectacle  of  the  dead  and wounded,  that  the  commander  has  to  withstand—first  in himself,  and  then  in  those  who,  directly  or  indirectly,  have entrusted  him  with  their  thoughts  and  feelings,  hopes  and 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fears.  As  each  man’s  strength  gives  out,  as  it  no  longer responds to his will, the inertia of the whole gradually comes to rest on the commander’s will alone. The ardor of his spirit must  rekindle  the  flame  of  purpose  in  all  others;  his  inward fire must revive their hope. Only to the extent that he can do this will he retain his hold on his men and keep control. Once that hold is lost, once his own courage can no longer revive the courage  of  his  men,  the  mass  will  drag  him  down  to  the brutish world where danger is shirked and shame is unknown. Such  are  the  burdens  that  the  commander’s  courage  and strength  of  will  must  overcome  if  he  hopes  to  achieve outstanding success. The burdens  increase with the number of 
men in his command, and therefore the higher his position, the 
greater the strength of character he needs to bear the mounting 
load. (HP: 104‐105) (emphasis added)  Strength  of  character,  for  von  Clausewitz,  is  not  action  based  on  feeling  or passion  but,  rather,  the  ability  to  stay  calm  and  act  consistently  in  times  of extreme  stress  and  agitated  emotion.  This  ability  does  not  result  solely  from intellect;  this  ability  is  a  matter  of  self‐control,  which  itself  is  an  emotion exhibited by  a  certain  kind of  temperament.  This  temperament  acknowledges that  passion  exists  but  that  decisions must  be made  on  as  rational  a  basis  as possible. Appropriate experience allows for this rational behavior in the fog of war.  In  sum,  strength  of  character  is  an  ability  to  maintain  balance  in  the presence  of  great  emotion  and  to  act  with  steady  firmness  in  a  “stable  and constant” manner under the most trying conditions.   In the making of military genius,  the role of  imagination is paramount. Von Clausewitz’s use of the word “imagination” is somewhat different than how we might  today  use  that  term.  He  develops  the  concept  of  imagination  in  his discussion  of  the  commander  and  his  or  her  relationship  with  the  terrain. 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Terrain  is  of  utmost  importance  and understanding  the  terrain’s  potential  for deciding  not  only  the  outcome  of  a  battle,  but  potentially  the  entire  war, demands  that  the  commander  has  an  intimate  apprehension  of  the  multiple possibilities that terrain has in deciding victory or defeat. The General contends,  This  problem  is  unique.  To  master  it  a  special  gift  is needed, which  is  given  the  too  restricted  name  of a  sense  of 
locality. It is the faculty of quickly and accurately grasping the 
topography of  any area which enables  a man  to  find his way about at any time. Obviously this is an act of the imagination. Things are perceived, of  course, by  the naked eye and partly by  the  mind,  which  fills  the  gaps  with  guesswork  based  on learning  and  experience,  and  thus  constructs  a whole  out  of the  fragments  that  the  eye  can  see;  but  if  the whole  is  to be vividly presented to the mind,  imprinted  like a picture,  like a map, upon the brain, without fading or blurring in detail, it can 
only be achieved by the mental gift that we call imagination. A poet  or  a  painter  may  be  shocked  to  find  that  his  Muse dominates these activities as well … A commander‐in‐chief … can draw general  information  from reports of all kinds,  from maps,  books,  and  memoirs.  Details  will  be  furnished  by  his staff. Nevertheless it  is true that with a quick, unerring sense of locality his dispositions will be more rapid and assured; he will run less the risk of a certain awkwardness in his concepts, and be less dependent on others. (HP: 109‐110)   This  description  is  nothing  less  than  a  demand  for  a  developed  temperament that can only be had from a base of varied and frequent experiences in war and its  surrounding.  Having  discussed  requirements  of  command  terms  of  the intellect  and moral  powers,  von  Clausewitz  concludes  that  the  term  “genius” must be reserved  for  those who excel at  the highest  levels—the commanders‐in‐chief. Only at those levels are the intellectual and moral powers the greatest. 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 A final note on the military genius  is essential to understanding the role he or she must play. As noted earlier, war is an extension of politics. Consequently, a  successful  war  can  only  be  brought  about  if  the  commander‐in‐chief  is thoroughly  acquainted  with  national  policy.  National  policy  and  military strategy  must  be  synchronous  and  cannot,  at  any  level,  diverge.  This requirement  demands  that  the  commander‐in‐chief  is,  at  the  same  time,  a statesman. Even though the demand requires this commander to function in the realm  of  national  policy,  he  or  she must  never  forget  the  requirement,  at  the same time, to act as a general. “What this task requires … is a sense of unity and a power of judgment raised to a marvelous pitch of vision, which easily grasps and dismisses  a  thousand  remote possibilities which an ordinary mind would labor to identify and wear itself out in doing so.” (HP: 112) 
Friction and Resistance   The military genius operates in the quixotic milieu of the battlefield. As has been  previously  shown,  this  miasma  is  a  sea  of  probabilities,  uncertainties, chance,  serendipity  and  misfortune.  All  actions,  both  at  the  tactical  level  of individual  combat  as well  as  at  the  strategic  level  in which  the  entire war  is prosecuted,  are  carried out with  constant  resistance  from not only  the enemy but also the environment, inadequate military intelligence, bodily effort, and the like. The only way one can cope with these “frictions” (as von Clausewitz calls them) is through experience—intimacy in the actual conduct of war. He opens Book I, Chapter VII, as follows: 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 If  one  has  never  personally  experienced war,  one  cannot understand  in  what  the  difficulties  constantly  mentioned really  consist,  nor  why  a  commander  should  need  any brilliance and exceptional ability. Everything looks simple; the knowledge  required  does  not  look  remarkable,  the  strategic options  are  so  obvious  that  by  comparison  the  simplest problem  of  higher  mathematics  has  an  impressive  scientific dignity.  Once  war  has  actually  been  seen  the  difficulties become  clear;  but  it  is  still  extremely  hard  to  describe  the unseen, all‐pervading element that brings about this change of perspective. (HP: 119) 
 Simply  put, without  experience  one  cannot  conceive  of  the  difficulties  of war. The  difficulties  of war  are  the  results  of  the  resistances,  or  frictions,  that  can only be dealt with  if  the commander has the “inner eye” and determination to do so. Only experience offers the commander the opportunity to develop these capabilities or “moral virtues.”    Friction—resistance—is what separates real war from theoretical war. Not only does resistance come from the environment and the actions of the enemy but  also  resistance  comes  from  within  the  being  of  each  individual  soldier. Battle  plans,  order  of  battle,  grand  strategy,  tactics,  and  the  like  are  all determined in a theoretical manner. Von Clausewitz reminds us that all of these things may  look easy  in  theory, but “In  fact,  it  is different, and every  fault and exaggeration of theory is instantly exposed in war.” (HP: 119) He notes, further, that  these  resistances  are  everywhere  and  ever  present—both  spatially  and temporally—and can take up volumes if we try to foresee them all. Only those who  have  the  appropriate  prior  experiences  in  this  world  of  friction  can 
86 
 
function  well  when  new  and  unexpected  scenarios  are  presented.  Past experience is prologue.    The only experience  that  is  appropriate  for developing  the military genius, therefore,  is experience gained in actual, real war. The General clearly realizes that “every war is rich in unique episodes. Each is an uncharted sea, full of reefs. The  commander  may  suspect  the  reefs’  existence  without  ever  having  seen them; now he has to steer past them in the dark. If a contrary wind springs up, if some  major  mischance  appears,  he  will  need  the  greatest  skill  and  personal exertion, even the utmost presence of mind, though from a distance everything may seem to be proceeding automatically.” (HP: 120) The anxious general may think he or she can prepare the troops so well as to rid war of the friction and resistance. This is not the case. The good and effective general knows resistance will  always  be  present  and  is  prepared,  by  previous  experience,  to  deal  with these frictions as they arise. No theory can prepare a commander for resistances and frictions and, consequently, theory becomes a bystander once war begins.    Book I, Chapter VII, ends thus:   As with a man of the world instinct becomes almost habit so  that  he  always  acts,  speaks,  and moves  appropriately,  so only  the  experienced  officer will make  the  right  decisions  in major and minor matters—at every pulsebeat of war. Practice and  experience  dictate  the  answer:  “this  is  possible,  that  is not.” So he rarely makes a serious mistake, such as can, in war, shatter  confidence  and  become  extremely  dangerous  if  it occurs.   Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult. We shall frequently revert to this subject,  and  it  will  become  evident  that  the  eminent 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commander needs more than experience and a strong will. He must have other exceptional abilities as well. (HP: 120‐121)  As he concludes the first chapter of On War, von Clausewitz reiterates his main points. He  asks  if  anything  can  act  as  an  antidote  to  the  friction  that  impedes progress  in war.  “In  their  restrictive  efforts  they  can be grouped  into  a  single concept of general friction. Is there any lubricant that will reduce this abrasion? Only  one,  and  a  commander  and  his  army  will  not  always  have  it  readily available: combat experience.” (HP: 122) (emphasis added)   Experience allows the army, from foot soldier to the commanding general, to develop the habits necessary to deal with friction. Habit strengthens the body, engenders  spirit  and  courage,  but  also,  and  more  importantly,  allows  the commander  to  suspend  judgment  against  first  impressions.  Training  is  not  a substitute for actual combat experience. Since armies are not constantly at war, von Clausewitz demands that effective training must include as many elements of  friction  as  possible.  Operating  and  training  in  the  shifting  and  amorphous environment  endemic  to  combat  is  the  only  way  to  have  the  requisite experiences that lay the groundwork for the future. 
Theory, Practice, and Moral Forces   Von  Clausewitz’s  views  of  theory,  in  general,  are  such  that  theory  offers items  for  study  and  perhaps  some  guides  for  behavior,  but  that  theory  itself gives  little of value  for  the conduct of actual war. This holds  true especially at 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the  strategic  level,  which  is  the  purview  of  the  commander‐in‐chief.  He emphasizes this as follows:   It  is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called  advances  in  the  realm  of  truth;  synthetically,  in  the rules and regulations they offer, they are absolutely useless.   They  aim  at  fixed  values;  but  in  war  everything  is uncertain,  and  calculations  have  to  be  made  with  variable quantities.   They  direct  the  inquiry  exclusively  toward  physical quantities,  whereas  all  military  action  is  intertwined  with psychological forces and effects.   They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites. (HP: 136)  Using  this  observation  of  the  nature  of  theory,  von  Clausewitz  arrives  at  a stunning conclusion. If theory cannot, scientifically, guide forces in combat then all attainment in war rests in the hands of the military genius. Victory depends on the genius and, consequently, genius makes the rules. “Pity the soldier who is supposed  to  control among  these scraps of  rules, not good enough  for genius, which genius can ignore, or laugh at. No, what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be the case. Pity the theory  that  conflicts  with  reason!  No  amount  of  humility  can  gloss  over  this contradiction;  indeed,  the greater  the humility,  the sooner  it will be driven off the field of real  life by ridicule and contempt” (HP: 136) Benoit Durieux notes, “Indeed,  Clausewitz  does  not  wish  to  propose  solutions  for  the  military commander, because such solutions, supposing they were possible, would limit his  freedom of action. On the contrary, he wants  to enable him to exercise his freedom of action.”  (Durieux: 252) This concept can be succinctly stated  in an 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old  United  States  Air  Force  saying,  “We  only  need  regulations  for  those  who cannot lead!”   The  General  gives  examples  of  how  this  concept  comes  into  play  when “moral  factors”  are  involved.  Moral  factors  are  those  qualities,  which  the military,  the  people,  and  the  government  exhibit  in  the  conduct  of  war.  The factors  are  the  human  element  that  give  war  its  quixotic  nature  and  help  to make the entire effort unpredictable. The architect and the painter know all the theory behind what materials  to use and how  to mathematically  calculate  the forces  on  an  arch  or  the  right  angles  to  consider  for  illustrating  a  certain perspective but, as the General tells us, when the aesthetic nature of their work comes into play—when they aim at a particular effect on the mind or senses—all  the  rules  of  theory  dissolve.  This,  too,  is  what  happens  in  warfare.  Like Dewey, von Clausewitz uses the example of medicine and the organism to show how  theory  cannot  give  concrete  answers  for  actions  in  the  “real”  world. Medicine  deals  with  the  physical  phenomena  of  the  body,  but  an  animal organism  is  always  changing  and  reacting  to  the  environment  in  which  that organism finds itself. The organism is different at each and every moment. “This renders the task of medicine very difficult, and makes the physician’s judgment count  for more than his knowledge. But how greatly  is  the difficulty  increased when  a  mental  factor  is  added,  and  how much more  highly  do  we  value  the psychiatrist!” (HP: 136‐137) In war the military genius is the counterpart of the psychiatrist  given  in  the  General’s  example.  The  moral  factors  in  war  are  a 
90 
 
parallel  for  the  mental  factor  in  medicine.    These  moral  factors  cannot  be ignored and form the core of the environment in which appropriate experiences are to be had.    Military action  is often conceived as a  struggle between opposing material forces. While this is indeed true, this view captures only the superficial aspect of war. War  is  always,  von Clausewitz  asserts,  aimed  simultaneously  at  the  very moral forces that give life to that activity. The material and the moral forces are always inextricably linked. While the material forces are subject to analysis by intelligence  reports,  order of battle  tables,  and  the  like,  the  “moral  values  can only be perceived by  the  inner eye, which differs  in  each person,  and  is often different in the same person at different times.” (HP: 137)   War  is  fought  in  the  realm  of  danger.  Everything  in  war  happens  in  an environment  of  pervasive  threat  of  death.  As  we  have  shown,  courage  is  the counter  to danger and  is what gives  the soldier his or her strength  to act. We should not forget the two types of courage von Clausewitz considers important and  to  which  level  of  leadership  each  applies.  Courage  is  what  allows individuals engaged in war to exercise judgment and is the prism through which all  “impressions  pass  to  the  brain.  And  yet  there  can  be  no  doubt  that experience will by itself provide a degree of objectivity to those impressions. … All  these  and  similar  effects  in  the  sphere  of  the  mind  and  spirit  have  been proved  by  experience:  they  recur  constantly,  and  are  therefore  entitled  to 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receive their due as objective factors. … Of course these truths must be rooted in experience, …” (HP: 137)   Von  Clausewitz  is  adamant  in  claiming  what  kind  of  knowledge  that  the commander must possess. He  is  firm  in asserting  that no  leader can  learn  the requisite  knowledge  from  books  or  theory.  While  the  architect,  artist, philosopher,  and  businessperson might  learn  enough  to  function within  their respective  professions  in  this  manner,  knowledge  gained  this  way  does  not allow the practitioner’s “personality” to be expressed through their work. This, too,  applies  to  the  military  leader  but  the  consequences  are  dire  if  the commander fails to gain his or her knowledge via experience. In the section of Book  II,  Chapter  II,  entitled  “Knowledge Must  Become  Capability,  the  General makes this clear:   One  more  requisite  remains  to  be  considered—a  factor more  vital  to military  knowledge  than  any other. Knowledge must  be  so  absorbed  into  the  mind  that  it  almost  ceases  to exist  in  a  separate,  objective  way.  In  almost  any  other profession  a man  can work with  truths  he  has  learned  from musty books, but which have no life or meaning for him. … It is never  like  that  in  war.  Continual  change  and  the  need  to respond  to  it  compels  the  commander  to  carry  the  whole intellectual  apparatus  of  his  knowledge  with  him.    He  must always  be  ready  to  bring  forth  the  appropriate  decision.  By total  assimilation  with  his  mind  and  life,  the  commander’s knowledge  must  be  transformed  into  a  genuine  capability. That  is why  it  all  seems  to  come  so  easily  to man who have distinguished themselves in war, and why it  is all ascribed to natural talent. We say natural talent  in order to distinguish it from  the  talent  that  has  been  trained  and  educated  by reflection and study. (HP: 147) 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The  centrality  of  experience  is  clear  in  the making  of  the military  genius.  The entire  purpose  of  having  the  right  kind  of  experiences—which  can  only  be gained  in  combat—is  to  develop  commanders  who  can  internalize  their “knowledge”  so  that  all  new  situations  which  are  presented  in  the  cloaks  of uncertainty  and  resistance  can  be  appropriately  attacked  and  handled.  This continuing loop of experience is a precarious yet constant environment for the 
military genius.  
War as Art or Science?   Von Clausewitz addresses  the question whether war  should be  considered as  art  or  a  science.  He  acknowledges  that  these  words  do  not  have  settled meanings  but,  nonetheless,  he  offers  a  sense  in  which  the  words  should  be understood. Early  in On War, von Clausewitz notes that knowledge and ability (or doing) are quite different things and the two ideas should never be confused with  one  another.  Books  cannot  really  teach  us  to  do  anything.  The  doing  to which von Clausewitz refers has a deep sense that transcends mere mechanical performance.  The  term  “art”  should  be  reserved  for  activity  whose  object  is “creative  ability.”  In  contrast,  the  General  uses  the  term  “science”  for  those disciplines whose object  is pure knowledge. As an exemplar of art he gives us architecture and as exemplars of science he offers mathematics and astronomy. The reader should note that in the two major translations of On War the editors and translators have chosen different words to express von Clausewitz’s object, or end, of art. Howard and Paret use the term “creative ability” as the defining 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term while Colonel Graham uses the term “doing” in his earlier translation. The senses of these defining terms differ one from the other but each can clearly be seen as distinct contrasts to pure knowledge (science). Each of the terms for art offers some advantage for understanding von Clausewitz’s distinction between art  and  science.  The  discussion  in  this  dissertation  will  use  both  “creative ability”  and  “doing”  for  the  defining  concepts  inherent  in  art.  Although  the Graham  translation  appears  to  be  somewhat  dated,  the  language  used  by Graham is contemporaneous with language that Dewey might have used and, in some  senses, will  offer  an advantage  for  later  comparisons of Dewey and von Clausewitz. Specifically, the word “doing” is critical in understanding the role of experience  in  Dewey’s  aesthetics  while  a  similar  understanding  of  von Clausewitz’s  experiential  demands  in  war  are  equally  well  understood  as  an outcome of “doing.”   Von Clausewitz is not so naïve as to believe that art and science are totally separable. He  readily  acknowledges  that  all  art  encompasses  certain  scientific demands and that all science requires some artistic acumen. “The reason is that, no  matter  how  obvious  and  palpable  the  difference  between  knowledge  and ability  (doing)  may  be  in  the  totality  of  human  achievement,  it  is  extremely difficult  to  separate  them  entirely  in  the  individual.”  (HP:  148)  (Parenthetical added)  Von  Clausewitz  takes  as  a  given  that  all  thought  is  art.  When  the premises  that  are  generated  from  perceptions,  or  sense  data,  cease  and judgments begin based on those percepts, that is the beginning of art. The mind, 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too, perceives and such perception constitutes judgment as well; hence, that is also  an  art.  “In  brief,  if  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  a  human  being  capable  of perception  but  not  of  judgment  or  vice  versa,  it  is  likewise  impossible  to separate art and knowledge altogether. The more these delicate motes of  light are personified in external  forms of being, the more will  their realms separate. To repeat, creation and production lie in the realm of art; science will dominate where the object is inquiry and knowledge. It follows that the term “art of war” is more suitable than “science of war.” (HP: 148‐149)   Further explanation shows that the General believes any attempt to strictly view war  as  solely  art  or  science  is  misleading.  He  cautions  that  history  has taught us that any attempt to pigeonhole war as either art or science, when in fact war  is  neither,  often  leads  to  an  incorrect  categorization  of  war  and  has given  us  many  false  analogies.  Attempts  to  call  war  a  “craft”  has  lead  many analysts  even  farther  afield because one presumes a  craft  to be  some  inferior sort of art—as if a craft can even legitimately be viewed as art at all. As Dewey addressed this issue in Art as Experience when he described the aesthetic nature of experience and suggested that all human endeavors, if engaged in the correct way  with  the  environment,  constitute  an  aesthetic  experience  or  art.  What, however, does the General suggest is the solution to this nominative quandary?    The way  out  is  to  understand  that war  does  not  belong  to  either  the  arts alone  or  to  science  alone  but  more  appropriately  war  is  an  innate  part  of mankind’s  social  existence.  The  only  difference  between war  and  other  social 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conflicts  such  as  business  or  politics  is  that  war  involves  violence  and bloodshed. War,  in  its  essence,  is  still  a  matter  of  “intercourse  of  the  human race” (OW: 202) or part of the social interaction of mankind. War is essentially different from those other mechanical or fine arts of mankind in that war does not exert itself against inanimate matter or passive objects “but against a living and reacting force.” (OW: 203)    In war, the will is directed at an animate object that reacts. It must be obvious that the intellectual codification used in the arts  and  sciences  is  inappropriate  to  such  an  activity,  At  the same  time  it  is  clear  that  continual  striving  after  laws analogous  to  those  appropriate  to  the  realm  of  inanimate matter was bound to lead to one mistake after another. Yet it was  precisely  the  mechanical  arts  that  the  art  of  war  was supposed to imitate. The fine arts were impossible to imitate, since they themselves do not have sufficient laws and rules of their  own.  So  far  all  attempts  at  formulating  any  have  been found  too  limited  and  one‐sided  and  have  constantly  been undermined  and  swept  away  by  the  currents  of  opinion, emotion and custom. (HP: 149)  Any attempt to codify war through analogy to any science or art  is doomed to fail.  What  is  required,  according  to  the  General,  is  an  inquiring  mind.  Put differently,  the  military  genius  must  be  always  engaged  with  his  or  her surroundings  and must  be  immersed  in  every  experience  presented. Without this total involvement in the moment, no credible way exists for the experiences of war to build the foundation for future action.      Von Clausewitz claims, “in war, as  in  life generally, all parts of a whole are interconnected and thus the effects produced … must  influence all subsequent military  operations  and modify  their  final  outcome  to  some  degree,  however 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slight. In the same way, every means must influence even the ultimate purpose. … In the same way, a means must be evaluated, not merely with respect to  its immediate  end:  that  end  it  self  should  be  appraised  as  a means  for  the  next highest  one;  and  thus we  can  follow  a  chain  of  sequential  objectives  until we reach one that requires no justification, because its necessity is self‐evident. … Every  stage  in  this  progression  obviously  implies  a  new  basis  for  judgment.” (HP:  158‐159)  Every  decision  or  experience  is  a  foundation  for  future experiences and decisions. The inquiring mind of the commander and leader is immersed  in  a  continuing  chain  of  experience  that  sets  the  stage  for  future action. The chain of experience  is never broken. All action  is bedding  for  later action.   To internalize and potentially optimize the effects of any given action in the tactical  or  strategic  realm  requires  not  a  scientific  analysis  of  the  action  but, rather,  an  ability  to  significantly  extract  the  “lessons”  of  that  experience.  This ability to unrelentingly become immersed in the experience of war creates the journey that the military genius must travel if he or she is going to be capable of the  highest  deeds  and  performance  necessary  to  lead  an  army  to  victory  and secure a peace  for  the state. To extract  the essence of  the experience  involves not just the knowing of the situation, or rather the “facts of the case,” but more importantly  the  commander must  be  plunged  into  the  doing  of  the  situation. Only by active involvement can the commander do  the right action to secure a positive  outcome.  The  doing  is  effectively  the  creative  ability  to  use  the 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experience at hand, not only for a positive result  for the action at hand, but to ensure what can be gained  in order  to set best  footing  for  future experiences. This  requisite creative ability  is what  led von Clausewitz  to earlier assert  that war is, most likely, more akin to an art than a science.  
Pedagogical Value of Moral Virtue 
  Von Clausewitz does not  specifically describe  the educative quality of war. Unlike Dewey, who has a well‐developed philosophy of education,  the General touches  on  education  in  terms  of  requirements  for  training  an  army.  His seemingly cursory discussion of training becomes scaffolding on which to hang a  well‐reasoned  pedagogical  concept.  In  Book  III,  Chapter  III,  von  Clausewitz returns  to his  previous discussion of  the moral  elements  of war. These moral virtues constitute the most important aspects of war and are among the driving factors  that  give  life  to  the  opposing  forces  of  the  engagement.  These  moral forces make up the spirit that is endemic in war and is the motivating force of the will that “moves and leads the whole mass of force, practically merging with it, since the will  is  itself a moral quantity.” Further,  these moral  forces are not subject to analysis or “academic wisdom,” as the General notes, but these forces must  be  “seen  or  felt.”  (HP:  184)  Only  through  this  understanding  can  the reader see the role of these forces in experience. Von Clausewitz describes any attempt  to  lay  down  rules  and  principles  of war without  taking moral  values into  account  as  a  “miserable”  or  “paltry”  philosophy.  He  is  reminding  us  that these moral values are the forces that give armies, countries, and commanders 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their  reactive  abilities  that  make  war  more  than  a  clash  of  mechanical  or quantitative bodies or forces. Put simply, rules and principles cannot work in an environment of change. When prosecuting a war “by the book” the moral forces of both sides react in such a way as to make “the book” obsolete and unusable from  the  very  opening  of  hostilities.  The  only  effective  resort  is  an  appeal  to 
military  genius,  which,  the  General  reminds  us,  is  above  the  rules.  Or,  as  he effectively claims, this appeal to genius “amounts to admitting that rules are not only made for idiots, but are idiotic in themselves.” (HP: 184)    The principal moral elements to which von Clausewitz refers are “the skill of 
the  commander,  the  experience  and  courage  of  the  troops,  and  their  patriotic 
spirit.” (HP: 186) He claims that all are interrelated and we would be mistaken to rate any one of them as dominating. For the purposes of this dissertation the emphasis is placed on the commander but, as is evident, the commander’s place is only secure when fixed to the army, the state, and the citizenry. A signal point of the effective commander is his or her ability to impart and maintain an esprit among the troops—an enthusiasm for the tasks at hand. Per the General:   War  is  a  special  activity,  different  and  separate  from any other  pursued  by  man.  …  An  army’s  military  qualities  are based  on  the  individual  who  is  steeped  in  the  spirit  and essence of this activity; who trains the capacities  it demands, rouses  them,  and  makes  them  his  own;  who  applies  his intelligence  to  every  detail;  who  gains  ease  and  confidence through  practice,  and  who  completely  immerses  his personality in the appointed task. …   An  army  that  maintains  its  cohesion  under  the  most murderous fire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears and resists well founded ones with all  its might; that, proud of its 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victories,  will  not  lose  the  strength  to  obey  orders  and  its respect and trust for its officers even in defeat; whose physical power,  like  the  muscles  of  an  athlete,  has  been  steeled  by training  in  privation  and  effort;  a  force  that  regards  such efforts  as  a  means  to  victory  rather  than  a  curse;  that  is mindful of all these duties and qualities by virtue of the single powerful  idea  of  the  honor  of  its  arms—such  an  army  is imbued with the true military spirit. (HP: 187‐188)  When an army lacks spirit, effective training and leadership ability befall the commander to assuage this deficit.  If military spirit  in  the army  is poor, or missing,  that  shortfall  must  be  made  up  by  the  commander’s  leadership qualities.    Von Clausewitz  adamantly proclaims  there are only  two ways  that  this spirit can be  imbued:  foremost by a series of victories and,  if conditions of war are absent, continuous training in an environment requiring the utmost exertion by the forces. Anything short of these two methods is incapable of demonstrating  to  the  soldiers  their  true  capabilities.  Said  another  way, anything less than actual combat experience, or realistic training that pushes the individual to extremes, will not let the soldier or the commander know his or her limits.  A general can depend only on those troops with whom he or she has shared hardships and dangers. “In short, the seed will grow only in  the soil of  constant activity and exertion, warmed by  the sun of victory. Once  it  has  grown  into  a  strong  tree,  it will  survive  the wildest  storms  of misfortune and defeat, and even the indolent inertia of peace, at  least for a while. Thus, this spirit can be created only in war by great generals, though 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admittedly  it  may  endure,  for  several  generations  at  least,  even  under generals  of  average  ability  and  through  long  periods  of  peace.”  (HP:  189) The  major  import  to  be  gleaned  from  this  is  that  the  spirit  of  the  army depends on an “education” that can only be learned from actual experience. The commander  is  the “teacher” and must have developed his or her skills through  continued  experience  in  combat  and  statesmanship.  That  is,  the experience  must  be  real  and  continuous  if  leadership  and  “pedagogical effectiveness” is realized.    A brief reprise of the requirements for military genius shows that the genius is  a  rare  individual who  can  only  attain  the  lofty  goal  of  commander‐in‐chief through a succession of appropriate experiences. The experiences demanded by von Clausewitz fit well with an inquiring mind rather than a creative one and a comprehensive  view  rather  than  a  specialized  or  narrow  one.  Further,  he demands of  the genius a  “calm rather  than excitable head  to which  in war we would  choose  to  entrust  the  fate  of  our  brothers  and  children,  and  the  safety and honor of our country.” (HP: 112)   War,  in  a  pure  sense,  must  continually  add  manpower  and  materiel  to respond to an adversary’s actions. This indicates war, theoretically, is an action of extremes.  In  reality, war  is  subject  to  the many  foibles of mere existence—uncertainty,  probability,  poor  information,  personal  traits  and  characteristics, chance,  luck, and the like. In this milieu, war is changed from the absolute and the seemingly inevitable push toward extremes to action in the sense of a game; 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that is, the successful military commander must deal with living and, what von Clausewitz calls, moral forces. Hence, war can never attain “the absolute and the positive.”    These moral forces of the commander lead to moral virtues such as courage and self‐reliance. Moral action enables the commander to successfully deal with the  accidental  and  the  improbable.  That  is,  the  successful  commander,  or 
military genius, becomes capable only through experience with the fog and error created by imperfect knowledge, uncertainty, chance, and shifting probabilities. The essence of this genius “consists of every common tendency of the powers of the  mind  and  soul  toward  the  business  of War;  there must  be  a  harmonious 
association  of  powers.”  All  the  moral  powers  or  virtues—intellect,  courage, strength  of  body  and mind,  logical  reasoning,  coup  d’oeil,  among  others—are required  of  the  military  genius.  For  Clausewitz,  the  military  genius  can  only develop  through  a  continuous  and  continuing  process  inherent  in  the  actual experience of war. Only through a process of immersion in war, and doing that which is required to understand all of the vagaries of combat, can a commander become  the military  genius.  This  parallels  Dewey’s  description  of  the  process required for the aesthetic experiences demanded for the live creature.   Von  Clausewitz  describes  war  as  movement  in  an  atmosphere  of  four elements:  danger,  physical  effort,  uncertainty,  and  chance.  To  deal with  these elements requires great force of mind and understanding; only a commander’s 
force  of will  can  overcome  troop  resistance  to  these  forces.  The  commander’s 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strength  of  character  can  only  be  manifest  through  habit.  Only  through immersion in the experience of war can the genius develop. War offers continual resistances, which von Clausewitz calls friction, to all the activities of combat—both  in  the actual execution as well as  the strategic development of  the entire war effort. Since war is always fought for political purposes, the military genius must  in  fact  be  a  statesman  in  addition  to  being  a  strategist  and  operational expert.  All  these  roles  can  only  be  developed  through  the  understanding garnered through experience.   Theory  is of marginal use  for von Clausewitz. Since attempts at  theory are only  valuable  analytically,  theory  cannot  provide  the  commander  with  an epistemic or ontological grounding for war. The world of war is only synthetic and  all  decisions  made  theoretically  are  bound  to  become  valueless  or inadequate with the onset of actual hostilities. When intelligent and living forces engage one another as adversaries,  all  attempts at  theory  lose  their  force and effectiveness.  Only  a  military  genius—with  an  existential  basis  in  actual experience—can adequately react to and understand the changing nature of the environment and action in which he or she is engaged. This applies to the realm of  physical  combat  as  well  as  to  the  political  and  strategic  levels  of  the  war effort. For the military genius, experience replaces theory as the operative factor determining the success of the war.   Von Clausewitz delves deeply into the conceptual understanding of war and asks whether war  is  an  art  or  a  science? While  acknowledging  that  the  exact 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 Previous chapters limned the thought of the two great philosophers, through their respective concepts of experience. Having elucidated the similarity of their thoughts  concerning  the  development  of  the  complete  individual,  the “flourishing person” can now be explored. Experience for both men is central to their  philosophical  thought.  The  strong  association  between  the  thought  of Dewey and von Clausewitz can be gleaned by  identifying the common threads that pervade their philosophies and clarifying how each philosopher used them to build a philosophical “whole.” Those “wholes” for each philosopher result in two  separate  but  are  conceptually  similar  philosophies.  To  illustrate  these threads that make up the tapestry of each philosophy, several specific concepts, inherent  in  the  philosophy  of  each  man,  should  suffice  to  demonstrate  the exceptionally strong linkage between the two philosophers. The concepts are: (1) The aesthetic (2) Continuity  (3) Uncertainty and friction; the organism (4) Theory and practice (or the abstract and the real) (5) Art and science (6) Existence as a social construct (7) The live creature and the military genius 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Each  concept,  or  thread,  builds  toward  a  complete philosophical  structure  for both  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz.  When  the  edifice  is  complete  the  similarity between  the  two  philosophies  is  evident.  To  establish  these  various connections, the reader will recognize that none of the individual threads stands alone. Each thread overlaps with others and the concepts often include subtexts from other threads. Nonetheless, separating the threads allows for a construct from which to understand the connections between the two philosophies. Once the  similarity  is  established,  one  further  question  suggests  itself,  namely,  “Do these  philosophies  have  value  in  today’s  modern  world,  especially,  in  the context of contemporary war?” This chapter lays the foundation for addressing this important query. 
The Aesthetic 
  Dewey’s aesthetics have been fully elucidated in Chapter II. The purpose in this  section  is  to  winnow  those  concepts  that  will  lead  to  the  aesthetic understanding  required  of  those  individuals  who  are  “alive”  in  the  world. Dewey  hopes  to  “recapture”  the  appreciation  that  man  “lost”  by  becoming “modern  or  civilized.”  His  contention  is  that  the  aesthetic  nature  of  man  is something that should be lived in all of his or her experiences not simply in the supposed  appreciation  of  art  as  understood  and  promulgated  by  a  cadre  of “experts”  or  critics.  Aesthetic  appreciation  inheres  in  every  individual  and, correctly understood, is a journey and not a destination. 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military genius acts as an archetype of Dewey’s  live creature. Each philosopher viewed  experience  as  the  grounding  of  the  individual  and  one’s  engagement with  experience  determines  the  degree  to  which  the  individual  can  become what  he  or  she  potentially  can  be.  Even  though  the  process  of  experience  for each  philosopher  is  discussed  in  disparate  spheres,  analysis  reveals  the processes  themselves  are  almost  indistinct  from  one  another.  For  both philosophers  the way  in  which  one  undergoes  an  experience  determines  the aesthetic and, in the end, the existential status of every individual.   Dewey  claims  that  art  is not  to be  separated  from  life. The aesthetic deals with how events are perceived  in experience. Art  for Dewey  is not a  separate realm but is inherent in all we do and requires a certain approach to experience that does not cut the individual off from direct and immediate association with human effort—the undergoing and doing of  the one who experiences  and  the environment  or  object  of  that  experience.  (AE:  2)  Von  Clausewitz  says something quite similar when he says, “Every action needs a certain time to be completed. The period  is called  its duration, and  its  length will depend on  the speed with which the person acting works.   … Everyone performs a task in his own way; a slow man, however, does not do it more slowly because he wants to spend more time over it, but because his nature causes him to need more time. If he made more haste he would do the job less well.” (HP: 82) For both of these views,  we  see  that  aesthetic  experience  requires  immersion  and  complete 
109 
 
undertaking.  Von  Clausewitz  is  already  indicating  the  need  for  experience  to reach  a  satisfactory  conclusion  if  that  experience  is  to  be  appropriately undergone. This completion at which he hints is the consummation required in Dewey’s aesthetic scheme described earlier.   Aesthetic  understanding,  per  Dewey,  must  start  not  with  an  object  but rather  with  the  conditions—“the  soil,  air,  and  light”—from  which  the  object arose.  These  conditions  must  be  appreciated  if  any  aesthetic  experience  is  to reach  fruition.  (AE:  11)  This  is  precisely  the  point  that  von  Clausewitz made, years earlier, in his claim that the military genius must develop a sense of battle that can only be garnered from the maelstrom of actual combat. From this fog, only  an  intimate  interaction with  all  the  conditions  of  battle  can  prepare  the future  commander  to  properly  understand  the  lessons  necessary  to  engage successfully  in  prospective  positions  of  ever  increasing  responsibility  and leadership. Fulfilling the requirement for the “proper” kinds of experience at all levels  of  war  is  what  allows  for  the  development  of  the  highest  levels  of command.  This  view  is  a  narrower  description  of  Dewey’s  concept  of  an experience  as  a  constant  interaction  of  the  individual  with  the  environment until  a  consummation  is  reached.  That  consummation  acts,  not  as  a  fixed completion,  but  as  a  launching  pad  for  future  experience.  In  discussing  this interaction,  Dewey  appears  to  have  paraphrased  von  Clausewitz  in  his discussion  of  a  commander’s  development  of  his  or  her  sense  of  a  combat engagement, or an entire war.  “The first great consideration is that life goes on 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in an environment; not merely in it but because of it, through interaction with it. …  At  every  moment  the  living  creature  is  exposed  to  dangers  from  its surroundings,  and  at  every  moment,  it  must  draw  upon  something  in  its surroundings  to  satisfy  its needs. The  career and destiny of  a  living being are bound up with its  interchanges with its environment, not externally but in the most intimate way.” (AE: 12) This aesthetic appreciation of man in everyday life is  the  same  aesthetic  appreciation  of  the  soldier  in  combat.  The  proper appreciation of the aesthetic experience is what leads to the full development of the individual.   At this juncture, a question is evident. If all persons have “experiences,” what suggests  that,  in  any  given  environment,  all  people  experiencing  that environment are not undergoing similar aesthetic understanding? Why do not all  individuals  listening  to  a Mozart  opera  have  a  similar  appreciation  for  the work  or why did  not  all  participants  in  the Battle  of Antietam have  the  same appreciation for what was to be learned and understood from that battle? Two possible  replies  seem  apparent.  First,  at  any  single  event  the  environment  is different for every individual so the “experience” must perforce be unique to the individual. Second, while the environment may be different for each individual, the  similarities  allow  for  an  aesthetic  interpretation  by  all,  or  most,  of  the persons experiencing that “event.” If this is the case, differences in the quality of the  aesthetic  experience  has  to  be  explainable  by  the  different  ways  the experience  itself  is  undergone  by  each  individual.  Since  both  of  these 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explanations  appear  plausible,  a  reasonable  presumption  would  be  that  an interplay  between  the  individual  and  the  environment  is  “in  play”  in  all experiences  and  the  “strength” or  “quality” of  that  interaction  is what,  in  fact, determines  the  aesthetic  nature  of  the  event.  This  interaction  is what  Dewey posits  as  the  continuing  cycle  of  doing  and  undergoing  that  culminates  in  a consummation  of  the  aesthetic  experience.  “Experience  is  the  result,  the  sign, and  the  reward  of  that  interaction  of  the  organism  and  environment  which, when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into participation and  communication.”  (AE:  22)  This  “participation  and  communication”  when “carried to the full” is the defining mark of the aesthetic.    Von  Clausewitz  shares  this  view—a  view  integral  to  the  character  of  the 
military  genius.  Before  expanding  on  the  development  of  the  genius,  it  is sufficient  to  note  von  Clausewitz  believed  a  prerequisite  for  the  highest positions of command is the ability to see and understand the total environment of war, at all  levels,  from the  individual engagements  to  the goals and ends of state  policy.  Only  a  keen  intellect  immersed  in  a  continuing  doing  and undergoing  of  the  “right”  experiences  can  achieve  this  understanding.  The importance of  the aesthetic experience  is  the demand for a continuing tension between the  individual and his or her environment until nothing more can be gleaned  from  the  interaction.  This  requires  not  only  a  particular  acumen  but also an intense desire for the experience. The difference between “doing a job” and being a live creature or genius in any occupation is the approach employed. 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That approach is determined by the distinctive caliber of previous experiences. Dewey  explains,  “Compartmentalization  of  occupations  and  interests  brings about  separation  of  that  mode  of  activity  commonly  called  ‘practice’  from insight, of imagination from executive doing, of significant purpose from work, of  emotion  from  thought  and  doing.  …  Those  who  write  the  anatomy  of experience then suppose that these divisions inhere in the very constitution of human nature.”  (AE:  21)  For most  people,  experiences  are  actions  undergone amidst a scheme of separation and are rarely understood within the framework of  their  intrinsic  meaning.  Only  the  few,  the  aesthetic  persons,  can  have  an experience  that  results  from  full  immersion  in  the  cycle  of  undergoing  and doing.  Commitment  to  the  experience  is  the  foundation  of  the  aesthetic  and differentiates an experience from mere experience.   Dewey  asserts  that  the  “truth”  can never be  known by  simple  consecutive reasoning  and  that  all  philosophical  reasoning  can  only  arrive  at  the  goal  by putting aside numerous objections. “Does not the reasoner have also to trust to his ‘intuition’ to what come upon him in his immediate sensuous and emotional experiences,  even  against  objections  that  reflection  presents  to  him.  … Ultimately  there  are  but  two  philosophies.  One  of  them  accepts  life  and experience in all its uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half‐knowledge and turns experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities—to imagination and  art.”  (AE:  34‐35)  This  states  precisely  von  Clausewitz’s  philosophy  of 
military  genius.  The  deepened  and  intensified  understanding,  manifest  in  his 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concept of coup d’oeil, enables the successful commander (at the highest levels) to see war as an experience and an aesthetic endeavor. Recall briefly, coup d’oeil refers to the commander’s “inner eye,” the ability to partake and understand the entire  environment  of  war  appropriate  to  his  or  her  position.  At  the  highest levels, this requires intimate familiarity with all phases of battle, both strategic and tactical, as well as the requirements of state policy. This familiarity can only be  seen  as  aesthetic,  fitting  the  rubric  of  Dewey’s  concept  of  the  aesthetic  as experiences appropriately undergone—a continuum of rhythmic ebbs and flows made of cycles of doing and undergoing—reaching consummation, only to serve as the launching point for new experience.   In art, the aesthetic guaranteed for Dewey the continuing interaction of the individual  with  the  object  being  considered  in  its  ever‐shifting  environs.  The cycle  continues  until  nothing  more  can  be  had;  consummation  results  in  a temporary stability. Now a new basis for consideration nears and with an ever so  slight  change  in  the  environment  a  new  aesthetic  cycle  begins.  For  von Clausewitz,  the  same occurs  in war. He  tells  us  that  his  rhythmic  demand  for new experience serves as the only trail that can lead to success for the military 
genius.  Therefore,  war  becomes  aesthetic  in  the  Deweyan  sense.  The  soldier‐philosopher,  J.  Glenn  Gray,  in  his  classic, The Warriors;  Reflections  on  Men  In 
Battle,  describes  war  in  purely  aesthetic  terms.  Referring  to  the  havoc  and terror of a shelling of the French Riviera on August 25, 1944, he says, 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 When  I  could  forget  the  havoc  and  terror  that was  being created  by  those  shells  and  bombs  among  the  half‐awake inhabitants of the villages, the scene was beyond all question magnificent.  …  Many  former  soldiers  must  be  able  to  recall some similar experience. … As far as I am concerned, at  least part of that satisfaction can be ascribed to delight in aesthetic contemplation.   As  I  reflect  further,  it  becomes  clear,  however,  that  the term  “beauty,”  used  in  any  ordinary  sense,  is  not  the major appeal  to  such  spectacles.  Instead,  it  is  the  fascination  that 
manifestations  of  power  and  magnitude  have  for  the  human 
spirit. … Fleeting as these rapt moments may be, they are, for the majority  of men,  an  escape  from  themselves  that  is  very different  from the escapes  induced by sexual  love or alcohol. This raptness is a joining and not a losing, a deprivation of self in  exchange  for  a  union  with  objects  that  were  hitherto foreign. Yes, the chief aesthetic appeal of war surely lies in this 
feeling  of  the  sublime,  to  which  we,  children  of  nature,  are directed whether we desire it or not. Astonishment and wonder 
and awe appear to be part of our deepest being, and war offers them an exercise field par excellence.    Perhaps  the majority of men  cannot become  so absorbed in a spectacle that they overcome fear of pain and death. … If ever the world is blown to bits by some superbomb, there will be  those  who  will  watch  the  spectacle  to  the  last  minute, without  fear,  disinterestedly  and  with  detachment.  I  do  not mean that there is lack of interest in this disinterestedness or lack of emotion in this detachment. Quite the contrary. But the 
self  is  no  longer  important  to  the  observer;  it  is  absorbed  into 




  Von Clausewitz asserts  the only way  for an experience  to have worth  is as part of a thread, or tapestry, of continual, victorious battles or the most realistic training.  The  imputation  of  this  view  demands  that  only  by  a  series  of meaningful  actions  or  experiences  can  the  stage  be  set  for  the  increasing development  of  the  commander  as  he  or  she  moves  from  foot  soldier  to commander‐in‐chief. Theory and study are not sufficient to develop the leader or commander. Full immersion in the environment of interest provides the only mechanism  wherein  the  traits  and  attributes  can  be  generated.  Aesthetic experiences—as conceived by Dewey—in actual combat and positions of state policymaking are the genesis of, and framework for, the fully developed military 
genius.  This  concept  parallels  Dewey’s  picture  of  the  aesthetic  development needed to become a live creature.   Von Clausewitz and Dewey also share the sense that thinking corresponds to an aesthetic endeavor. This is important because for an individual to reach his or her acme of potential he or  she must be able  to  think clearly and correctly within his or her environment. Thinking, as Dewey explains, requires not only intellectual but emotional effort. Likewise the process fosters volitional and goal oriented or purposive. Thinking is a train of ideas, both emotional and practical, that are not separate from one another but part of a complete whole. “We say of an  experience  of  thinking  that  we  reach  or  draw  a  conclusion.  Theoretical formulation of the process is often made in such terms as to conceal effectually the  similarity  of  ‘conclusion’  to  the  consummating  phase  of  every  developing 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integral  experience.”  (AE:  39)  Of  course,  this  “integral  experience”  is  nothing more than Dewey’s rhythmic cycle of doing and undergoing or, succinctly put, 
an aesthetic experience.    Dewey further  links thinking to the aesthetic. He expatiates on the concept as follows:   Hence  an  experience  of  thinking  has  its  own  esthetic quality.  It  differs  from  those  experiences  that  are acknowledged  to  be  esthetic,  but  only  in  materials.  The material  of  the  fine  arts  consists  of  qualities;  that  of experience having intellectual conclusion are signs or symbols having  no  intrinsic  quality  of  their  own,  but  standing  for things  that  may  in  another  experience  be  qualitatively experienced. The difference is enormous. … Nevertheless, the experience itself has a satisfying emotional quality because it possesses internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement. In so far, it is esthetic. (AE: 39‐40)  Von Clausewitz holds a view of thinking that seems a precursor to the Deweyan concept  of  thought.  Describing  the  requisite  intellectual  abilities  of  the successful  commander  (military  genius),  the  General  is  clear  on  the  aesthetic quality of thinking.   One  more  requisite  remains  to  be  considered—a  factor more vital to military knowledge that to any other. Knowledge must  be  so  absorbed  into  the  mind  that  it  almost  ceases  to exist  in  a  separate,  objective way.  In  almost  any other  art or profession  a man  can work with  truths  he  has  learned  from musty books, but which have no life or meaning for him. Even truths  that  are  in  constant  use  and  are  always  to  hand may still  be  externals.  …  It  is  never  like  that  in  war.  Continual change and the need to respond to it compels the commander to  carry  the  whole  intellectual  apparatus  of  his  knowledge within  him.  He  must  always  be  ready  to  bring  forth  the appropriate decision. By total assimilation with his mind and 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life,  the commander’s knowledge must be  transformed  into a genuine capability. …    A  book  cannot  really  teach  us  how  to  do  anything,  and therefore  “art”  should  have  no  place  in  its  title.  …  It  is therefore  consistent  to keep  this basis  of distinction and  call everything “art” whose object is creative ability, …   Of  course  all  thought  is  art.  The point where  the  logician draws  the  line,  where  premises  resulting  from  perceptions end and where judgment starts, is the point where art begins. But further: perception by the mind is already a judgment and therefore an art;  so  too,  in  the  last  analysis,  is perception by the senses. In brief, it is impossible to imagine a human being capable of perception but not of  judgment or vice versa,  it  is likewise impossible to separate art and knowledge altogether. The  more  these  delicate  motes  of  light  are  personified  in 
external  forms  of  being,  the more will  their  realms  separate. (HP: 147‐148)  Art,  as  described  by  von  Clausewitz,  is  almost  a  direct  parallel  to  Dewey’s description of the aesthetic experience. We see that the General claims war is a milieu  of  continual  change  demanding  a  continual  response  from  the  service member.  This  is  akin  to  Dewey’s  requirement  of  a  constant  doing  and undergoing  for  an  experience  to  qualify  as  aesthetic.  Von Clausewitz  portrays knowledge as something that must “be so absorbed into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a separate, objective way.” This description differs little from Dewey’s  claim  that  thinking,  “has  a  satisfying  emotional  quality  because  it possesses  internal  integration.”  The  General  states  his  case  by  asserting thinking is “of course” an art. Art for von Clausewitz is the aesthetic. (This idea is expanded in his discussion of war as social.) Dewey, as stated above, tells us that  thinking  is,  indeed,  aesthetic.  “Nevertheless,  the  experience  itself  has  a 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satisfying  emotional  quality  because  it  possesses  internal  integration  and fulfillment  reached  through  ordered  and  organized movement.  In  so  far,  it  is esthetic.” (AE: 40)   The  aesthetic,  for  both  von  Clausewitz  and  Dewey,  is  the  very  nature  of experience undergone in such a way as to completely involve the individual and the environment. This  intimate and precarious  connection between being and nature, in constant struggle with one another, each reacting with and changing the  other  until  stability  and  consummation  is  reached,  is  the  essence  of  an experience. This ongoing cycle of action and reaction, stopping and starting,  is the aesthetic.   An  incomplete  cycle  of  doing,  undergoing,  and  consummation  is  one  of anesthesia. The individual no longer develops, cannot flourish, and is incapable of being a  live creature or military genius. The words of both philosophers are uncannily similar;  their metaphors are  inter‐changeable. For Dewey,  “  (W)hen excitement  about  the  subject matter  goes deep,  it  stirs up a  store of  attitudes and meanings derived from prior experience. As they are aroused into activity they become conscious thoughts and emotions, emotionalized images. To be set on fire by a thought or scene is to be inspired. What is kindled must either burn itself out, turning to ashes, or must press itself out in material that changes the latter  from  crude metal  into  a  refined  product.”  (AE:  68)  For  von  Clausewitz, “The  effects  of  physical  and  psychological  factors  (the  environment  and  the individual) form an organic whole which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by 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chemical  processes.  … Hence most  of  the matters  dealt with  in  this  book  are composed of equal parts of physical and of moral causes and effects. One might say that the physical is little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely‐honed blade.” (HP: 184‐185) (Parenthetical added)   Aesthetic  experience,  per  Dewey,  results  from  all  meaningful  experiences previously  undergone.  We  are  capable  of  having  an  experience  only  as  a consequence of  the nature as determined by earlier  experience. An  individual may never know how earlier experiences will shape future experiences but each experience  serves  as  bedding  for  new,  aesthetic  experiences.  Experiences  are beginnings, often hazily formed, for the new and novel. This inchoate nature of experience has been well characterized by McDermott as follows:    Taking  these phases now  in  turn, what  can we say of  the inchoate  as  characteristic  of  our  aesthetic  sensibility?  We carry each with us, subcutaneously, as Dewey would say, all of our  experiences  ever  undergone.  To  retrieve  them  we  have obvious  activities,  such  as  memory,  and  more  determined attempts,  such  as  retrospection.  We  are  also  subject  to flashbacks, startling intrusions from our past into our present consciousness.  At  times,  we  can  trace  the  relational  netting that  gave  rise  to  these  eruptions  but  at  other  times  their origins  are  vague,  unknown,  as  if  they  were  self‐propelled from  our  past  into  our  present.  What  is  startling  and pedagogically  crucial  about our experience of  the  inchoate  is that when  it makes  its  appearance  in  our  consciousness, we realize  the  originating  power  and  the  surprising  novelty  of experiences we once “had” and yet of which we were unaware in our daily consciousness. (2007: 232) 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Von  Clausewitz  would  certainly  agree  with  this  observation  but  would  most likely  argue  that  experiences  in war  should  be  sought  as  often  as  possible  in order  to  “train”  or  “teach”  the  future  genius  for  the  certain  and  sure  unique experiences  he  or  she  will  face  in  future  combat.  That  he  understands  the pedagogical value and nature of experience is clear.   The  actions  of  Colonel  Joshua  Chamberlain  is  a  prime  example  of  the inchoate making “its appearance in our consciousness” as a result of “the power and surprising novelty of experiences we once ‘had’ and yet of which we were unaware.”  Colonel  Chamberlain,  at  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  made  one  of  the most daring counter charges in the history of warfare. Many military historians credit the Colonel as the decisive factor in ensuring the Union victory. Charged with  defending  the  extreme  southern  flank  at  Little  Round  Top,  Chamberlain and  hi  20th  Maine  Infantry,  were  in  fierce  combat  with  the  15th  Alabama Infantry. During this intense firefight, the Confederates began to turn the flank, while  the  Union  forces  were  quickly  depleting  their  stocks  of  ammunition. Chamberlain realized that if the Alabamians succeeded the entire Northern lines would  fall.  To  use  von  Clausewitz’s  terminology,  Chamberlain’s  coup  d’oeil enabled him to see the “big picture”  in through the miasma of combat and the fog  of war.  Even  though  struck  by  a  bullet  in  the  thigh  (he was  saved  by  his sword  which  deflected  the  missile),  the  Colonel  ordered  his  men,  who  were without  ammunition,  to  begin  a  charge  against  the  enemy.  This  is  a  prime 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example of von Clausewitz’s demand for determination and resoluteness once a decision is made. In Colonel Chamberlain’s own words, Not a moment was about to be lost! Five minutes more of such a defensive and the last roll call would sound for us! Desperate as  the chances were,  there was nothing  for  it but  to  take  the offensive. I stepped to the colors. The men turned towards me. One  word was  enough‐  “BAYONETS!”  It  caught  like  fire  and swept along  the ranks. The men  took  it up with a  shout, one could not say whether from the pit or the song of the morning sat,  it  was  vain  to  order  'Forward!'  No  mortal  could  have heard it in the mighty hosanna that was winging the sky. The whole  line quivered  from  the  start;  the  edge of  the  left‐wing rippled, swung, tossed among the rocks, straightened, changed curve from scimitar to sickle‐shape; and the bristling archers swooped down upon  the  serried host‐  down  into  the  face  of half a thousand! Two hundred men! It was a great right wheel. Our left swung first, the advancing foe  stopped,  tried  to  make  a  stand  amidst  the  trees  and boulders,  but  the  frenzied  bayonets  pressing  through  every space  forced  a  constant  settling  to  the  rear. Morrill  with  his detached  company  and  the  remnants  of  our  valorous sharpshooters... now fell upon the flank of the retiring crowd. At  the  first  dash  the  commanding  officer  I  happened  to confront,  coming  on  fiercely  (with)  sword  in  hand  and  big navy revolver (in) the other, fires one barrel almost in my face. But seeing the quick saber point at his throat, reverses arms, gives  sword  and  pistol  into  my  hands  and  yields  himself prisoner.    Ranks  were  broken;  some  retired  before  us  somewhat hastily; some threw their muskets to the ground‐ even loaded; sunk  on  their  knees,  threw  up  their  hands  calling  out,  “We surrender. Don't kill us!” As  if we wanted  to do  that! We kill only  to  resist  killing.  And  these were manly men,  whom we could befriend and by no means kill,  if  they came our way  in peace and good will. (Heiser: Web)  For his actions at Gettysburg, The Lion of Round Top as he was later called, was awarded the Medal of Honor. In April of 1865, General Ulysses Grant gave then brevet‐Major General Chamberlain the honor of commanding the Union forces 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at  Appomattox  in  accepting  the  surrender  of  General  Robert  E.  Lee’s Army  of 
Northern Virginia.  
  The example of Colonel Chamberlain illustrates the experiential concepts of both  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz.  From  the  Clausewitzian  perspective,  the Colonel  not  only  had  experienced many  prior  combat  actions,  which  enabled him to have the right kind of experiences to engender a refined “inner eye.” He not only had  the sense of  combat  that  required  immediate action  if he was  to survive but he also saw the strategic, or political, implications of defeat. Loss not only meant defeat for the 20th Maine but also quite probably meant the loss of the Battle of Gettysburg as well. Such a loss would have had dire consequences for the Union. Instead, the battle marked a clear turning point in the war. From a Deweyan understanding,  all  of  Chamberlain’s  prior  experiences  prepared him for the moment at Little Round Top. The  inchoate nature of  those experiences “erupted” on that fateful July day in 1863. Perhaps, as McDermott suggests, the nature of the inchoate of those experiences are not consciously knowable but, as Dewey  asserts,  all  of  the  Colonel’s  prior  experiences  enabled  him  to  take  the bold actions required. 
Continuity   The  “aesthetic,”  as  this  dissertation  uses  the  term,  has  as  its  generative kernel the concept of an experience, or, experiences properly had as a relation of  the  individual with his or her  environment.  Inherent  in  the aesthetic  is  the demand for continuity. The word  ‘continuity’ has two senses for Dewey. In the 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first  sense,  continuity  means  a  re‐establishment  of  the  aesthetic  with  the practical;  that  is,  to make clear  that  the  real and pulsating world  in which we live offers us the aesthetic in the very environment of life. In the second sense, continuity  is  a  thread  that  binds  all  meaningful  experiences  together  into  a meaningful  whole.  In  this  sense,  continuity  enables  the  individual  to  meld experiences  into  a  complete  and  unified  set,  thus,  enabling  that  person  to become  Dewey’s  live  creature  or  von  Clausewitz’s  military  genius.  This  brief section  explicates  the  need  for  continuity  in  the  aesthetic  and,  more importantly, how von Clausewitz’s view of continuity exemplifies  in a realistic and practical manner, and in all meaningful or properly undergone experiences, Dewey’s demand for continuity.   At the beginning of Art as Experience, Dewey describes his philosophical task in  terms  of  the  restoration  of  the  aesthetic  as  a  re‐establishment  of  the continuity between  the cultural concepts of  the  fine arts  (as archetypes of  the aesthetic) with  the practices  of  the  actual world. Dewey  clarifies  the need  for continuity, in the first sense of the word, as follows:   When  artistic  objects  are  separated  from both  conditions of  origin  and  operation  in  experience,  a wall  is  built  around them  that  renders  almost  opaque  their  general  significance, with which esthetic theory deals. Art is remitted to a separate realm,  where  it  is  cut  off  from  that  association  with  the materials and aims of every form of human effort, undergoing and  achievement.  A  primary  task  is  thus  imposed  upon  one who undertakes to write upon the philosophy of the fine arts. This task is to restore the continuity between the refined and intensified  forms of experience  that are works of art and  the everyday  events,  doings,  and  sufferings  that  are  universally 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recognized  to  constitute  experience.  Mountain  peaks  do  not float unsupported; they do not even rest upon the earth. They 
are  the  earth  in  one  of  its  manifest  operations.  It  is  the business  of  those who  are  concerned with  the  theory  of  the earth, geographers and geologists, to make this fact evident in its  various  implications.  The  theorist  who  would  deal philosophically with fine art has a like task to accomplish.  (AE: 2)  Dewey’s  philosophical  task  is  to  make  clear  that  the  aesthetic  is  not  merely something  that  operates  apart  from our place  in  the world. He notes  that  the aesthetic inheres in “everyday events, doings, and sufferings.” Continuity, in this sense, becomes more clearly illuminated in the exposition of the role of theory as it relates to development of von Clausewitz’s discussion of the military leader or  commander. As Dewey puts  it,  “My purpose, however, …  is  to  indicate  that 
theories  which  isolate  art  and  its  appreciation  by  placing  them  in  a  realm  of their own, disconnected from other modes of experiencing, are not inherent in the  subject‐matter  but  arise  because  of  extraneous  conditions.  …  Even  to readers who are adversely  inclined  to what has been  said,  the  implications of the statements that have been made may be useful in defining the nature of the problem:  that  of  recovering  the  continuity of  esthetic  experience with normal processes of living.” (AE: 9)   The major  import  in  the above description of  continuity  is,  simply,  that all we  do,  if  understood  and  undergone  correctly,  constitutes  the  aesthetic.  The aesthetic is not relegated to objects or things apart from the relationship of the individual  with  the  environment.  This  proper  understanding—the  cycle  of 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doing  and undergoing—entails  continuity  as described  in  the  second  sense of the word. Chapter II offered a full explanation of Dewey’s insight and awareness of  the  nature  of  the  continuity  of  experience.  Briefly,  the  individual  and  the environment  continually  interact  and  each  changes  as  a  result  of  that interaction. Once changed,  the conditions appear as  “new” and  the  interaction continues  based  on  the  renewed  relationship  between  individual  and environment. This cycle continues until a point of stability  is established. This stability, or consummation as Dewey calls this temporary condition, is not to be confused with stasis or a  fixed, unchanging relationship. Consummation,  if  the experience  has  extracted  all  that  can  be  gained  from  the  relationship  of  the individual  and  environment,  has  changed  the  individual  in  such  a  way  as  to form  an  incubator  for  understanding  new  and  different  experiences.  Thus, consummation is not finality.   The individual now has formed a more complete foundation for interaction with novel environments and conditions which may arise whereas, heretofore, the  full  potential  of  the  relationship  of  person  and  surroundings  could  never have  been  realized  because  the  bedding  was  not  set  for  the  new  conditions. Clearly stated, Dewey comments,    There  is  in nature, even below the  level of  life, something more than mere flux and change. Form is arrived at whenever a stable, even though moving, equilibrium is reached. Changes interlock  and  sustain  one  another.  Whenever  there  is coherence  there  is  endurance.  Order  is  not  imposed  from without  but  is  made  out  of  the  relations  of  harmonious interactions  that  energies  bear  to  one  another.  Because  it  is 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active  (not  anything  static  because  foreign  to what  goes  on) order  develops.  It  comes  to  include  within  its  balanced movement a greater variety of changes. …   For only when an organism shares in the ordered relations of  its  environment  does  it  secure  the  stability  essential  to living.  And  when  the  participation  comes  after  a  phase  of disruption  and  conflict,  it  bears  within  itself  the  germs  of  a consummation akin to the esthetic. (AE: 13‐14)  One must,  for maximal  discernment, mastery  and  appreciation  of  any  and  all experiences,  have  set  the  bedrock  underpinnings  in  place  by  having  had previous meaningful experiences that allow for an understanding of the new.   Von  Clausewitz  makes  this  clear  in  his  exposition  on  developing  the commander‐in‐chief—the military genius. While the terms the General employs to  describe  the  requisite  experiences  necessary  for  one’s  evolution  into  the consummate  leader  are  not  those  of  Dewey,  conceptually  the  process  of  the 
genius’s development  fits  the Deweyan  paradigm. Coup  d’oeil,  the  “inner  eye,” (discussed in Chapter III) is the ability to see the battle and the war as it unfolds with  all  the  uncertainties  and  the  possibilities  that  are  offered.  Only  through previous experience of  the appropriate kind can the battlefield commander or the  commander‐in‐chief develop  this  “inner eye.” Von Clausewitz  is  explicit  in his demand for real and continued experience as the bedrock for preparation for victory.  When  citing  the  requirements  for  the  spirit  of  a  victorious  army,  he says,    There  are  only  two  sources  for  this  spirit,  and  must interact in order to create it. The first is a series of victorious wars; the second, frequent exertions of the army to the utmost limits of its strength. Nothing else will show a soldier the full 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extent of his capacities. The more a general  is accustomed to place heavy demands on his soldiers, the more he can depend on their response. A soldier  is  just as proud of  the hardships he has overcome as of  the dangers he has  faced. In short,  the 
seed will grow only in the soil of constant activity and exertion, 
warmed by  the sun of victory. Once  it has grown  into a  strong 
tree, it will survive the wildest storms of misfortune and defeat, 
and  even  the  indolent  inertia  of  peace.  (HP:  189)  (emphasis added)  Von Clausewitz saw quite clearly that constant exposure and involvement in the experiences of war was a necessary condition for successful undergoing of the new and uncertain  experiences  that  actual  combat would offer. Without prior experiences  of  the  “right”  nature  an  army  will  disintegrate  in  the  caldron  of fighting. For a commander‐in‐chief lacking the necessary range of experience in both warfare  and  statecraft,  the  entire war may  be  lost.  Experiences must  be constantly  renewed  and  understood  based  on  the  foundation  of  the  constant struggle undergone by the military leader in previous actual combat. Failing the opportunities for actual combat, von Clausewitz demands that training must be realistic, constant, and carried out to the “highest pitch.” (He is reacting to the type of training that some armies use of incessant drill to carry out preplanned movements of large forces. He found such training to be virtually useless.) In the quotation immediately above, von Clausewitz states emphatically that the best way to lose the spirit required for victory is to cease to experience the exertions of war and undergo “the indolent inertia of peace.” He is not advocating war for its own sake but he does realize that without opportunities for a continuing real combat action or realistic training experiences that the individual soon becomes 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unable  to  gain  the  most  from  new  and  uncertain  environments.  There  is  no doubt the only constant in war is the new and the uncertain and, therefore, the 
military  genius  must  evolve  from  within  a  domain  of  constant  combat experience or realistic training. 
Uncertainty and Friction; the Organism   Dewey  emphasizes  the  nature  of  continuity  in  an  aesthetic  experience  by asserting  that  the consummation  is merely a stage of stability ready to  launch the  individual  into  another  experience.  In  terms  of  a  work  of  art,  the consummation  of  an  experience  may  be  the  beginning  of  a  new  aesthetic experience  of  the  very  same  object  depending  on  how  the  work  is  seen;  for example, the lighting may be different, the viewing angle might have changed or the  viewer  is  in  a  different  physical  or  mental  state  than  when  the  previous experiences with  the  same  object were  undergone.  Von  Clausewitz makes  an identical point in his discussion of the moral factors in war. The General claims,    Mechanical  and  optical  structures  are  not  subject  to dispute. But when  they  come  to  the aesthetics  of  their work, when  they  aim  at  a  particular  effect  on  the  mind  or  on  the senses, the rules dissolve into nothing but vague ideas.    Medicine  is  usually  concerned  only  with  physical phenomena.  It  deals  with  the  animal  organism,  which, 
however, is subject to constant change, and thus is never exactly 
the same from one moment to the next. This renders the task of medicine  very  difficult,  and makes  the  physician’s  judgment count  for  more  than  his  knowledge.  But  how  greatly  is  the difficulty  increased when  a mental  factor  is  added,  and  how much more highly do we value the psychiatrist!   Military  activity  is  never  directed  against  material  force 




  But  moral  values  can  only  be  perceived  by  the  inner  eye, 
which differs  in each person, and  is often different  in  the  same 
person at different times. (HP: 136‐137) (Emphasis added)  Several  critical  ideas  manifest  themselves  in  this  brief  observation  of  von Clausewitz. First, the physical world—his “mechanical and optical structures”—is  only  “real”  insofar  as  that  world  reacts  in  relation  to  the  mind  of  the individual. This  is the same construct as Dewey’s demand for a relationship of “doing and undergoing” between the individual and his or her environment. Von Clausewitz  even  employs  terms  worthy  of  Dewey  when  he  describes  the environment in term of the aesthetic nature of its “effect on the mind or on the senses.” Next,  the General observes that humans are organisms and organisms are  in a continual  state of change. This means each person’s  relationship with the  environment  is  a  relationship  of  an  ever‐changing  nature  and  each experience is perforce a new and different one. Experiences,  in that sense, can never be claimed as “complete.” Each experience may affect the way in which a mind will change but  the only guarantee  is  that  the mind will  change. This re‐enforces  the concept of  continuity described earlier. Third, military  forces are never  engaged  against  static  or  predictable  opposing  forces,  a  static environment  or,  what  the  General  calls,  “material  force  alone.”  Instead,  the military must  respond  to  “moral  forces,” which  are  considered  to  be  reactive and active entities that are unpredictable, uncertain, subject to randomness and chance, and often even unknown. Finally, any understanding that is possible in this  environment  is  only  possible  by  the  “inner  eye”  and,  as we  have  already 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seen,  this  can  only  be developed by  appropriate  experience  gained  in  combat and,  for  the  highest  level  of  command,  appropriate  exposure  to  the  political requirements of the state.    The  moral  forces  to  which  von  Clausewitz  refers  are  but  a  part  of  what constitutes the reactive element of the environment in which war is conducted. These  forces  represent  the human  element  and  are  always unpredictable  and destabilize  the surroundings of both combat and the political arena—both are the  major  and  proper  concerns  of  the  military  genius.  The  other  aspect contributing to the instability of the environment of war are those elements of nature  that  cause  all  plans  to  be  made  moot  once  hostilities  begin.  For  the purposes  of  this  section,  noting  that  role  of  unpredictability  is  sufficient  to introduce a major  concept of experience  that  is  critical  to  the  thought of both Dewey and von Clausewitz, namely, friction or resistance.    The  concept  of  disorder,  disarray,  unpredictability,  chance  and  luck  are necessary for an experience to be aesthetic and, consequently, is the very thing that enables the individual to become the live creature or the military genius. “In a  growing  life,  the  recovery  is  never  mere  return  to  a  prior  state,  for  it  is enriched  by  the  state  of  disparity  and  resistance  through  which  it  has successfully  passed.  If  the  gap  between  the  organism  and  environment  is  too wide,  the  creature  dies.  If  its  activity  is  not  enhanced  by  the  temporary alienation  it  merely  subsists.  Life  grows  when  a  temporary  falling  out  is  a transition  to  a  more  extensive  balance  of  the  energies  of  the  organism  with 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those of the conditions under which it lives.” (AE: 12‐13) Growth, claims Dewey, can only occur through the resistances encountered and faced in the domain of the  surroundings  in  which  the  organism  finds  itself.  Once  the  “disparity  and resistance”  is  squarely  faced and undergone,  the organism  is  forever changed. No  reversion  to  a previous  state of  existence  can occur. The  “new” existential state of  the organism  is path dependent and results  from all prior experience. Put  simply,  the  organism  is  an  archetypical  example  of  hysteresis.  When stability in the organism is reached, that equilibrium, or the consummation, can only result from the prior resistance or tension between the individual and the environment.    The individual,  the organism, always struggles for stability and order. Both von  Clausewitz  and  Dewey  are  aware  that  a  constant  state  of  equilibrium  is impossible because  the nature of  the world  is such  that disarray and disorder are the only true constants. To paraphrase Heraclitus, “The only thing constant is  change.” Nonetheless,  temporary  stability marks  the  goal  of  an  ordered  life and offers a consummation, which enables the individual to have a new starting point for future experiences.    In his discussion of  the artist, Dewey proclaims, “Since the artist cares  in a peculiar way for the phase of experience in which union is achieved, he does not shun moments of resistance and tension. He rather cultivates them, not for their own sake but because of their potentialities, bringing to living consciousness an experience that is unified and total.” (AE: 14) Critical to Dewey’s conception of 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the need for “resistance and tension” is the idea that the continual changes in an individual’s relation to his or her environment occur in a rhythm of stability and instability.    Direct experience comes from nature and man interacting with each other.  In this  interaction, human energy gathers,  is released,  damned  up,  frustrated  and  victorious.  There  are rhythmic  beats  of  want  and  fulfillment,  pulses  of  doing  and being withheld from doing.   All  interactions  that  effect  stability  and  order  in  the whirling flux of change are rhythms. There is an ebb and flow, systole and diastole: ordered change. The latter moves within bounds. To overpass the limits that are set is destruction and death, out of which, however, new rhythms are built up. The proportionate interception of changes establishes order that is spatially, not merely temporally patterned … Contrast of  lack and fullness, of struggle and achievement, of adjustment after consummated  irregularity,  form  the  drama  in  which  action, feeling,  and  meaning  are  one.  The  outcome  is  balance  and counterbalance.  These  are  not  static  nor  mechanical.  They express  power  that  is  intense  because  measured  through overcoming  resistance.  Environing  objects  avail  and counteravail. (AE: 15)  Dewey’s  concept  of  resistance  and  tension  is  evident.  His  demand  for  the rhythmic  interplay  of  the  steady  and  the  certain  with  the  parlous  and precarious highlights the positive role of resistance in developing the individual to become, potentially, the flourishing or complete individual.    Dewey also notes that resistance can be disruptive and counterproductive if the individual is incapable of interacting appropriately with or ameliorating the effects  of  his  or  her  environment.  In  his  essay,  “Experience,  Knowledge  and Value:  A  Rejoinder,”  Dewey  acknowledges  this  in  his  response  to  a  critic, Stephen C. Pepper. He states,  “Instead of denying  the  importance of conflict  in 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esthetic  experience,  I  have  emphasized  its  indisputable  function—see  for example  the  references  to  Resistance  in  the  Index.  What  I  have  done  is  to distinguish between cases of conflict that lead to dispersion and disruption (of which for example modern psychiatry gives so many examples), and those cases in  which  conflict  and  tension  are  converted  into  means  of  intensifying  a consummatory appreciation of material of an individual qualitative experience. …  Mr.  Pepper  was  led  astray  by  ignoring  what  I  said  about  the  uniquely qualitative  individualized  and  discrete  aspect  of  the  situations  which  have esthetic  traits.”  (LW14:  36‐37)  This  acknowledgement  by  Dewey  frames  a possible distinction that could apply between those who, through continued and incessant combat, develop illnesses such as post‐traumatic stress syndrome and those  who  emerge  more  able  to  cope  in  similar  environments.  In  sum,  this difference is explained by how one deals with and understands the “lessons” to be gained from his or her surroundings. “What is called experience becomes so dispersed  and  miscellaneous  as  hardly  to  deserve  the  name.  Resistance  is treated as an obstruction to be beaten down, not as an invitation to reflection. …Experiences are also cut short from maturing by excess of receptivity. What is prized is then the mere undergoing of this and that, irrespective of perception of any meaning”  (AE:  46)  Again,  Dewey  is  demanding  a  certain  “quality”  in  the relationship  of  the  individual  to  the  environment.  This  appropriate  quality demands  the  acceptance  of,  and  maturation  through,  the  resistances  and tensions inherent in the relationship. 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 Von Clausewitz, as does Dewey,  finds special  significance  in  the concept of resistance.  As  earlier  suggested,  this  resistance,  or  friction  as  the  General  is wont to call the unexpected, takes the form of feedback from the environment. This  feedback  has  two  sources:  either  from  the moral  forces  of  the  opposing army and  its generals or  from the natural environment  in  the  form of  terrain, weather, and the like. If this friction is to contribute to the development of the 
military genius the individual must view the uncertainties in a positive manner, 
á  la  Dewey.  Von  Clausewitz  describes  the  moral  nature  of  the  resistance  in terms of the enemy’s will, thus,   War,  however,  is  not  the  action  of  a  living  force  upon  a lifeless mass (total nonresistance would be no war at all) but always  the  collision of  two  living  forces. The ultimate  aim of waging  war,  as  formulated  here,  must  be  taken  to  apply  to both sides. Once again,  there  is  interaction. So  long as  I have not  overthrown  my  opponent  I  am  bound  to  fear  he  may overthrow me. Thus I am not  in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him. …   If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means 
at  his  disposal  and  the  strength  of  his  will.  The  extent  of  the means at his disposal is a matter—though not exclusively—of figures, and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is  so  much  less  easy  to  determine  and  can  only  be  gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it. (HP: 77)  Uncertainty  pervades  the  morass  of  war;  the  environment  is  not  simply  a stagnant  pond,  unmoving  and  still,  but  rather  a  roiling  river  ready  to  change course  at  any  time  at  the  will  of  the  opposing  commanders.  The  will  of  the commanders is often determinative of an engagement and, in the end, the entire 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war.  The  importance  of  the  commander’s,  as well  as  the  people’s, will  can  be seen in many engagements throughout history and is clear in battles and wars being  fought  today.  The  motives  and  the  will  of  those  forces  of  terror  have effectively held the military might of the western industrialized world at bay for a  decade.  In  this  “modern” war,  will  appears  to  trump  strength  of  arms  and, most certainly, contributes to the uncertainty and friction of the contemporary battlefield.   Generators of uncertainty and  friction are an  inherent  feature of war. This dissertation  does  not  include  a  discussion  of  all  of  them,  however,  several illustrations  should  set  the  framework  for  the  environment  in  which  the commander must operate. Since war, per von Clausewitz,  is a political act,  the commander‐in‐chief  must  be  first  and  foremost  politically  attuned  to  the reasons  for  war.  “The  political  object—the  original  motive  for  the  war—will thus determine the military objective. …The political object cannot, however, in 
itself provide the standard of measurement. Since we are dealing with realities, not with abstractions,  it can do so only in the context of the two states at war. The  same  political  object  can  elicit  differing  reactions  from  different  peoples, and  even  from  the  same  people  at  different  times. We  can  therefore  take  the political object as a standard only if we think of the  influence it can exert upon 
the  forces  it  is meant to move.” (HP: 81) The import  is  that even at the highest levels of war, the commanders must realize that the reasons for war are never static  and  the  political mandate  for  the war  itself  is  always  in  a  state  of  flux. 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Since military action  is meant to  implement a political aim,  the military genius must  structure his  or her understanding  for  the war on a  shifting  foundation. Granted, this shift does not often take the form of rapid change, but the potential for  shift  is  nonetheless  critical.  If  the  raison  d’être  for  the  war  is  subject  to change,  the  entire  construct  of  the  war  is  unlikely  to  remain  steady.  As  von Clausewitz notes, not all wars have the same goals. If the political aims are ever‐changing  the  ability  of  the  commander  to  shift  the  course  of  the  war  can  be problematic.    A more immediate, and perhaps more interesting, demonstration of the role of resistance and friction in warfare occurs in the tactical and strategic realms of actual  combat. Von Clausewitz notes  that  a major  cause of  the  “unknowns”  in the environment of war is the fact the commanders almost always are acting in the  arena with  imperfect  knowledge.  Knowledge  of  the  enemy’s  strength  can only come from intelligence and that is always suspect. When the requirement to understand the enemy’s will and motives is factored into the calculation, the commander is required to make decisions based on only a partial, and perhaps faulty,  foundation.  At  this  point  in  the  planning,  only  prior  experience  and  a strategic  sense  based  on his  or  her  “inner  eye,”  can  guide  the military  genius. The way in which these prior experiences are more meaningfully held, that is in the Deweyan sense of an aesthetic experience, the more likely is the commander able to plan appropriately. 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 Beyond the political motives for war and the planning for action, the actual combat  looms  as  the  most  critical  for  direct  interaction  of  individual  and environment.  Friction  in  combat  is  evident  at  nearly  every  turn.  Almost immediately, once war has begun, the abstract objective of planning and theory gives way to the subjective world of the real. The General elucidates, “It is now quite  clear  how  greatly  the  objective  nature  of  war  makes  it  a  matter  of assessing  probabilities.      Only  one  more  element  is  needed  to  make  war  a gamble—chance: the very last thing that war lacks. No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war.” (HP: 85) War is the essence of contingency. The absolute, the necessary, the predictable, are all chimeras.    The subjective nature of war requires the commander to conduct operations in an environment of constant change. This environment is not one that offers hope  for abstraction but,  rather,  requires decisions similar  to  those a gambler might  make,  decisions  based  on  an  assessment  of  probabilities  and  vague understandings of conditions acquired through a lifetime of previous exposure to  like  conditions  and  scenarios.  Von  Clausewitz  calls  upon  the  commander’s moral  qualities  (courage,  staunchness,  presence  of mind,  and  the  like)  as  the only effective antidote  to  this  constricting environment. These moral qualities are not the result of the classroom or philosophical pondering but are the result of  experiences  in  the  crucible of battle  and,  at  the highest  levels of  command, 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the  understandings  gained  as  a  political  being—the  statesman.  “In  short, absolute,  so‐called  mathematical,  factors  never  find  a  firm  basis  in  military calculations.  From  the  very  start  there  is  an  interplay  of  possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves it way throughout the length and breadth  of  the  tapestry.  In  the  whole  range  of  human  activities,  war  most resembles a game of cards.” (HP: 86)   The military genius  is at home in this sphere of uncertainty and chance. As new information is always open to doubt and the physical environment is ever changing,  the  commander  realizes  that  things  are  never  as  he  or  she  expects them  to  be.  Von  Clausewitz  says  the  genius’s  mind  must  be  “permanently armed” to deal with these continually changing and unknown conditions. “If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are  indispensible:  first, an  intellect  that, even  in  the darkest hour, 
retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the 
courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.  The first of these qualities is described by the French term, coup d’oeil, the second is determination.” (HP: 102) The General’s description of the necessary conditions for dealing with the unpredictability of war parallels Dewey’s understanding of an experience—the aesthetic  experience  of  the  live  creature.  As  stated  earlier,  Coup  d’oeil  is  the “inner  eye”  which  can  only  develop  through  constant  contact  with  the experiences of war or realistic training carried out to the highest level possible. Only the continual cycle of interacting with the environment in such a way as to 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develop the sense of the battle or, at the highest levels, the entire war will allow the commander to make the future decisions necessary for victory. The General says  quick  and  timely  decisions  are  critical  if  a  commander  is  to  control  the battle  or  the  war.  These  decisions  are  only  possible  if  the  commander  has developed  the  ability  to  see  all  the  pertinent  factors  necessary  to  make  a decision that has the highest probability of success. This ability, coup d’oeil, is a developed  ability  that  is  second  nature  to  the  military  genius.  In  today’s parlance, coup d’oeil is often translated as “situational awareness.” This seems a weak characterization of the term, however, because mere awareness neglects the requirement for continual exposure to the hostile environment of war and the need to develop the right habits in order to carry the awareness through to action.   Like  Dewey’s  continual  loop  of  doing  and  undergoing,  von  Clausewitz demands constant  interaction with the environment and subsequent decisions and  actions.  These  actions  are  the  foundation  of  what  he  describes  as  the commander’s  moral  qualities.  The  General  portrays  his  call  for  action  as 
determination. “Determination in a single instance is an expression of courage; if it  becomes  characteristic,  a  mental  habit.  But  here  we  are  referring  not  to physical courage but to the courage to accept responsibility, courage in the face of  a  moral  danger.  This  has  often  been  called  courage  d’esprit,  because  it  is created by the intellect. That, however, does not make it an act of the intellect: it is an act of temperament.” (HP: 102) Further, determination can only be built on 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previous experience. The purpose of determination is to allow the commander to act when  the  fog  of  combat would  stymie  the novice  or  the  inexperienced. The motives  for  action may  be  lacking  in  the  commander without  the  habits gained in the constant demands of war. Mere understanding of the situation—which, in itself, is a daunting capability—is not necessarily sufficient to prod the commander into action. Determination’s role is to provide that prod.   Coup d’oeil and determination are bedrock of  the commander’s presence of 
mind.  Von  Clausewitz  stresses  that  presence  of  mind  is  vital  in  war.  “This (presence of mind) must play a great role in war, the domain of the unexpected, since it is nothing but an increased capacity of dealing with the unexpected. We admire presence of mind in an apt repartee, as we admire quick thinking in the face of danger. Neither needs to be exceptional, so long as it meets the situation. A reaction following long and deep reflection may seem quite commonplace; as an immediate response it may give keen pleasure. The expression ‘presence of mind’ precisely conveys the speed and  immediacy of  the help provided by the intellect.”  (HP:  103‐104)  These  talents  of  the  commander  are  habits  formed through  continued  exposure  to  the  frictions  of war.  Not  everyone  exposed  to these  frictions  will  develop  the  necessary  coup  d’oeil,  determination  and presence of mind to become the complete commander. The military genius will develop  these  requisite  talents only by undergoing and doing  in  the Deweyan sense the experiences presented in actual war.  
141 
 
  Friction,  while  inherent  in  the  concepts  of  the  uncertain,  the  improbable, chance and luck, is also the basis for demanding that life be pursued in the real world and not in some abstract realm.    Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.  The  difficulties  accumulate  and  end  by  producing  a kind  of  friction  that  is  inconceivable  unless  one  has experienced war. … Friction  is  the only concept  that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. … This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics,  be  reduced  to  a  few  points,  is  everywhere  in contact with  chance,  and brings  about  effects  that  cannot  be measured,  just  because  they  are  largely  due  to  chance.  … 
Incidentally, it is a force that theory can never quite define. (HP: 119‐120) (emphasis added)  Theory, to be of any use, must include the understanding that the live creature and  the military  genius will  act within  the  construct  of  their  experiences  and, therefore, be acting outside of the “rules.” Both von Clausewitz and Dewey made clear that theory, whether one is addressing the aesthetic in a work of art or the practical  necessity  of  fighting  a  war,  must  not  and  cannot  dictate  how  the experience is to be undergone or understood.   Dewey identifies the theorist as one who isolates art from the realm of experience by detaching the object from the cycle of interaction of the object and its environment from the artist or the viewer. Theory assumes appreciation comes from the object itself and not from the relationship of  individual with  the object.  “Theory can start with and  from acknowledged  works  of  art  only  when  the  esthetic  is  already compartmentalized, or only when works of art are set in a niche apart instead of being  celebrations,  recognized  as  such,  of  the  things  of  ordinary  experience. 
Theory and Practice, or the Abstract and the Real
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Even a crude experience, if authentically an experience, is more fit to give a clue to the intrinsic nature of esthetic experience than is an object already set apart from any other mode of  experience.  (AE: 9) This  sense of  the  limits of  theory describes  von Clausewitz’s  view of  the value of  theory  for  the military genius. Von  Clausewitz,  describing  danger  in war,  also  notes  the  value  of  experience contra theory as the guide to understanding.    It  (danger)  is  the  lens,  so  to  speak,  through  which impressions pass to the brain.    And yet there can be no doubt that experience will by itself provide a degree of objectivity to these impressions. …    All these and similar effects in the sphere of the mind and spirit have been proved by experience; they recur constantly, and  are  therefore  entitled  to  receive  their  due  as  objective factors. What  indeed would become of  a  theory  that  ignored them?    Of  course  these  truths must  be  rooted  in  experience.  No theorist,  and  no  commander,  should  bother  himself  with psychological and philosophical sophistries. (HP: 137)  Neither philosopher is claiming that theory has no value but, rather, that theory cannot  give  rise  to  an  aesthetic  experience  nor  can  theory  act  as  a  guide  to action  in  war.  Von  Clausewitz  believes  that  the  real  conduct  of  war  decries theory and its “rules and regulations.” This does not mean war has no rules of behavior in combat but, rather, that rules for how to interpret, and dicta for how to  understand,  the  conditions  of  war  are  useless.  Only  actual  experience  can give  that  appreciation  necessary  for  survival  and  victory.  This  is  the  sense  in which he claims that the military genius is above the rules. The sense developed from  intimate knowledge of  combat, or continued and realistic  training,  is  the 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foundation for decisions of the genius. For von Clausewitz, understanding of the environment  of  war  does  not  come  from  rules  or  dogma.  The  connection  to Dewey’s construct of the aesthetic is clear.   Dewey asks rhetorically whether theory can aid in aesthetic appreciation. He cites this query as a branch of criticism, which can only offer something useful if the theorist can aid the individual in discovering how to relate to the object in question. He asserts this can only be done if the theory can somehow relate the observer and “the  function of art …to other modes of experience.” (AE: 10) As cited  earlier  in  this  dissertation,  von  Clausewitz  claims  theory  becomes “infinitely more difficult” once the individual tries to apply it to the real world. “Architects  and  painters  know  precisely  what  they  are  about  as  long  as  they deal with material phenomena. … But when they come to the aesthetics of their work, when  they  aim  at  a  particular  effect  on  the mind  or  on  the  senses,  the rules dissolve into nothing but vague ideas.” (HP: 136) Like Dewey, a theory is only  useable  in  the  real  world  of  experience  if  that  theory  allows  for  a  full continuum of interaction of the individual and the environment. No theory can determine the individual nature of the aesthetic nor can rules determine how to develop coup d’oeil or determination and presence of mind on the battlefield.   The prior discussion of von Clausewitz’s separation of the analytic (theory of war) and the synthetic (real war) indicated that theory is  intended to aim at a fixed  or  constant  understanding  while  the  actual  environment  offers  nothing but  uncertainty;  hence  theory  can  offer  no  rules  and  the military  genius  thus 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“rises above all rules.” (HP: 136) The commander is for all intents and purposes reacting  in  an  intimate way with  his  or  her  environment  and  decisions must come from within and not be subject to received dogma. Likewise, Dewey says the same thing regarding the separation of theory and the real. “The elevation of the ideal above and beyond immediate sense has operated not only to make it pallid and bloodless, but it has acted, like a conspirator with the sensual mind, to impoverish and degrade all things of direct experience.” (AE: 32)   To be fair to both the General and to Dewey, we must be aware that theory can have a positive role. Von Clausewitz believes theory is a good basis for study since  theory makes  one  familiar with  the  subject matter.  He makes  a  similar claim  for  the  study  of  history.  “It  is  precisely  that  inquiry  which  is  the most essential  part  of  any  theory,  and  leading  to  a  close  acquaintance  with  the subject;  applied  to  experience  …  it  leads  to  thorough  familiarity  with  it.  … Theory  …  is  meant  to  educate  the  mind  of  the  future  commander,  or,  more accurately,  to  guide  him  in  his  self‐education,  not  to  accompany  him  to  the battlefield …” (HP: 141) Quite obviously, theory plays an important role in our reflections and our attempts  to understand any  subject. Dewey  is well  known for his “theory of education” while von Clausewitz is renown for his “theory of war.”  This  should  not  confuse  the  reader  because  both  men  are  making  the same simple claim; while theory may help us understand a subject and make us familiar with  that  subject,  theory cannot make an experience an aesthetic one either in the world of art or the world of war. 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 In  sum,  von  Clausewitz  notes  that  the  abstract  and  the  analytic  cease  to guide  the  individual  effectively  once  he  or  she  is  thrust  into  the  synthetic environs of the world.    (W)e  can  only  say  to  ourselves,  that  it  is  a  sheer impossibility  to  construct  for  the  art  of war  a  theory, which, like  a  scaffolding,  shall  ensure  to  the  chief  actor  an  external support on all  sides.  In all  those cases  in which he  is  thrown upon  his  talent  he  would  find  himself  away  from  this scaffolding  of  theory,  and  in  opposition  to  it,  and,  however many‐sided  it might be  framed,  the same result would ensue of  which we  spoke when we  said  that  talent  and  genius  act beyond  the  law,  and  theory  is  in  opposition  to  reality.  (OW: 189‐190) (emphasis added)  Like  Dewey,  the  General  directs  the  genius  into  the  world  of  the  living;  the actual interactive environment and the changes and responses of the individual determine  what  an  experience  can  be  and  the  aesthetic  nature  of  one’s existence. 
Art and Science    Von Clausewitz was critical of  those  theorists who attempted  to make war subject  to rules. These theorists and analysts addressed war as a pure science amenable  to  empirical  experimentation  and  subject  to  certain  “laws”  of  war. The  General,  as  demonstrated,  had  little,  if  any,  tolerance  for  this  attempt  at theory. On War addressed the question of whether war was an art or a science and in so doing answered once again those analysts and critics, such as Jomini, who saw war as an endeavor subject to strict analysis. 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 Dewey  also  addressed  a  similar  question  regarding  science  and  art  in relation to the aesthetic and the nature of experience. As noted, an experience requires  an  intimate  relationship  between  individual  and  environment.  This relationship, if the experience is to qualify as aesthetic, is continuous and always changing  until  a  consummation  is  reached.  In  the  relationship,  the  individual and  the  environment  are  affecting  each  other  in  ways  that  “renew”  the relationship  at  every  instant until  the point  of  stability.  Since  the  relationship and  the  ever‐present  changing are unique  to  the  individual  and  the  attendant environment, no rules or requirements can be laid on the interaction as to how the relationship will progress. Thus, the aesthetic experience is not teleological.    Von Clausewitz takes theorists to task for not delving into the nature of war but  trying  to  analyze  war  through  mathematical  balances  and  formulas. “Writers  on  theory  felt  the  difficulty  of  the  subject  soon  enough,  and  thought themselves entitled to get rid of it by directing their maxims and systems only upon material things and a one‐sided activity. Their aim was to reach results, as in  the  science  for  the  preparation  for  war,  entirely  certain  and  positive,  and therefore  only  to  take  into  consideration  that which  could be made matter  of calculation.” (OW: 182) To answer the theoreticians, von Clausewitz undertook a brief—but powerful—attempt to explore war relative to its nature as science or art. Book II, Chapter III, of On War is titled “Art or Science of War.” This short chapter  reflects  the  General’s  awareness,  in  a  Deweyan  sense,  of  the 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shortcomings  of  viewing  the  world  in  the  abstract  versus  being  in  the  real environment of actual combat.    Von  Clausewitz  begins  by  acknowledging  that  the  terms  ‘art’  and  ‘science’ are unsettled and arguments persist as to what the words mean. He claims that this  is  easily  resolved  because,  as  he  has  pointed  out  earlier  in  his  work, “knowing”  and  “doing”  are  different  from  one  another  and  denote  disparate actions.  “The  two are  so different  that  they  should not  easily be mistaken  the one for the other. The ‘doing’ cannot properly stand in any book, and therefore also Art should never be the title of a book.” (OW: 201) This cutting remark,  I surmise,  is aimed at Baron Antoine‐Henri  Jomini whose magnum opus  is  titled 
The  Art  of  War.  In  his  essay  “Jomini  and  Clausewitz:  Their  Interaction,” Christopher Bassford, Professor of Strategy at the National War College, says in contrasting the views of the General and the Baron, 
  In  contrast  (to  von  Clausewitz),  Jomini's  view  of  history and of war was  static  and  simplistic. He  saw war as a  "great drama," a stage for heroes and military geniuses whose talents were beyond the comprehension of mere mortals. He saw the revolutionary warfare in which he himself had participated as merely  the  technical  near‐perfection  of  a  fundamentally unchanging  phenomenon,  to  be modified  only  by  superficial matters  like  the  list  of  dramatis  personae,  technology,  and transient  political  motivations.  He  drew  his  theoretical  and practical prescriptions from his experiences in the Napoleonic wars. The purpose of his theory was to teach practical lessons to "officers of a superior grade."    Accordingly,  Jomini's  aim  was  utilitarian  and  his  tone didactic.  His  writing  thus  appealed  more  readily  to  military educators. (Web) 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Jomini had  reduced war  to  certain movements of  armies  and  set  tactics  to be used in given situations. This is a view that is non‐synchronous with almost any perspective of von Clausewitz. A static view of war is precisely the opposite of either a Clausewitzian or a Deweyan view. For any majestic human endeavor, especially  one  such  as  war,  both  philosophers  would  demand  dynamic interaction and an ever‐changing relationship of commander to environment.   Von  Clausewitz  simplifies  for  the  reader  his  usage  of  the  terms  “art”  and “science.” Art is, for the General, the act of doing, or being able, while science is mere knowing. Like Dewey, von Clausewitz notes that art includes “branches of knowledge (which may be separately pure sciences) necessary for the practice of  an  art.  …  That  in  every  Art  certain  complete  sciences  may  be  included  is intelligible  of  itself,  should  not  perplex  us.  But  still  it  is worth  observing  that there  is also no science without an admixture of Art.”  (OW: 201) Likewise,  in, 




   The difference between the esthetic and the intellectual is thus  one  of  the  places  where  emphasis  falls  in  the  constant rhythm that marks the interaction of the live creature with his surroundings. … The odd notion that an artist does not think and  a  scientific  inquirer  does  nothing  else  is  the  result  of converting  a  difference  of  tempo  and  emphasis  into  a difference in kind. The thinker has his esthetic moment when his  ideas  cease  to  be  mere  ideas  and  become  corporate meanings of objects. The artist has his problems and thinks as he works.  But  his  thought  is more  immediately  embodied  in the object. Because of the comparative remoteness of his end, the  scientific  worker  operates  with  symbols,  words  and mathematical  signs.  The  artist  does  his  thinking  in  the  very qualitative media he works in, and the terms lie so close to the object  that  he  is  producing  that  they  merge  directly  into  it. (AE: 14‐15)  Von Clausewitz noted that art and science are inextricably linked in the manner suggested  by  Dewey.  Like  Dewey’s  assertion  that  the  artist  does  his  or  her thinking in the media of concern, the General tilts the scales toward art, rather than science, for the military genius.  “In a word, if it is impossible to imagine a human being possessing merely the faculty of cognition, devoid of judgment or the  reverse,  so  also  Art  and  Science  can  never  be  completely  separated  from each other. The more these subtle elements of  light embody themselves in the outward forms of the world, so much more separate appear their domains; and now,  once  more,  where  the  object  is  creation  and  production,  there  is  the province of Art; where the object is investigation and knowledge Science holds sway. After all this it results of itself that it is more fitting to say the Art of War 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Existence as a Social Construct We  therefore  conclude  that  war  does  not  belong  to  the realm  of  arts  and  sciences;  rather  it  is  part  of  man’s  social existence.  War  is  a  clash  between  major  interests,  which  is resolved by bloodshed—that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts. Rather than comparing it to art we could more  accurately  compare  it  to  commerce,  which  is  also  a conflict of human  interests and activities; and  it  is still  closer to  politics,  which  in  turn  may  be  considered  as  a  kind  of commerce on a larger scale. Politics, moreover, is the womb in which war develops—where its outlines already exist in their hidden  rudimentary  form,  like  the  characteristics  of  living creatures in their embryos. (HP: 149)  The social aspect of war exists at many levels for von Clausewitz. In separating war  from  the  arts,  the  General  claims  war  differs  from  those  arts  in  a  very specific and important manner. The mechanical arts, he tells us, directs the will toward  inanimate  matter  or,  as  in  the  fine  arts,  the  mind  and  emotions  are directed matter which may be animate but  is passive. The difference between the  arts  and  war,  however,  hinges  on  the  reactive  nature  of  the matter  with which war deals. “In war, the will is directed at an animate object that reacts. It must be obvious that the intellectual codification used in the arts and sciences is inappropriate  to  such  an  activity.  At  the  same  time  it  is  clear  that  continual striving  after  laws  analogous  to  those  appropriate  to  the  realm  of  inanimate matter was bound to lead to one mistake after another. Yet it was precisely the mechanical arts that the art of war was supposed to imitate. The fine arts were 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impossible to imitate, since they themselves do not yet have sufficient laws and rules of  their own. So  far all attempts at  formulating any have been  found too limited and one‐sided and have  constantly been undermined and  swept  away by the currents of opinion, emotion and custom.” (HP: 149) At the macro‐level, war differs from the arts and sciences by the very reactive nature of the forces involved. Earlier in this dissertation, the fact that each side in war reacted as an 
organism was seen to be the force that produced the “moral forces,” which von Clausewitz argued were the primary contributors to the uncertainty inherently experienced as “the norm” in all of warfare. War, described by the General, is an act  of  human  intercourse  and  prompts  his  parallels  to  commerce  and,  more pointedly,  to  politics.  These  activities  are  entirely  social  and  offer  an overarching descriptor for war.    The social nature of war  is  seen clearly  in  the  “wonderful  trinity”  that von Clausewitz  cites  is  the  structure  of  all  war.  Recall,  the  elements  of  this “paradoxical”  trinity  of  war  are  composed  “of  violence,  hatred,  and  enmity, which  are  to  be  regarded  as  a  natural  force;  of  the  play  of  chance  and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and, of its element of subordination,  as  an  instrument  of  policy,  which  makes  it  subject  to  reason alone.” (HP: 89) The first leg of the trinity is the will and concerns of the people; the commander and the army represent the second leg; the third leg consists of the government and the political will of the state. Thus, the nexus of the people, the army and its commander, and the political structure of the state constitute 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the social milieu in which war is conducted. These forces continually interact to define  a  constantly  changing  environment  and  define  the  very  nature  of war. The  commander  is  a  player—arguably  the  most  important  player—in  the conduct of war but he or she does not act alone. The commander is a part of the larger society for which he or she acts and, to a large extent, is defined by that society.    The  commander  and  the  army  are  co‐equal  to  the  community  and  the political.  Of  concern  are  the  main  moral  or  social  elements  of  the  army  that make  for  success  in war. Von Clausewitz  lists  the principal moral  elements of the military  as  “the  skill  of  the  commander,  the  experience  and  courage  of  the 
troops, and their patriotic  spirit.” (HP: 186) The General discusses  these moral elements  and  describes  their  importance  and  development.  Dissecting  each element  is  unnecessary  other  than  to  note  that  each  of  these  qualities  is developed not  in  isolation but  as  the  result  of  intense  social  conditioning  and interaction. The army does not function alone as separate and disparate units or individuals.    The  commander’s  skill  is  developed  through  continuous  and intense  interaction  in  combat  and,  eventually,  at  the  highest  levels  of  the political  arena.  This  interaction  with  armies—both  one’s  own  and  the enemy’s—is intensely social. This is certainly the case for senior leaders as each becomes  steeped  in  the political  arena of  the nation.  Similarly,  the experience and courage of the troops can only be forged in a tight knit community of peers undergoing  similar  trials  and  hardships.  No  peacetime  community  offers  or 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wisdom  has  for  its  bedrock  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the 
immediate  environment  and  trained  capacity  for  dealing with 
it.  The  quality  of  mind  thus  engendered  is  simple  and  clear­
sighted, formed by having to do with uncompromising realities and hence adapted to future situations. It is firm, sensitive and 
sure of itself. … The moral is plain: Knowledge that is worthy of being called knowledge, training of the intellect that is sure to 
amount  to  anything,  is  obtained  only  by  participating intimately and actively  in activities of social  life.”  (MW8: 249‐250) (emphasis added)  Dewey’s brief comment contains the essence of von Clausewitz’s conception of the social in the development of the successful commander. His observation that our  “direct  sense  of  reality”  is  formed  by  commitment  to  close‐knit  social environs  is  the paradigm for development of  the military genius  as well as  for the  army  in  general.  In  the  previous  discussion  of  the  necessity  for  a  refined 
coup  d’oeil,  the  observation  was  made  that  only  through  continuous participation in actual combat and the political deliberations of the state—both closely held social undertakings—could the requisite capabilities be developed in  the  commanders at  the highest  levels. Likewise,  this Clausewitzian demand for  participation  offers  a  preview  for  Dewey’s  “intimate  knowledge  of  the immediate environment and trained capacity for dealing with it.” The intimate knowledge of the immediate environment and the capacity for dealing with the vagaries  of  that  environment  exemplifies  precisely  von  Clausewitz’s understanding  of  coup  d’oeil  and  the  determination  for  acting  appropriately under  conditions  of  stress  and  uncertainty.  Dewey  calls  this  ability  “wisdom” but  this wisdom is nothing neither more nor  less  than what  is required of  the 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commanders and leaders at the highest levels of the military if that military is to be victorious. He says this plainly in the quote above, “The quality of mind thus engendered  is  simple  and  clear‐sighted,  formed  by  having  to  do  with uncompromising  realities  and  hence  adapted  to  future  situations.  It  is  firm, sensitive  and  sure  of  itself.”  The  quality  of  mind  is  coup  d’oeil  which,  as  the General has noted,  is  the ability  to  see  clearly  in  the  fog of war and make  the best  possible  decision  in  the  haze  and  mist  of  uncertainty,  luck,  chance,  and unpredictability.  This  ability  can  only  be  garnered  through  intense  and  social interactions  of  the  appropriate  sort.  Dewey’s  stipulation  for  a  mind  that  is sensitive and sure of itself is a restatement of the General’s call for a mind that is reflective  yet  resolute.  Dewey’s moral  that  knowledge worthy  of  being  called knowledge  can  only  be  fostered  and  engendered  as  a  result  of  strong  social forces  parallels  von  Clausewitz’s  observation  that  war—if  war  is  to  be successfully  waged—is more  than  an  art  or  a  science,  rather,  war  is  a  social phenomenon and construct. 
The Live Creature and the Military Genius   War is a social endeavor for all who participate. For the highest commander (the military  genius  or  commander‐in‐chief,  as  von  Clausewitz  describes  this supreme  leader),  his  or  her  development  must  be  realized  through  social experiences  appropriately  undergone.  In  essence,  von  Clausewitz’s  military 
genius is an aesthetic being akin to Dewey’s live creature. The parallel threads in the  philosophy  of  each  man,  discussed  thus  far  in  this  dissertation,  should 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already give the reader clear insight into how the military genius represents the quintessential live creature. John J. McDermott describes the live creature as an individual  who  “is  about  the  potentially  incessant  drama  of  everyday experience. … Dewey  then works  out  the  relationship  between  the  rhythm of experience ordinarily undergone and the achievement of the enhancements and consummations which characterize human living at its peak.” (1981: 525‐526)  The military genius  fits well  this description of  the  “human  living at  its peak.” The only difference  is,  for  the military genius,  the “everyday experience”  takes place in the boiling kettle of war.   The  live  creature  lives  life  to  the  fullest  possible  extent  by  sampling  the experiences  offered  in  the  aesthetic  manner  discussed  earlier  in  this dissertation.  That  is,  experiences  are  held  to  be  aesthetic  or meaningful  only insofar  as  the  individual  acts  in  relationship  with  the  environment  and continues  the  interaction,  each  continually  changing  the  other,  until  a consummatory condition is reached. This state represents a temporary stability that acts as a starting point for future experiences. Experiences, thus undergone, constitute  the  aesthetic  and  allow  the  individual  to  fully  engage  in  life  and extract  the most  from  future  experiences.  This  individual  is  the  live  creature. The  military  officer  who  undergoes  experiences  aesthetically  in  the environments of combat and statecraft emerges as the military genius. Both the 
live  creature  and  the  military  genius  emerge  from  the  same  mold;  the  only 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difference between the two is nature of the environments from which they are produced.   “Genius,”  as  described  by  von  Clausewitz,  is  not  simply  a  person  of  great intellect. Rather, a genius is a person who has a “very highly mental aptitude for a particular occupation.” (HP: 100) Genius certainly requires intellectual ability but  genius  also  requires  appropriate  temperament.  This  temperament  allows the  individual  to  function  at  a  high  level  in  times  of  severe  stress  and  in  an environment of uncertainty. This ability to respond appropriately and quickly to glean the important factors necessary for the right decision can, per the General, only be developed through constant combat or realistic training. The necessary exposure  to  combat,  or  training,  is  the  environment  that  permits  the  future 
military genius to reach his or her maximum potential. Only through a continual series of  real experiences—in which  the  individual can winnow the  important factors  presented  in  various  scenarios  occurring  in  the  fog  of  war—can  the future  leader  undergo  the  necessary  transformation  from  soldier  to military 
genius.  All  the  gifts  of  intellect  and  temperament  must  be  nurtured  through experience so that all the “gifts” can function to provide the maximum capability to the commander. “Genius consists in a harmonious combination of elements, in which  one  or  the  other  ability may  predominate,  but  none may  be  in  conflict with thee rest.” (HP: 100) Von Clausewitz believes that the development of the genius is a social function to be sure. 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 If every soldier needed some degree of military genius our armies would be very weak, for the term refer to a special cast of mental or moral powers which can rarely occur in an army when  a  society  has  to  employ  its  abilities  in many  different areas. The  smaller  the  range of  activities of  a nation and  the more  the  military  factor  dominates,  the  greater  will  be  the incidence of military genius. This, however,  is true only of  its distribution,  not  of  its  quality.  The  latter  depends  on  the 
general  intellectual  development  of  a  given  society.  In  any primitive, warlike race, the warrior spirit is far more common than among civilized peoples. It  is possessed by almost every warrior, but in civilized societies only necessity will stimulate it  in  the  people  as  a  whole,  since  they  lack  the  natural disposition for it. (HP: 100)  The General notes  that necessity stimulates  the warrior spirit—a spirit  that  is the  foundation of  the military  genius.  Recall  this  idea  is  analogous  to Dewey’s claim that the aesthetic was, in earlier times, endemic to everyday life because man  lived  in  an  environment  of  necessity;  that  is,  man  was  always  in  the precarious  position  of  ensuring  his  or  her  own  survival.  Necessity  demands total engagement with the environment. Similarly,  the military genius can only develop  through  a  total  engagement  with  the  environment  of  war.  This  total engagement  is  the  only  way  the  commander  can  become  the  master  of  the uncertain and unpredictable. Coup d’oeil and determination are the products of aesthetically undergone experiences in war.   The  commander  becomes  responsible  for  not  only  himself  or  herself  but ultimately  for  the  entire  military  apparatus  as  well  as  for  the  state.  This responsibility can only be adequately fulfilled by timely and proper decisions in both combat and at the policy levels of the nation. “It is the impact of the ebbing 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of moral and physical strength, of  the heart‐rending spectacle of  the dead and wounded, that the commander has to withstand—first in himself, and then in all those who,  directly  or  indirectly,  have  entrusted  him with  their  thoughts  and feelings, hopes and fears. … Such are the burdens in battle that the commander’s courage and strength of will must overcome if he hopes to achieve outstanding success.  The  burdens  increase with  the  number  of men  in  his  command,  and therefore the higher the position, the greater the strength of character he needs to bear the mounting load.” (HP: 104‐105) The only way the officer can continue to scale  the  ladder of  leadership and shoulder  the ever‐increasing demands of responsibility, is to garner the lessons appropriate to his or her position that are offered through the experiences of war. At base, the only way a leader can best fulfill his or her responsibilities to self, troops, or the state is to make timely and adequate  decisions which  offer  the  best  chances  of  success  and  victory.  Only through  the  continuous  rhythm  of  doing,  undergoing,  and  consummation  can the military genius develop this ability.    The  military  genius  must  become  immersed  in  the  activity  of  war.  Only through  immersion  can  experiences  be  properly  undergone.  Von  Clausewitz claims this immersion can only occur when the commander is driven by strong motivation.  The  General  claims  that  passions  such  as  “patriotism,  idealism, vengeance,  (and)  enthusiasm  of  every  kind”  are  venerated  emotions  but  they are  not  sufficient  to  sustain  the  leader.  Rather,  the most  power  emotion  that inspires performance in battle is the quest for fame, honor, and renown. “Other 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emotions … may, indeed, rouse the mass to action and inspire it, but they cannot give the commander the ambition to strive higher than the rest, as he must if he is  to  distinguish  himself.  They  cannot  give  him,  as  can  ambition,  a  personal, almost  proprietary  interest  in  every  aspect  of  fighting,  so  that  he  turns  each opportunity  to  best  advantage …  It  is  primarily  this  spirit  of  endeavor  on  the part  of  commanders  at  all  levels,  this  inventiveness,  energy,  and  competitive enthusiasm, which vitalizes an army and makes it victorious. And so far as the commander‐in‐chief  is  concerned, we may well  ask whether  history  has  ever known a great general who was not ambitious; whether, indeed, such a figure is conceivable.”  (HP: 105)    Von  Clausewitz  characterizes  the  commander  as  one  who  strives  at  the highest  levels  to  garner  the most  from  experiences  so  that  he  or  she  can  use every opportunity to the best advantage. This spirit, whether it be generated by ambition  or  some  other  emotion,  is  what  is  required  if  one  is  to  undergo  an experience  in  the Deweyan  sense.  Total  immersion  in  the  environment  is  the necessary  condition  taking  part  in  the  rhythm  and  continuity  of  meaningful, aesthetic,  experience. Dewey  tells  us  the  continuity  of  experience  is  such  that each  consummation  gives  a  platform  for  further  experiences.  Similarly,  von Clausewitz says  that when a decision  is  in doubt  the commander must always stick with his or her first decision unless clear and overriding conviction forces a  change.  (HP:  108)  He  calls  this  ability  to  hold  to  our  earlier  convictions “strength  of  character.”  More  important,  analogous  to  Dewey’s  concept  of 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experience,  this  principle  of  holding  to  initial  decisions  unless  clear  evidence forces  a  change,  results  from  lessons  learned  from  all  previous  experiences. That  is,  the commander’s earlier experiences form the bedrock for the current required decision and should appropriately inform him or her when making the new decision at hand.  Like Dewey,  von Clausewitz  claims  the decisions of  the commander  require  creativity  and  imagination  that  can  only  be  incubated  by having appropriately undergone earlier experiences.   The General captures the role of experience, of the aesthetic kind mandated by  Dewey,  in  the  development  of  the  military  genius  at  the  end  of  Book  I, Chapter III, of On War. He says,   Circumstances  vary  so  enormously  in  war,  and  are  so indefinable,  that  a  vast  array  of  factors  has  to  be appreciated—mostly  in  the  light  of  probabilities  alone.  The man  responsible  for  evaluating  the  whole  must  bring  to  his task  the quality of  intuition  that perceives  the  truth at  every point. Otherwise a chaos of opinion and considerations would arise, and fatally entangle judgment. Bonaparte rightly said in this  connection  that  many  of  the  decisions  faced  by  the commander‐in‐chief  resemble  the  mathematical  problems worthy of the gifts of a Newton or an Euler.   What  this  task  requires  in  the  way  of  higher  intellectual gifts is a sense of a unity and a power of judgment raised to a marvelous pitch of vision, which easily grasps and dismisses a thousand remote possibilities which an ordinary mind would labor to identify and wear itself out in so doing. Yet even that superb display of divination, the sovereign eye of genius itself, would  still  fall  short  of  historical  significance  without  the qualities  of  character  and  temperament  we  have  described. (HP: 112)  This short synopsis of the military genius  includes several thrusts, which could easily derive  from Dewey’s conditions  for  the  live creature. First,  the genius  is 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born  in  the  world  of  uncertainty,  resistance,  and  the  novel.  Second,  the responsible  individual must bring his or her “intuition”  to bear at every point. This  intuition  can  only  evolve  through  exposure  to  experiences  of  the appropriate  kind.  Without  this  ability  to  discern  the  real  import  of  novel situations presented in the cloud of uncertainty, chaos ensues and judgment is weakened.  Next,  clarity  gained  by  experience  enables  the  genius  to  grasp  the important aspects from an indefinitely perceived environment. The “possible” is retrieved  from an atmosphere of  the unachievable and  the apparently absurd. Finally, only the experience gained by being fully  in the world,  in this case the world  of  war,  can  the military  genius  mature  and  flourish.  This  genius  is  the exemplar of the Deweyan live creature. 
  To  summarize,  Dewey  asserts  that  our  experiences  require  active participation while von Clausewitz claims real experience demands interaction with  the moment  and  the  living  and  reacting  forces  of  war.  Dewey  says  that principles  of  action  are  abstract  and  that  theory  is  in  tension  with  life.  Von Clausewitz gives great weight to the lessons gained through experience. He has minimal tolerance for using theory as a basis for one’s actions in warfare. This holds  true  for  all  levels,  from  those  who  set  the  political  agenda  to  the commander who envisages and determines the military strategy for the army to those who actually lead the forces in combat.    The past, for Dewey, connects the live creature to the future. This connection is organic and can only be had through experience and education based on the 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genius fits snugly with Dewey’s requirement for experience as the basis for the live  creature.  The  parallel  in  the  processes  inherent  in  the  educational  and aesthetic  components  of  experience  is  apparent.  Dewey  sees  the  process  of 
experience as a continuous loop of doing and undergoing resulting ultimately in a  consummation  of  the  experience.  This  consummation  is  not  the  end  of experience but, rather, the bedrock on which new and continued experience can be had. Likewise, for von Clausewitz experience is a continued series of doings, which must be repeated on a regular basis if any experience is to give meaning to the individual. That is, for both men, experience can never become static but requires constant refinement and shifts to new experiences.   Most important to showing the deep philosophic connection between Dewey and von Clausewitz is the conclusion of each that the aesthetic of living is, in the end,  a  social  action.  For  Dewey  the  aesthetic  is  a  social  activity  and  for  von Clausewitz  the  same  holds  true  for  war.  Both  arrive  at  their  respective conclusions through analysis of art—the finer arts for Dewey and the art of war for von Clausewitz.   This  Deweyan  comparative  with  von  Clausewitz  should  demonstrate  the close  philosophical  connection  between  the  two  philosophers.  The  close connection  of  each  man’s  philosophy  with  that  of  the  other  is  striking  when each  thread  examined  in  this  chapter  is  appraised. When  all  the  threads  are taken together the similarity of  the two philosophies  is clear.  Intriguingly, von 
166 
 





THE DEWEY/VON CLAUSEWITZ PHILOSOPHY IN MODERN WAR     Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz  epitomized  pragmatic  philosophy  at  its  zenith. Both men’s deep concern centered on how man functioned in his or her social, communal world. Neither bothered with the academic niceties of philosophy but rather  each  focused  on  man’s  relation  to  the  world  and  his  or  her  particular environment. The philosophies propounded by these men are to be lived so that the individual can partake fully in his or her surroundings and live the aesthetic life. For Dewey this  life resulted in the  live creature and for von Clausewitz the product was the military genius. As philosopher Guy W. Stroh, while describing William James’ conception of pragmatism, so well states,    One principal advantage of pragmatism is the ability to cut through  endless  entanglements  with  words  in  philosophical controversies.  Pragmatism  cannot  accept  any  purely  verbal solution to problems. … Consider the problem of materialism versus  spiritualism.  …  The  materialist  wants  to  account  for everything  in  terms  of  matter  and  motion,  while  the spiritualist  wants  to  account  for  matter  and  motion themselves. But  James contends  that no adequate solution  to this  problem  can  be  found  until  we  ask  what  practical difference  is  involved  in  these  two  conceptions  for  our personal  lives.  There  can  be  no  point  to  the  problem  or  the resolution  of  it  until  we  demand  and  look  for  practical consequences.  This means we must  look  to  the  future,  since without  a  future  there  can  be  no  practical  consequences.  (Stroh: 131)  James’ demand for a  forward‐oriented view that can be  judged only by the “workability”  of  the  practical  consequences  seems  a  central  tenet  of  both 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Dewey and von Clausewitz. This does not mean that anything that works is permissible  but,  rather,  that  the  practical  consequences,  when  directed toward a meaningful aim, objective or, more important, a raison d’être, are a significant  determinant  of  appropriate  action.  As  Stroh  characterizes Dewey’s conception, “All good art serves some human purpose and all great art serves as a source of enduring enrichment. … What they (art and science) have  in  common  is  the  devising  of  using  of  intelligent  means  to  produce worthwhile  human  ends.”  (Stroh:  261)  Thus,  for  Dewey  the  aim  is  to undergo  the  aesthetic  in  all  of  our  actions  of  living  in  the  pursuit  of “meaningful  human  ends”  while,  for  von  Clausewitz,  the  paramount meaningful human end is to prevail in war.   With this view foremost in the reader’s mind, one must address the obvious matter of the practical consequences of the Dewey/von Clausewitz philosophy. More succinctly, we must ask and answer  the question of whether or not  this philosophy,  indeed, has consequences in contemporary war and if so what are those  consequences.  Can  the  pragmatic  philosophy  of  these  two  philosophers act as a paradigm for action in modern war? If so, does this relate to the making of the modern military leader? This chapter demonstrates that the philosophies discussed  thus  far are not only germane  to  today’s wars but also  serve as  the conceptual  basis  for  one  of  the  most  accomplished  branches  of  the  modern military,  namely,  the  United  States  Marine  Corps  (USMC).  The  intent  is  to demonstrate that philosophical concepts, if they are to be of service to the social 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fabric of the nation and community, must manifest themselves in action. That is, the pragmatic philosophy must be directed, through action, to some meaningful and consequential ends. For the purposes of this dissertation, those meaningful and consequential ends are taken to be those of von Clausewitz, that is, victory in war.   A synthesis of their ideas leading to action, or actionable activity, is required to  demonstrate  that  the  philosophies  of  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz  fit  this construct. I propose to show the practical nature of these philosophies through the  conceptual  synthesis  developed  by  John  Boyd.  That  synthesis  laid  the foundation  of  what  the  USMC would  later  develop  as  its  core  philosophy  for fighting modern wars. I will then demonstrate that the doctrine of USMC can be used  effectively  at  all  levels  of modern war  to  lead  to  a  successful  outcome  if that doctrine  is  correctly understood. A word of  caution  is  in  order here. The word  ‘doctrine’  is  often  used  interchangeably  with  the  word  ‘theory.’  In common usage  this  interchangeability  is  generally permissible  insofar as both terms are understood to be directive in nature and consist of rules of behavior or action under given circumstances. The discussion of the development of the philosophical  concepts  underpinning  success  in  fighting modern wars  should make evident  the USMC  “doctrine” does not  fit  the  abstract  rule‐based  theory model, which both Dewey and von Clausewitz so effectively decried if one is to live in the “real” world. 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This analysis proceeds as follows: (1)  The nature of contemporary war  (2) Boyd’s philosophical synthesis as a reflection of Dewey and von Clausewitz (3) The philosophical basis for fighting (and winning) modern wars (4) Dewey and von Clausewitz’s philosophy in practice (5) Observations on the philosophical demands for victory 
The Nature of Contemporary War   To proceed to the question of the applicability of the Dewey/von Clausewitz philosophy  to  contemporary,  or modern, war  one  first must  have  a  clear  and workable concept of what is meant by “contemporary” or “modern” war. Critics of  von  Clausewitz  claim  that  the  General’s  thinking  is  outdated  because  his views  reflect  war  as  conducted  in  the  early  19th  century  and,  hence,  cannot apply in our modern world. If he developed his views, the thinking goes, based on  large  armies  on  foot  facing  each  other  as  representatives  of  well‐defined political  entities,  then  the  concepts  surely  must  fail  in  warfare  using  highly sophisticated  weapons  or  in  combat  between  forces  with  no  clearly  defined political state. While considered true that the outward appearance of warfare is certainly different than in the first decades of the 1800s, these critics are easily countered if the case can be made the nature of combat is, at the core, the same today as in the 19th century or, for that matter, as in the 3rd century BCE.  
171 
 
  Contemporary war has multiple  forms,  few of which von Clausewitz  could have possibly conceived. Dewey was certainly  familiar, however, with some of the forms of contemporary war; for example, he had lived to see the advent of nuclear warfare and terrorism. War has long been described as a spectrum. This spectrum can be thought of as a continuum from low‐intensity combat through an  ever‐increasing  level  of  violence  culminating  in  nuclear  exchanges.  Exactly where any particular type of war should be placed may be open for debate but the  matter  of  concern  for  this  dissertation  is  to  discern  whether  war,  in  all forms, differs sufficiently to render the experiential, pragmatic philosophies of Dewey and von Clausewitz moot. As exemplars of  the spectrum, a  few specific examples of contemporary war found at various levels should suffice to address the  question  of  whether  war  in  general  shares  common  philosophical underpinnings.    Nuclear  war  is  perhaps  the  most  feared  of  all  potential  modes  of contemporary warfare but  the most  likely  form is some variation of  terrorism or  low‐intensity  conflict.  As  this  dissertation  is  being  written,  the  world  is grappling with terrorist organizations that have integrated themselves into the political processes of the state such as Hamas and Hezbollah while at the same time watching several revolutions and civil wars in such places as Libya, Ivory Coast, and Yemen among others. Still, military planners grapple with scenarios, which  can  have  far  reaching  consequences  for  technologically  developed societies; cyber‐war and network‐centric war are two such possibilities. Fourth 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generation  warfare  (4GW)  is  an  example  many  military  thinkers  embrace  to characterize the current and likely future methods of combat. The philosophical question remains the same, however, regardless of which mode of warfare one is  considering.  Namely,  do  any  or  some  of  the  potential  modes  of  current  or future combat negate  the pragmatic philosophical  concepts of Dewey and von Clausewitz as those concepts pertain to war and leadership?   Concern  for 4GW and network‐centric war often dominate  the discussions concerning the constitution of contemporary war. These discussions imply that modern war  is  somehow different  in kind  from previous methods of war. For example,  4GW  is  so  named  because  proponents  envision  modern  war  as  a distinct from previous forms of war. Proponents, however, view contemporary war as an historical or evolutionary development. Antulio Echevarria describes this development. “In brief,  the theory holds that warfare has evolved through four  generations:  1)  the  use  of massed manpower, 2)  firepower,  3) maneuver, and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince an opponent’s decisionmakers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly.” (Echevarria: v) On  first  glance,  the  reader  might  surmise  that  4GW  appears  to  be  a  concise portrayal  of  modern  war.  Echevarria  calls  4GW  “a  myth”  because  such  wars represent nothing new  in warfare and,  from an historical perspective,  all  four generations  of  war  are  still,  in  one  way  or  another,  part  of  most,  if  not  all, contemporary wars. That is, technology may change but the basic presumptions 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concerning  the nature  of warfare  remains  little  changed  throughout  time.    As Max Boot has noted, “But in the final analysis, having the best technology is not enough  to  defeat  the  most  ruthless  terrorists.  In  fact,  most  of  the  expensive weapons  systems  being  purchased  by  the  U.S.  and  its  allies  are  almost completely irrelevant to the war against terrorism. Smart bombs can be useful for  killing  the  enemy  once  he  is  located.  But  figuring  out  who  the  enemy  is, where he is, and what he is up to—that requires smart people.” (220)    Insurgency, the focal point of 4GW, shares all the attributes of war inherent in  von  Clausewitz’s  philosophy  of  war.  Critics  of  von  Clausewitz  either misunderstand  his  concepts  or  willfully  mischaracterize  them.  Many  military thinkers  claim  that  war  is  no  longer  “Trinitarian”  in  the  Clauswitzian  sense. Recall,  von  Clausewitz  saw  war  as  a  “wonderful  trinity.”  This  trinity  is “composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative  spirit  is  free  to  roam;  and  of  its  element  of  subordination,  as  an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.” (HP: 89) The first part of the trinity of war concerns the people, the second is the purview of the army and the general, and the last relates to the government and is the outcome of  policy.  All  three  of  these  parts  depend  on  each  other  and,  the  General contends,  to  ignore  any  single  spoke  of  the  trinitarian  wheel  conflicts  with reality. 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 Modern  4GW  theorists  claim  contemporary  insurgency  no  longer  fits  this Clausewitzian  paradigm  and  imply,  therefore,  that  the  philosophical underpinnings  of  von  Clausewitz’s  understanding  of war  no  longer  apply  and are  outdated  and  inappropriate  for  understanding  war  today.  Echevarria,  in countering Martin van Creveld’s criticism of  the General,  correctly dispels  this misconception  and  succinctly  demonstrates  the  timelessness  of  the  General’s philosophy.   The  fundamental  problem with  the  idea of  nontrinitarian war  is  that  it  does  not  understand  the  thing  it  purports  to negate,  that  is,  so‐called  trinitarian  war.  The  concept  of trinitarian  war  has,  in  fact,  never  existed  except  as  a misunderstanding  on  the  part  of  those who  subscribe  to  the notion  of  nontrinitarian  war.  It  resulted  from  van  Creveld’s misrepresentation  of  Clausewitz’s  “wondrous  (wunderliche) trinity,” a construct the Prussian theorist used to describe the diverse  and  changeable  nature  of war.  Clausewitz  portrayed the nature of war in terms of three tendencies, or forces: basic hostility,  which  if  unchecked  would  make  war  spiral  out  of control;  chance  and  uncertainty,  which  defy  prescriptive doctrines and make war unpredictable; and the attempt to use war to achieve a purpose, to direct it toward an end.   Indeed,  his  portrayal  appears  accurate,  for we  find  these forces  present,  in  varying  degrees,  in  every  war,  ancient  or modern, traditional or otherwise. …   These  tendencies,  as  Clausewitz  went  on  to  explain, generally  correspond  to  three  institutions:  the  first  to  the populace,  the  second  to  the  military,  and  the  last  to  the government.  However,  he  also  noted,  each  of  these institutions  have  taken  various  forms  over  time;  we  should not  consider  them  only  in  terms  of  these  three  forms.  The term “government,” for instance, as Clausewitz used it, meant any  ruling  body,  any  “agglomeration  of  loosely  associated forces,”  or  any  “personified  intelligence.”  Similarly,  the  term military  (sic)  represents  not  only  the  trained,  semi‐professional  armies  of  the  Napoleonic  era,  but  any  warring body  in  any  era.  Likewise,  Clausewitz’s  references  to  the 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“populace” pertain to populations of any society or culture in any  given  period  of  history.  Thus,  the  government  can  be  a state, such as Prussia, or a nonstate actor, such as a clan or a tribe.  In  truth,  the  trinity  consists  of  the  actual  forces  or tendencies  themselves,  which  are  universal,  and  not  the institutions, which are merely representations of those forces that  would  have  been  familiar  to  Clausewitz’s  readers.  He considers  these  tendencies  themselves  to  be  universal—common  to  every war—and,  indeed, we  find  them at play  in the war on terror.   As  we  can  see,  each  of  these  tendencies  in  Clausewitz’s wondrous  trinity  remains  alive  and well,  even  in  the war on terror,  which  is  precisely  the  kind  of  conflict  that  scholars such  as  van  Creveld  wrongly  refer  to  as  “nontrinitarian.”  Strictly  speaking  there  is  no  such  thing  as  trinitarian  war because, as any review of history shows, the forces Clausewitz described are present in every war, not just the wars of nation‐states. If they are present in every war, then the term must fall out as a discriminator. In other words, if the basis for making a distinction,  any  distinction,  disappears,  then  the  distinction itself also vanishes. It follows, then, that since there is no such thing as “trinitarian” war, per se, there can be no such thing as “nontrinitarian” war;  the  initial  concept  or  idea  has  no  exist before  the  idea  that  it  negates  can  come  into  being. Nontrinitarian  war  is,  therefore,  nothing  more  than  the negation  of  a  misunderstanding.  The  proponents  of  4GW failed  to  perceive  this  particular  flaw  in  their  reasoning because  they  did  not  review  their  theory  critically;  instead, they attempted to augment  it with whatever  ideas seemed in vogue at the time. (6‐9)  Echevarria  concisely  depicts  the  essence  of  von  Clausewitz’s  philosophical foundation of war’s fundamental nature. In so describing the General’s concepts, he  makes  a  strong  case  that  war  at  all  points  in  the  spectrum  fits  the Clausewitzian archetype. Perhaps, viewing the Clausewitzian archetype as near the Platonic Form of War would not be far‐fetched. 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 The  accusation  that  von  Clausewitz’s  philosophy  only  applies  to  wars between  nation‐states,  and  therefore  not  germane  to  contemporary  wars  of terrorism  or  insurgency,  is  misguided.  The  General  certainly  knew  of  these types  of  conflicts  and  he  addressed  them  squarely  in  On  War.  In  Book  VI, Chapter XXVI, titled “The People in Arms,” he proclaims,   In  the civilized parts of Europe, war by means of popular uprisings is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. It has its advocates and  its opponents. The  latter object  to  it either on political  grounds,  considering  it  as  a  means  of  revolution,  a state of legalized anarchy that is as much a threat to the social order  at  home  as  it  is  to  the  enemy,  or  else  on  military grounds,  because  they  feel  that  the  results  are  not commensurate with the energies expended.   The  first  objection  does  not  concern  us  at  all:  here  we consider  a  general  insurrection  simply  as  another  means  of war—in its relation, therefore, to a popular uprising should, in general, be considered an outgrowth of  the way in which the conventional barriers have been swept away  in our  lifetimes by  the  elemental  violence  of  war.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  broadening and intensification of the fermentation process known as war. …   By  its very nature, such scattered resistance will not  lend itself  to major actions, closely compressed in time and space. Its effect is like that of the process of evaporation: it depends on how much surface is exposed … like smoldering embers, it consumes the basic foundations of the enemy forces. …   A  general  uprising,  as we  see  it,  should  be  nebulous  and elusive;  its  resistance  should never materialize  as  a  concrete body,  otherwise  the  enemy  can  direct  sufficient  force  at  its core,  crush  it,  and  take many prisoners. When  that  happens, the  people  will  lose  heart  and,  believing  that  the  issue  has been decided and further efforts would be useless, drop their weapons.  On  the  other  hand,  there  must  be  some concentration at certain points: the fog must thicken and form a  dark  and  menacing  cloud  out  of  which  a  bolt  of  lightning may strike at any time.  (HP: 479‐481) 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Von Clausewitz astutely realized that war comes in many forms. For his ideas to matter  they  had  to  apply  to  the  fundamental  nature  of  war  and  not  specific instances  or  historical  cases  alone.  The  fundamental  difference  between  von Clausewitz and Jomini rests in each man’s fundamental understanding of what war is. Von Clausewitz saw war as ever‐changing and fluid, subject to constant revision, while Jomini thought of war as relatively static and subject to historical analysis.   The Echevarrian analysis of von Clausewitz, relative to 4GW as given above, can easily be extended to all types of wars. Not only does this apply to terrorism and insurgency but, most certainly, this applies to the extremes of nuclear war and cyber‐war as well. P. W. Singer captures this  idea  in relation to the use of high‐tech, robots in contemporary wars, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.   Insurgencies  are  sometimes  framed  as  an  asymmetric battle  between  one  side  that  depends  on  high‐tech weapons and  the  other  side  that  eschews  them.  This  may  have  been true  of  battles  in  the  past,  where  rifle‐  and  machine‐gun wielding imperialists took on tribes armed with spears, but it just  isn’t  the  case  in modern war,  including  in  Iraq.  Instead, there  is a sophisticated back‐and‐forth going on between the two  sides  in  technology,  the  second  reason  why  Iraq  didn’t end the role of unmanned technology in war. “We adapt, they adapt,” says John Nagl. “It’s a constant competition to gain the upper  hand.”  Concurs  one  of  the  robot  makers  at  Foster‐Miller,  “There  is  a  huge  intellectual  battle  going  on  between the U.S. technology and the insurgents. (218)  This dissertation presumes, if the reader accepts the above analysis, the fact the Clausewitzian understanding of war applies to contemporary war as strongly as 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to classical warfare between nation‐states  is self‐evident. That  is,  the  inherent nature of all wars fits the Clausewitzian philosophy. 
Boyd’s Philosophical Synthesis    Having established the pertinence of Clausewitz’s philosophical conception of war to the contemporary understanding of war as a spectrum, the question remains whether the philosophical views of the General, and by extension those of  Dewey,  can  be  effectively  incorporated  into  the  actual  environment  of contemporary  war—war  as  it  really  exists.  Since  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz exemplify  the  essence  of  pragmatism,  their  philosophies  must  have  practical consequences—some  goal‐oriented  usefulness  in  the  real  world.  Recalling Stroh’s characterization of James’ pragmatism, “This means we must look to the future, since without a future there can be no practical consequences.”  (Stroh: 131)  The  goal  of  war  is  to  win  (fulfill  the  political  objectives  of  the  state  or appropriate  political  body).  The  usefulness  of  the  Deweyan/Clausewitzian philosophy can only be assessed  if  that philosophy can be,  and  is, used  in  the realm  of  actual  military  operations.  To  that  end,  I  will  show  there  is  a philosophy that incorporates the Dewey/von Clausewitz philosophy that acts as a  foundation  for  contemporary  military  action.  The  reader  might  rightly  ask why a third philosophy is needed.  The contention is for any philosophy to have value  in  life’s actual environment,  that philosophy has  to be couched  in  terms that are, at least potentially, actionable. 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 For a military ethos to incorporate a meaningfully actionable philosophy that philosophy must have a firm foundation. Further, that foundation must lead to a concept  for warfighting  that  is effective and will  lead  to success  in combat. As both Dewey and von Clausewitz so trenchantly observed, rules and theories are certain  to  lead  to  failure.  Such  rules  and  theories  cannot  serve  as  guides  to having meaningful experiences or being victorious or war. Unfortunately, until quite  recently many,  if not most, military  services based warfighting guidance on these rule‐driven theories. The best example that the pragmatic ideals thus far discussed have been  translated  into a  “modern” philosophy  that  forms  the basis  for  fighting  in  the  contemporary world  is  that  of  the  of  the  USMC.  The Corps’ ethos of combat applies to all wars they may be called upon to fight.   The  foundation  for  the USMC’s  image of combat  is a philosophy developed by the late John Boyd. This philosophy, as will be demonstrated, is a pragmatic one and reflects the concepts inherent in the Dewey/von Clausewitz philosophy discussed  thus  far.  Colonel Boyd,  a  retired U.S. Air  Force  fighter pilot, made a name for himself as a pilot, commander and, most notably as the developer of the  theory  of  energy  maneuverability  (E‐M)  in  air‐to‐air  combat.iv  Boyd developed novel approaches to air‐to‐air combat during the 1950s,  found new maneuvers for aircraft that no others had tried before, and shook the world of air  combat  as well  as  the  area  of modern  aircraft  design with  the  completely radical E‐M theory. These areas are not concerns for this dissertation but they are illustrative of how Boyd approached any and all issues he addressed. Boyd 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epitomized  the  Deweyan  aesthetic  demands.  The  Colonel  did  not  identify  a problem,  find a  solution,  and move on. He  lived  the problem. Problem solving became a continuous cycle of doing and undergoing. When Boyd announced a solution  to  a  problem  or  let  his  theories  see  the  light  of  day  (the consummation),  one  could  rest  assured  that  he  had  gone  through  every conceivable aspect of  the  issue and knew every nuance and potential problem inherent  in  the  solution or  theory.  In  typical Deweyan  fashion,  his  solution  to one problem led immediately to a basis for evermore complex and challenging problems.  From  apparently  simple  individual  fighter  aircraft  tactics,  Boyd  led himself to sequentially develop a philosophy of war that is being used today as the  basis  of  winning  contemporary  wars  of  all  types.  This  philosophy  is  the practical application of Dewey and von Clausewitz.   Boyd, perhaps one of  the  few contemporary polymaths, was  in most of his areas  of  expertise  also  an  autodidact.  A  voracious  reader  and  “doer,”  his methods and “theories” resulted not from simple academic musings but, rather, from  intense  investigation,  testing,  trying  to  find  the  underlying  causes, more investigation, more testing, and so on until the method or concept was “ready.” As Robert Coram, when describing Boyd’s  style,  notes,  “As word  continued  to spread about this new E‐M Theory, the rank of those wanting to hear the brief increased. Now majors and lieutenant colonels and colonels asked for a session. If  a  superior  officer  congratulated  Boyd  on  his  brief,  Boyd’s  response  was always  the  same:  ‘Sir,  I  do my homework.’”  (Coram:  163) This  is  certainly  an 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understatement;  Boyd  did much more  than  his  “homework,”  Boyd  integrated himself into the very fabric of the “problem.”    Boyd retired from the Air Force in 1975 and began to question the causes of the United States’ defeat  in Vietnam. To many of  the company and  field grade officers (lieutenants through colonels), the nation’s defeat hinged on outmoded thinking about the fundamental nature of war, thinking that relied on “lessons” from  the  last  war  instead  of  understanding  war  qua  war.  Boyd  decided  to address this problem. He realized he could not do this while in uniform since he believed the senior officers and high‐level civilians who ran the military trapped themselves  in  rigid  defeatist  ideas.  As  von  Clausewitz  noted  so  presciently, dogma in thinking about war will inevitably lead to defeat. Boyd knew he had to be independent of all outside influences if he was going to solve “the problem of war”  and  avoid  the  contagion  of  institutional  thinking.  Like  the  earliest philosophers, “Boyd knew he had to be independent and he only saw two ways for a man to do this: he can either achieve great wealth or reduce his needs to zero. Boyd said if a man can reduce his needs to zero, he is truly free: there is nothing  that  can be  taken  away  from him and nothing  anyone  can do  to hurt him.” (Coram: 319)    Boyd began to address the problem from the perspective that had resulted in  E‐M  Theory.  “And while  (Boyd’s  closest  associates)  did  not  discuss  it with him, they knew that Boyd was fortune’s child, that he had passed beyond the E‐M Theory  and was  venturing  into more  rarefied  heights.  They  sensed he was 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about to give birth to his greatest work.” (Coram: 320) The Colonel wondered why  those who had much more  familiarity with  science and mathematics had not  discovered  E‐M  Theory  earlier.  Boyd  thought  his  ideas  were  self‐evident and  he  could  not  understand  why  he  could  find  solutions  where  others  had failed. Boyd began to ponder the larger question of how humans think and make decisions.   Boyd  incorporated  philosophy  with  conceptual  schema  from  science  and history to create a philosophical template for war—not just specific wars but for 
all wars. His pragmatic philosophy progressed in two stages. First, he developed a  grounding  document  called  “Destruction  and  Creation”  (Appendix  I).  The purpose of this philosophical discourse is to devise a concept for matching our mental  images  (concepts)  to  reality; more  succinctly,  how do we  think? Boyd notes that survival depends this ability.   To  comprehend  and  cope  with  our  environment  we develop mental patterns or concepts of meaning. The purpose of this paper is to sketch out how we destroy and create these patterns  to  permit  us  to  both  shape  and  be  shaped  by  a 
changing  environment.  In  this  sense,  the  discussion  also literally shows why we cannot avoid this kind of activity  if we 
intend to survive on our own terms. The activity is dialectic  in 
nature  generating  both  disorder  and  order  that  emerges  as  a changing and expanding universe of mental concepts matched 
to  a  changing  and  expanding  universe  of  observed  reality. (Boyd: Appendix I) (emphasis added)  Boyd’s purpose statement is quintessentially Dewey’s aesthetic understanding. Man  is  shaped  by,  and  simultaneously  shapes,  the  environment.  Survival depends  on  how  the  mental  concepts  so  shaped  match  reality.  The  dialectic 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requires  a  constant  interchange of man and environment. Disorder  and order are  simply  the doing,  undergoing  and  consummation. How did Boyd  arrive  at this view?   Boyd isolated himself from his surroundings and assimilated everything that could  address  the  ultimate  problems  he  would  undertake  to  understand.  As Coram  describes  the  process,  “Christies’s  phone  might  ring  at  2:00  A.M.    and Boyd would  say,  ‘I  had  a  breakthrough.  Listen  to  this.’  And without  pause  he would  begin  reading  from  Hegel  or  from  an  obscure  book  on  cosmology  or quantum  physics  or  economics  or  math  or  history  or  social  science  or education.  Christie  thought  Boyd  had  taken  leave  of  his  senses.”  (319) Ultimately,  Boyd  reached  consummation  with  the  publication  of  “Destruction and Creation,”  one of  the  very  few  things he  ever published. Boyd  spent  over four  years  developing  this  eleven‐page  document  that  synthesizes  the  core concepts  of  Gödel’s  Incompleteness  Theorem,  Heisenberg’s  Uncertainty Principle and the Second Law of Thermodynamics. “Philosophers such as Jacob Bronowski  sensed  relationships  among  these  disparate  elements,  but  no  one had  ever  linked  all  three,  raised  them  to  a  higher  level,  and  from  them synthesized  a  new  idea.”  (Coram:  322)  (Of  interest  is  the  fact  Boyd’s  earlier struggle with the Second Law of Thermodynamics is the catalyst that led to his groundbreaking  E‐M  Theory.  This  is  an  exemplar  of  Dewey’s  demand  for continuity as a criterion for an experience.) The dialectic of Boyd with himself and with his closest associates led to “Destruction and Creation.” 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 The Colonel used the principles underscoring the three theories to show the relationship between observer and that which is observed (the environment) is in a  constant  state of  change. Not only does  the process  change what  is being observed  but  also  this  continual  feedback  shapes how  the  observer  observes. That is, the observer’s outlook changes. Boyd believed that when we analyze a process or happening we could break the process or event  into  its component parts and  then make a deduction  from those components. The other option  is for  the  observer  to  take  those  component  parts  and  to  synthesize  something new. “Boyd thought analysis could  lead to understanding but not to creativity. Taken to  the extreme, he  thought analysis was an onanistic activity, gratifying only  the  person  doing  the  analyzing.  He  said  Washington  was  a  city  of  the thousand  analysts  and  no  synthesizers.”  (Coram:  324)  This  view  closely parallels von Clausewitz’s understanding of “genius” as a person who can take the pertinent  information  from a  “fog”  in war and apply  that  information  to a new, novel and, hopefully, correct solution to the problem at hand.    Boyd’s  oft‐used  example  is  a  thought  experiment  intended  to  show  the nature  of  creativity.  He  asks  his  audience  to  imagine  four  distinct  domains (images)  that  can  each  be  understood  by  examining  its  parts  and  their respective  relations  with  one  another.  By  examining  the  parts  and  their relations  to  each  other,  the  domains  are  easily  understandable.  As  Coram explains, 
  Boyd’s  four  dimensions  were  a  skier  on  a  slope,  a 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speedboat,  a  bicycle,  and  a  toy  tank.  Under  “skier”  were various  parts:  chairlifts,  skis,  people,  mountain,  and  chalets. He asked listeners to imagine these were all linked by a web of relations,  a  matrix  of  intersecting  lines.  Under  “speedboat” were the categories of sun, boat, outboard motor, water‐skier, and  water.  Again,  all  were  linked  by  the  intersecting  lines. Under  “bicycle” were  chain,  seat,  sidewalk, handlebars,  child, and  wheels.  Under  “toy  tank”  were  turret,  boy,  tank  treads, green paint, toy store, and cannon.   The  separate  ingredients  make  sense  when  collected under  the  respective  headings.  But  then  Boyd  shattered  the relationship between the parts and their respective domains. He took the ingredients in the web of relationships and asked the listeners to visualize them scattered at random. He called breaking the domains apart a “destructive deduction.” (Today some refer to such a jump as “thinking outside the box.” Boyd believed the very existence of a box is limiting. The box must be destroyed before there can be creation.) The deduction was destructive in that the relationship between the parts and the whole was destroyed. Uncertainty and disorder took the place of  meaning  and  order.  Boyd’s  name  for  this  hodgepodge  of disparate elements was a “sea of anarchy.” Then he challenged the audience: “How do we construct order and meaning out of this mess?”   Now  Boyd  showed  how  synthesis  was  the  basis  of creativity. He asked, “From some of the ingredients in this sea of anarchy, how do we find common qualities and connecting threads to synthesize a new domain?” Few people ever found a new way  to put  them together. Boyd coaxed and wheedled but  eventually  helped  the  audience  along  by  emphasizing, 
handlebars, outboard motor, tank treads, and skis.   These, he said, were the ingredients needed to build what he called a “new reality”—a snowmobile. (324‐325)  This process  is both Dewey’s  “aesthetic” and von Clausewitz’s coup d’oeil. The required  synthesis  “must  be  continually  refined  by  verifying  its  internal consistency  and  by  making  sure  it  matches  up  with  reality.”  (Coram:  325) Dewey and von Clausewitz also saw this process of synthesis as continual until reaching  temporary  stability—only  then  to be  continued out of  the domain of 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the  stable  back  to  the  realm  of  the  precarious.  If  we  could  have  asked  Boyd, hypothetically,  what  does  one  do  next  after  synthesizing  the  snowmobile,  he most  likely would have responded that we must once again examine the parts and  relationships  in  the  milieu  of  the  snowmobile’s  new  environment.  What else,  he  would  demand,  is  possible  in  the  yet  unknown  domain?  Charles  de Gaulle synopsized this view well when he observed, “If a commander is to grasp the essentials and reject the inessentials; if he is to split his general operations into a number of complementary actions in such a way that all shall combine to achieve the purpose common to every one of them, he must be able to see the situation as a whole, to attribute to each object its relative importance, to grasp the connections between each factor in the situation and to recognize its limits. All this implies a gift of synthesis … As Napoleon said: ‘The military leader must be  capable  of  giving  intense,  extended,  and  indefatigable  consideration  to  a single group of objects.’” (300)   Boyd’s contribution is significant in that his philosophy is grounded in three fundamental  physical  laws  that  form  a  nexus  for  understanding  the  “new reality.” “To make sure the new reality is both viable and relevant, Boyd said it must be continually refined by verifying its internal consistency and by making sure  it matches  up with  reality.”  (Coram:  325) One must  recognize,  however, that  the  structure  of  Boyd’s  philosophy  is  a  reprise  of  Dewey  and  von Clausewitz.  Boyd  used  Gödel,  Heisenberg,  and  the  Second  Law  of Thermodynamics to form his philosophy. Gödel showed Boyd that the nature of 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The Philosophical Basis for Fighting (and Winning) Modern Wars   Boyd’s  dialectic  engine  is  an  understanding  parallel  to  Dewey’s  aesthetic experience and von Clausewitz’s coup d’oeil. Thus, by determining  that Boyd’s “engine”  leads  to a philosophical basis  for  fighting and winning contemporary wars,  the  relevance of Dewey  and  von Clausewitz’s  pragmatic  philosophies  in contemporary war  is  likewise  established.  Boyd’s  dialectic  engine  produced  a rich  philosophical  paradigm  that  should  apply  to  all  wars:  ancient,  modern, cyber, insurgency, terror, nuclear, chemical, and post‐modern.    The  basis  for  Boyd’s  warfighting  philosophy  rests  on  an  “action”  cycle commonly  referred  to  as  the  “observe‐orient‐decide‐act  cycle,”  or  more commonly,  the  OODA  Loop.  As  is  the  case  with  von  Clausewitz,  a  cursory reading leaves many people with a misunderstood or shallow view of what the author  purports.  A  brief  description  of  how  Boyd  developed  the  OODA  Loop, and  what  the  concept  entails,  illuminates  the  philosophy  of  winning  and achieving victory in war.    Boyd,  while  applying  his  destruction  and  creation  philosophy  to  aerial combat, conceived of “fast transients” as basis for individual victory in air‐to‐air engagements. He developed a briefing in which his final slide said, “He who can handle the quickest rate of change survives.” (4 August 1976) While the briefing is  technical  in  nature,  Boyd  incorporates  his  ideas  from  “Destruction  and 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Creation.” His technical discussion morphs quickly into ideas such as confusion, unpredictability,  disorder,  exploitation  and  ambiguity.  Taking  the  idea  of “quickest rate of change” as the arbiter of victory in a single air‐to‐air “dogfight,” the Colonel extends the concept to all war. The quickest rate of change concept is characterized as the fastest tempo. Tempo is not to be confused with speed. “Thinking about operating at a quicker tempo—not just moving faster—that the adversary  was  a  new  concept  in  waging  war.  Generating  a  rapidly  changing environment—that is, engaging in activity that is so quick it is disorienting and appears  uncertain  and  ambiguous  to  the  enemy—inhibits  the  adversary’s ability  to  adapt  and  causes  confusion  and  disorder  that,  in  turn,  causes  and adversary to overreact or underreact. … The briefing revealed that  the central theme of Boyd’s work—a  time­based theory of conflict—was beginning  to  take form.”  (Coram:  328)  Boyd  often  alluded  to  the  ancient  Chinese  general  and warrior,  Sun  Tzu,  as  one  of  the  great  minds  of  military  philosophy.  Sun  Tzu offers a template for Boyd. “After that comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct and misfortune into gain. … Let your rapidity be  that  of  the  wind,  your  compactness  that  of  the  forest.  In  raiding  and plundering be  like  fire,  in  immovability  like a mountain. Keep your plans dark and impenetrable as night and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt. … He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.” (64‐66) 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 Within a month after his air‐to‐air briefing Boyd authored a second briefing called “Patterns of Conflict.” He continued to refine this briefing in the ensuing years  but  the  thrust  remained  constant—to  define  a  philosophy  for  all  war, from the individual combat to the conduct of the entire war at the political level. Coram  asserts  that many  of  the  “building  blocks”  of  Boyd’s  theories  are well known.  The  creative  nature  of  the  philosophy  lies  in  the  synthesis  that  Boyd gives to these building blocks. (Coram: 330) As is apparent, many of the building blocks are the conceptual ideas of Dewey and von Clausewitz (and many others as well).   The  intent  is  to  shatter  cohesion,  produce  paralysis,  and bring about collapse of the adversary by generating confusion, disorder,  panic,  and  chaos.  Boyd  said  war  is  organic,  and compared  his  technique  to  clipping  the  nerves, muscles,  and tendons of  the enemy,  thus  reducing him  to  jelly. … As Boyd studied  German  tactics,  words  such  as  Schwerpunkt  and 
Fingerspitzengefuhl  became  everyday  expressions.  Neither translates well.  Schwerpunkt means  the main  focus  of  effort. On  a  deeper  reading  it  is  the  underlying  goal,  the  glue  that holds  together  various  units.  Fingerspitzengefuhl  means fingertip  feel.  Again  the  fuller  meaning  applies  to  a  leader’s instinctive and  intuitive sense of what  is going on or what  is needed in a battle or, for that matter,  in any conflict. (Coram: 333‐334)  The organic nature of war and the Fingerspitzengefuhl are Clausewitzian to the core.  The  General  often  refers  to  the  forces  of  war  as  organisms  while  the definition  of  Fingerspitzengefuhl,  given  by  Coram,  could  easily  double  as  a definition of von Clausewitz’s sense of coup d’oeil.    Using  these  concepts  and  the  underlying  philosophy  of  destruction  and 
191 
 
creation, Boyd developed the OODA Loop as a conceptual device to envision the nature of all conflict. (This device not only has gained traction in contemporary military thought but has also been applied to business and sports as well.) The OODA Loop  is  often misread as  a decision‐making  tool  rather  than a  rich  and complex  philosophical  construct  for  “getting  inside  the  head”  of  any potential opponent. At first glance, many analysts believe the lesson of the OODA Loop is speed;  that  is,  whoever  acts  the  fastest  wins.  This  is  not  so.  While  speed  is important, the object is to act quickly enough to disrupt and confuse the enemy so that the adversary cannot react appropriately. If the actions of a military are predictable, such as those based on accepted theory or dogma, then speed is of little importance. The adversary will know what to expect and can prepare for most eventualities.  If  the adversary, however, has  little  idea of what  to expect then his or her actions are quite likely doomed to failure. Coram describes the Loop thus,   It is true that speed is crucial, but not the speed of simply cycling through the Loop. By simplifying the cycle in this way, the military can make computer models. But computer models do not take into account the single most important part of the cycle—the orientation phase, especially the implicit part of the orientation phase.   Before  Boyd  came  along,  others  had  proposed  primitive versions of an OODA Loop. The key thing to understand about Boyd’s version is not the mechanical cycle itself, but rather the need to execute the cycle in such a fashion as to get inside the mind  and  decision  cycle  of  the  adversary.  This  means  the adversary  is  dealing with  outdated  or  irrelevant  information and  thus  becomes  confused  and  disoriented  and  can’t function.   Understanding  the  OODA  Loop  is  difficult.  First,  even 
192 
 




The figure demonstrates the complexity of the concept. For the purposes of this dissertation, the first two phases are the most critical. If Boyd is correct that the object  is  to  disrupt  the  adversary  so  he  or  she  cannot  make  timely  and meaningful  decisions,  then  the  “friendly”  decision‐maker  must  be  able  to complete  the  Observe  and  Orient  phases  more  quickly  that  the  adversary. Coram explains, “…when one has developed the proper Fingerspitzengefuhl for a changing situation, the tempo picks up and it seems one is then able to bypass the explicit  ‘Orientation’ and  ‘Decision’ part of  the Loop,  to  ‘Observe’ and  ‘Act’ almost  simultaneously.  The  speed  must  come  from  a  deep  intuitive understanding of one’s relationship to the rapidly changing environment. This is what  enables  a  commander  seemingly  to  bypass  parts  of  the  Loop.  It  is  this adaptability that gives the OODA Loop its awesome power.” (335‐336)   In Clausewitzian terms, the military genius has this rare ability to synthesize the  proper  action,  Fingerspitzengefuhl,  through  his  or  her  coup  d’oeil.  This quality of the genius allows him or her to rapidly, almost instinctually, to grasp the multiple potentialities from any combat or war scenario and make the right decision  regarding  the  best  course  of  action.  The  only way  this  ability  can  be fostered  is  through  continuous  exposure  to  the  appropriate  environment  of war.  While  Dewey  does  not  demand  an  “increased  tempo”  for  an  aesthetic experience, the Boyd concept most certainly fits the conceptual construct of the Deweyan aesthetic. Note,  the OODA Loop has no explicit decision schemes; all feedback is implicit which implies the ability to synthesize based on experience. 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(See Figure 1.) The  “Orientation” phase demands prior  experience  if  one  is  to function within  the  Loop.  This  phase  looks  as  if  Boyd  expropriated  the  entire phase  from  Dewey.  Not  only  does  the  ability  to  orient  one’s  self  demand appropriate prior experience but also that ability demands an understanding of one’s  own,  and  the  adversary’s,  cultural  heritage,  genetic  makeup,  social conditions, and other such factors. Boyd in discussing the Loop observed, “Also note  how  the  ‘loop’  (not  just  orientation)  is  an  ongoing  many‐sided  implicit cross‐referencing  process  of  projection,  empathy,  correlation,  and  rejection.” (Coram: 344)  These words are the words of a philosopher, not those one would expect from a “mere” fighter pilot. This “form of thinking” is unique to military decision‐making processes.   Boyd  does  not  intend  to  offer  a  menu  for  how  to  make  decisions.  He  is demanding  a  new  way  of  thinking,  one  that  fosters  creativity  through deconstruction  and  synthesis.  The  Colonel  demonstrated  through  multiple examples  that disrupting  the enemy and “getting  inside  the adversary’s mind” not only leads to victory in combat but also such a tactic often leads to victory without having to commit to battle at all. “Boyd begins the section on maneuver conflict  with  two  crucial  words:  ‘Ambiguity,  deception  …’—the  essence  of maneuver tactics. This is General Patton’s approach to fighting the Germans. It is  Muhammad  Ali  saying  he  will  ‘float  like  a  butterfly  and  sting  like  a  bee.’” (Coram:  338)  The  lesson  to  be  taken  from  Boyd’s  briefing  is  that  military leaders need to  think  in an entirely new way  if  they are  to succeed. Boyd was 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attempting to shake the “brass” out of its institutional complacency. The object was  to  develop  leaders  who  thought  about  war  in  ways  that  were  not “traditional,” ways  that would  lead  to victory  in any  future war and avoid  the intellectual anchor of trying to win “the last war.”    Boyd’s approach philosophy met with a great deal of skepticism and doubt from  most  of  the  entrenched  leaders  within  the  military  and  its  civilian leadership. At the highest levels the feeling was, usually, to ask why one should follow this brash, philosophical colonel. After all, did not the high level “leaders” attain their positions because of their great knowledge and skill at planning and fighting wars? Change comes slowly in a bureaucracy. Not all, however, turned a deaf ear to Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict.” Most of those who heard and accepted this  “new”  philosophy  were  junior  and  field  grade  officers  as  well  as  young congressional  staffers.  Few  flag  officers,  generals  and  admirals,  gave  much consideration to the principles that were causing such a stir among the younger officers. A major exception was the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General A. M. Gray. The Commandant  saw  the paradigm shift  in military  thinking  that Boyd’s  philosophy  represented.  Incorporating  that  shift  into  the  USMC  ethos became one of General Gray’s ultimate concerns. 
Dewey and von Clausewitz’s Philosophy in Practice   The  philosophy  of  John  Boyd  incorporates  the  aesthetic  concepts  of  John Dewey  and  the  principles  of  war  and  leadership  in  Carl  von  Clausewitz’s philosophy  of  war.  This  section  is  intended  to  demonstrate  that  these  views 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have been incorporated into a practical application, which addresses combat in modern contemporary wars. This illustrative application suggests that those on the  forefront  of  contemporary  military  thought  consider  Dewey  and  Von Clausewitz  as  germane  today  as  in  the  past.  By  demonstrating  the appropriateness of Boyd’s philosophy to contemporary warfighting the case  is made simultaneously  that  the philosophies of both Dewey and von Clausewitz are, by extension, important to modern military thought and lay the foundation for addressing modern combat in all forms.    Boyd  “infiltrated”  the  USMC’s  educational  system.  He  worked  with instructors,  majors  and  lieutenant  colonels,  to  teach  them  the  lessons  of destruction  and  creation,  Schwerpunkt,  Fingerspitzengefuhl,  fast‐transients, OODA Loops—all new approaches to thinking. Boyd took part in the classes at Marine  Corps  Base  Quantico,  where  officers  are  trained.  The  classes incorporated  the  ideas  of  the  “Patterns  of  Conflict”  and  led  to  new  ways  of looking at combat. The doctrinal, rule oriented, methods of operations gave way to philosophical  concepts  about how  to  think  and how  to  conduct operations. This signaled a new paradigm for understanding war. Yet, this shift in thinking offered those who could understand and incorporate this non‐traditional mode of looking at war an opportunity to win any battle (or war), not just those of the last campaign.    Word  of  the  ideas  of  this  iconoclastic,  retired  Air  Force  colonel  began  to filter  through  the  Corps.  Eventually,  the  future  Commandant  of  the  Marine 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Corps, General Gray, heard these ideas as a colonel and became a “believer” in the  radical  new  wave  of  military  thought  and  philosophy.  This  adherent  of Boyd’s would eventually become instrumental in changing the military mind‐set regarding contemporary war.   Boyd, echoing both Dewey and von Clausewitz, adamantly championed the decision process’s implicit nature. Explicit guidance, or rule‐based decisions, is anathema to success and ultimate victory. Boyd demanded the  intuitive at  the expense of directions. A critical look at his concept leads to an obvious parallel; the Colonel is giving a template for the military genius of von Clausewitz. Look for  multiple  solutions  and  use  intuition—based  on  prior  experiences  and understandings—to  choose  the  best  or most  probable  successful  action.  Free play  exercises  based  on  these  ideas  replaced  the  set‐piece  problem  oriented scenarios that had historically been used at Quantico.  “Anything goes” became the  mantra.  Upstart  officers  who  failed  to  “follow  the  rules”  upset  those traditional  approaches  during  exercises.  Maneuver  became  the  watchword; focus  on  the  enemy  instead  of  equipment  and  terrain  became  the  norm.  The Marines  took  this  training  to heart. Gen.  John W. Vessey,  Jr., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the assault on Grenada in 1983 asked, “We have two  companies  of Marines  running  rampant  all  over  the  northern  half  of  this island,  and  three  Army  regiments  pinned  down  in  the  southwestern  corner, doing nothing. What the hell is going on?” (Quotes: Web) What was “going on” was maneuver warfare based on the principles of the OODA Loop. Get inside the 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head of  the enemy and cycle  through  the Loop  to disrupt his or her ability  to function. This  can only be done  if  the commanders have a developed sense of 
coup d’oeil gained through previous meaningful experiences.      Boyd’s  philosophy became  the  official  conceptual  underpinning of warfare for the Marine Corps in1987 with the publishing of Fleet Marine Field Manual 1 (FMFM  1)  at  the  behest  of  Commandant  Gray.  The  number  of  the  manual  is significant because, unlike most military manuals that carry the next sequential number to indicate a continuation of the process, FMFM 1 indicates a brand new beginning  for  the  Corps.  Gray  himself  directed  the  new  manual  carry  the number ‘one.’ The official title of FMFM 1 is Warfighting, thereby indicating the official mission of the Marines. Nonetheless, the thinking is all‐new. Essentially, the document  is Boyd’s philosophy. FMFM 1  is not a  “how to” manuscript but rather a  treatise on how  to orient one’s  thinking. FMFM 1 became mandatory reading  for  all Marines,  both  officer  and  enlisted.  In  1997,  the USMC  issued  a revised  version  of Warfighting, Marine  Corps Doctrine  Pamphlet  1  (MCDP  1). This  is  the  current  doctrinal  exposition  of  the  Corps. MCDP 1  does  retain  the number  ‘one’  as  a  designation  and  the  title,  Warfighting,  also  remains unchanged.  This  revision  is  an  amplification  of  FMFM  1  and  remains  true  to Boyd’s philosophy.   A review of the table of contents of MCDP 1 is instructive. (Appendix II) With few exceptions, the document is a reprise of von Clausewitz’s ideas in modern guise. The construct is eerily similar to On War. The subsections of Chapter 1, 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“The Nature of War,” are titled,    War Defined—   Friction—   Uncertainty—     Fluidity—   Disorder—   Complexity—   The Human Dimension—   Violence and Danger—   Physical, Moral, and Mental   Forces—   The Evolution of War—   The Science, Art, and Dynamic of War—   Conclusion Each of these subsections discusses war in Clausewitzian terms. For example, in “War Defined,” MCDP 1 states   War  is  a  violent  clash  of  interests  between  or  among organized  groups  characterized  by  the  use  of military  force. These  groups  have  traditionally  been  established  nation­
states, but they may also include any nonstate group—such as an  international  coalition  or  a  faction within  or  outside  of  an 
existing state—with its own political interests and the ability to 
generate  organized  violence  on  a  scale  sufficient  to  have 
significant political consequences.    The  essence  of  war  is  a  violent  struggle  between  two 
hostile,  independent,  and  irreconcilable  wills,  each  trying  to 
impose itself on the other. War is fundamentally an interactive 
social  process.  Clausewitz  called  it  a  Zweikampf  (literally  a "two‐struggle") and suggested the image of a pair of wrestlers locked in a hold, each exerting force and counterforce to try to throw  the  other. War  is  thus  a  process  of  continuous mutual 
adaptation,  of  give  and  take,  move  and  countermove.  It  is critical  to  keep  in  mind  that  the  enemy  is  not  an  inanimate 
object  to be acted upon but an  independent and animate  force 
with  its  own objectives and plans. While we  try  to  impose our 
will on the enemy, he resists us and seeks to impose his own will 
on us. Appreciating  this dynamic  interplay between opposing human  wills  is  essential  to  understanding  the  fundamental nature of war. 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 The  object  in war  is  to  impose  our will  on  our  enemy. The 
means  to  this  end  is  the  organized  application  or  threat  of 
violence by military  force. The  target of  that violence may be limited  to  hostile  combatant  forces,  or  it  may  extend  to  the enemy  population  at  large.  War  may  range  from  intense 
clashes between large military forces—sometimes backed by an 
official  declaration  of  war—to  subtler,  unconventional 
hostilities that barely reach the threshold of violence.    Total war and perfect peace rarely exist in practice. Instead, 
they  are  extremes  between  which  exist  the  relations  among 
most  political  groups.  This  range  includes  routine  economic competition,  more  or  less  permanent  political  or  ideological tension, and occasional crises among groups. The decision  to resort  to  the use of military  force of  some kind may arise  at any  point  within  these  extremes,  even  during  periods  of relative peace. On one end of the spectrum, military force may be  used  simply  to  maintain  or  restore  order  in  civil disturbances  or  disaster  relief  operations.  At  the  other extreme,  force  may  be  used  to  completely  overturn  the existing  order  within  a  society  or  between  two  or  more societies.  Some cultures  consider  it  a moral  imperative  to go to war only as a  last resort when all peaceful means to settle disagreements  have  failed.  Others  have  no  such  hesitancy  to resort to military force to achieve their aims. (3‐5)  Von Clausewitz himself  could have written  this definitive  introductory section to Warfighting. This section demonstrates the philosophical nexus between the forefront  of  contemporary  military  thought  and  the  concepts  of  history’s foremost military philosopher.    Almost  every  section  of  MCDP  1,  addresses  some  philosophical  aspect  of Dewey,  von  Clausewitz,  or  the  synthesis  of  Boyd.  For  the  purposes  of  this section of the dissertation, noting the appropriation of these three philosophers into  the central document of, arguably,  the world’s most elite military  force  is sufficient  to  corroborate  the  initial  claim  that  the  philosophies  of  Dewey  and 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von Clausewitz are applicable in today’s contemporary sphere of war. The basis of  the  conceptual  framework  of  the  Marine  Corps’  philosophy  is  that  the philosophy be applicable in all  types of wars. The question at the beginning of this  chapter  asked  whether  such  a  philosophy,  one  that  applies  across  the spectrum  of  contemporary war,  could  and  does  exist. MCDP  1  addresses  this query directly in Chapter Two, “The Theory of War.” 
THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT   Conflict  can  take  a  wide  range  of  forms  constituting  a spectrum which  reflects  the magnitude  of  violence  involved. At  one  end  of  the  spectrum  are  those  actions  referred  to  as military operations other than war in which the application of military  power  is  usually  restrained  and  selective.  Military operations other than war encompass the use of a broad range of military capabilities to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace,  and  support  civil  authorities.  At  the  other  end  of  the spectrum  is  general  war,  a  large‐scale,  sustained  combat operation  such  as  global  conflict  between  major  powers. Where on the spectrum to place a particular conflict depends on several factors. Among them are policy objectives, available military means, national will, and density of fighting forces or combat  power  on  the  battlefield.  In  general,  the  greater  this density,  the  more  intense  the  conflict.  Each  conflict  is  not uniformly  intense.  As  a  result,  we  may  witness  relatively intense actions within a military operation other than war or relatively quiet sectors or phases  in a major regional conflict or general war.    Military  operations  other  than  war  and  small  wars  are more probable  than a major regional conflict or general war. Many  political  groups  simply  do  not  possess  the  military means to wage war at the high end of the spectrum. Many who fight  a  technologically  or  numerically  superior  enemy  may choose to  light  in a way that does not  justify the enemy’s full use  of  that  superiority.  Unless  actual  survival  is  at  stake, political  groups  are  generally  unwilling  to  accept  the  risks associated  with  general  war.  However,  a  conflict’s  intensity may  change over  time. Belligerents may  escalate  the  level  of violence  if  the  original  means  do  not  achieve  the  desired 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results. Similarly, wars may actually de‐escalate over time; for example,  after  an  initial  pulse  of  intense  violence,  the belligerents may continue to fight on a  lesser  level, unable to sustain the initial level of intensity.    The Marine Corps, as the nation’s force‐in‐readiness, must have  the  versatility  and  flexibility  to  deal with  a  situation  at any  intensity across  the entire  spectrum of  conflict. This  is  a greater  challenge  than  it  may  appear:  Military  operations other than war and small wars are not simply lesser forms of general war. A modern military force capable of waging a war against a  large conventional  force may find  itself  ill‐prepared for  a  “small”  war  against  a  lightly  equipped  guerrilla  force. (26‐28)  The entire spectrum of war is encompassed in this document. A proposition of this dissertation is that the philosophy incorporated into MCDP 1 is both Deweyan and Clausewitzian, as synthesized by Boyd and the Marine Corps, and  that  document  represents  a  prime  example  of  those  pragmatic philosophies’ usefulness in contemporary wars of all types. 
Observations on the Philosophical Demands for Victory   
  Having established that the underlying philosophical concepts of Dewey, and von Clausewitz—so well synthesized in Boyd’s work and given concrete form  in  USMC  doctrine—do  apply  to  contemporary warfare,  the  reader  is right  to  conclude  these  concepts  are  timeless.  These  concepts  are  not directed  at  any  specific  type  of  war  but,  rather,  are  predicated  on  an existential view of human nature and how man sees him or her self  in  the world. Dewey tells us how we must participate in our relationship with the environment  if  we  are  to  fully  benefit  fully  from  our  experiences.  This participation defines Dewey’s aesthetic experience and how one becomes a 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live  creature.  Von  Clausewitz  understands  this  idea  as  that  idea  applies  to the realm of war. The General extends the notions of undergoing meaningful experience,  and  continual  immersion  in  the  art  of  and practice  for war,  to develop  the  concept  of  the  military  genius.  Live  creatures  and  military 
geniuses  think,  and  understand  the  world,  in  ways  that  allow  total immersion in the possibilities that experience offers. To win in combat, the genius must  see  and  grasp  the  course  of  action  that  offers  the  best  (most probable)  opportunity  for  victory.  Victory  will  most  often  accede  to  the commander who sees  the potential paths  to success and acts most quickly on the one most likely to attain the goal. This ability is timeless.   History  is  replete  with  examples  of  commanders  who  have  had  this ability and used it well. Hannibal’s victory at the Battle of Cannae (216 BCE) exemplifies  the Clausewitzian genius. Hannibal  is  said  to have never  lost a battle  but  his  victory  at  Cannae  was  particularly  stunning.  This  battle, believed  to  be  the  most  lethal  single  battle  in  history,  demonstrates  the concepts  illuminated in this dissertation. Before describing the battle as an exemplar  of  the  philosophy  thus  far  discussed,  a  brief  deconstruction  of Hannibal  as  a  leader,  offers  insight  into  what  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz require in the military genius, or live creature.   In  terms  of  psychological  and  philosophical  make‐up,  Hannibal resembles Dewey, von Clausewitz and Boyd, as well. All of these men were 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classic models of the fully involved individual. These men rarely had time for themselves and they lived the lives of which they so passionately espoused.    Of  Hannibal,  Robert  L.  O’Connell  says,  “The  personal  details  that  do remain mostly  form  an  image  of  a  generic martial workaholic.  Livy,  eying him through the lens of his own country’s military conventions, depicts him as  a  good  man  with  a  sword,  fearless  in  combat,  oblivious  to  physical discomfort, sleeping on the ground amidst his men, sharing their hardships, eating  for  sustenance,  not  pleasure.”  (84)  This  description  parallel’s  von Clausewitz in his demand for the genius to be not only competent in combat but also hardened to physical deprivations and have an abiding concern for the welfare of his or her troops. Understanding what the men and women at arms experience, aside from being a prime requisite for command, can only come from the lived experiences of one who has been molded in combat. As Lord Moran (Dr. Charles McMoran Wilson) so eloquently states,   A  friendly  critic  has  expressed  fear  that  the  soldier  who has not been seasoned by battle may be discouraged by all this fulminating  against  the  iniquity  of  war.  The  idea  is  to  hide from  him  what  war  is  really  like  until  he  finds  it  out  for himself. It would be as reasonable to keep the medical student away  from  disease  because  some  may  become  a  little  too introspective and get  it  into their heads that they themselves are suffering from the same malady. I have already warned the reader  that  this  book  is  a  record  of  changing  moods; sometimes fresh from some more personal loss I have written as  though  I  were  a  pacifist  and  war  was  sheer  waste, sometimes it is plain that I held war to be the ultimate test of manhood.  Besides,  I  will  not  tamper  with  the  testimony  it carries, however badly it may have worn with time. It  is well that those who command men in war—and it is for them that I 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write—should  have  known  such  moods,  if  they  recognise them for what they are, that they may the better detect them in others. The imaginative man in war pays a price which is not 
exacted from his more stolid brother, but his men are the more 
ready  to  follow his example when  they divine  that he has read 
their secret thoughts. (Moran: 46‐47)(emphasis added)  Hannibal lived, fought, and suffered with is troops. He has read their secret thoughts. As Dewey and von Clausewitz demand, he had, and shared with his troops, a continuous flow of meaningful combat experiences.   Likewise,  thinking  ahead  of  the  enemy  and  disrupting  the  adversary’s plans  were  always  part  of  Hannibal’s  tactical  efforts.  “His  capacity  for trickery was endless. Whether escaping from an apparently hopeless trap, or springing one on a hapless foe, he always seemed to concoct the unexpected and  employ  it  to  his  own  best  advantage.  In  the  case  of  the  Romans,  he 
proved  particularly  adroit  in  maneuvers  prior  to  battle,  turning  their 
instinctive aggressiveness against  them and  fighting only where he, not  they, 
chose.”    (O’Connell:  87)  (Emphasis  added)  This  describes  the  ability  of  a genius  to  see  through  the  fog  of  war  and  extract  what  is  necessary  for victory.  Von  Clausewitz  certainly  demands  this  ability,  coup  d’oeil,  of  the genius. O’Connell’s characterization of Hannibal shows the ability to relate to the  environment  that  is  foundational  to  Dewey’s  aesthetic  experience  (or Boyd’s destruction/creation synthesis model). 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 Von  Clausewitz  is  adamant  that  the  commander’s will  is  paramount  in maintaining  a  disciplined  fighting  force  and  that  only  his  or  her  will  is capable of keeping an army prepared for battle. The General proclaims,    But  as  soon  as  difficulties  arise—and  that  must  always happen when great results are at stake—then things no longer move  of  themselves  like  a  well‐oiled  machine,  the  machine itself  begins  to  offer  resistance,  and  to  overcome  this  the Commander must have great  force of will. … As  the  forces  in one  individual  after  another  become  prostrated,  and  can  no longer be excited and supported by an effort of his own will, the whole inertia of the mass gradually rests its weight on the Will of the Commander: by the spark in his breast, by the light of his  spirit,  the  spark of purpose,  the  light of hope, must be kindled afresh in others: in so far only as he is equal to this, he stands above  the masses and continues  to be  their master … (OW: 144)  Compare this passage with O’Connell’s description of Hannibal.   Without doubt he possessed the best army that ever fought under  a  Carthaginian  standard,  but  his  troops  won  in  large part  because  Hannibal  was  their  leader.  Not  only  was  he  a master  at  using  each  combat  component  to  maximum advantage, but it is evident that his inspirational example was central  to elevating  the performance of  all. During  the entire time they were together in Italy, immersed in what frequently must have amounted to a  litany of privation,  there was not a single  incident  of  truly  mutinous  behavior—an  amazing record  for  any  Carthaginian  army,  and  one  that  Scipio Africanus and  the notoriously well‐disciplined Romans  could not match. (86)  Hannibal is an exemplar of the will required for Clausewitz’s military genius.    The Battle of Cannae demonstrates this genius in action. Hannibal at Cannae, vastly outnumbered by the Roman legions, found his Carthaginians facing one of the  few  times  in  which  the  enemy  determined  the  field  of  battle.  Although 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historians disagree on the exact size of the opposing forces, Adrian Goldsworthy estimates  the  Romans  had  80,000  infantry  and  6,000  cavalry  to  face  the Carthaginians 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. (200) The Romans chose to deploy  their  legions  between  the  River  Aufidus  on  the  right  flank  and  higher ground on their left flank. The strategy was to use these natural boundaries to prohibit an end run by Hannibal’s cavalry and to keep the fighting confined to a relatively  narrow  front.  With  their  vastly  superior  numbers  the  Romans intended  to  march  directly  against  Hannibal’s  weaker  forces  and,  through sustained combat win the battle through attrition. Hannibal quickly understood the Roman plan and devised a masterful counterplan. He used his one area of superiority, his cavalry, to great advantage. Likewise, he used deception to array his forces for the eventual destruction of the Romans.   The  initial  deployment  of  forces  saw  the Romans massed  in  three  tiers  of infantry facing Hannibal’s army grouped in units of a few hundred soldiers per group.  Hannibal  arranged  these  forces  in  a  convex  pattern  in  front  of  the Romans. On his left flank, he arranged his light cavalry, which he “overloaded” to  outnumber  the  opposing  Roman  cavalry.  On  his  right  he  arrayed  the remainder  of  his  horsemen.  Behind  his  main  force  of  infantry  he  placed  two units of Libyan (African) infantry, but instead of using these units as a “second tier”  to  fill  in  when  the  infantry  at  the  front  needed  replacements,  Hannibal placed  the  Libyans  on  the  left  and  right  flanks  of  the  battle  areas.  By  placing these  units  as  he  did,  historians  surmise  that  their  deployment was  probably 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unknown to, or well hidden from, the Roman commanders, Paullus and Varro. “Hannibal had rightly guessed that the main Roman effort was to be made in the centre and had adjusted his deployment and issued orders accordingly. His plan was to use the enemy’s own strength against him …” (Goldsworthy: 207‐208)   Fighting  commenced  with  Hannibal’s  cavalry,  under  the  command  of Hasdrubal,  on his  left,  engaging  the  cavalry on  the Roman  right.  “It  is  unclear how much advantage Hasdrubal had from his numbers,  for the confined space between  the  infantry  centres  and  the  river  may  have  prevented  him  from bringing them to bear. It may be that the Roman cavalry had got used to being beaten  by  the  Punic  horsemen  as  the  latter  had  to  winning.  In  hand‐to‐hand combat  confidence  was  often  of  greater  importance  than  numbers  or equipment. The Romans  fled, but many  found that  their escape was cut off by the  river  and were  slaughtered  by  their  exultant  opponents.  …  Before  it  was finished, the heavy infantry had met in the centre.” (Goldsworthy: 209)    Figure 2  (page 210) depicts,  cartographically,  the deployment of  forces  for the first stage of the battle. Upon seeing the destruction of their cavalry on their right flank, the Romans attacked en masse with their infantry in the center. The Punic warriors fought the advancing Romans but slowly fell back in the face of the  advancing  legions.  As  they  slowly  moved  backwards  the  convex arrangement of Hannibal’s forces gave way to a convex front. This move to the rear  was not a  classic  retreat but rather  a deceptive  move to lure the  Romans 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(Blue forces are Roman/Red forces are Punic) (Ancient Times: Web) Figure 3‐ Destruction of the Roman Army     The  example  of  Cannae  is  timeless.  Hannibal  learned  from  meaningful experience in combat. His experiences were aesthetic in the Deweyan sense. He gained  from the uncertainty of  combat and he  lived  the  life demanded by von Clausewitz  for  the  development  of  a  military  genius.  Hannibal’s  “inner  eye” enabled  him  to  ascertain  quickly  the  intentions  of  the  enemy  and  to  devise  a response before  the adversary even understood what was happening to  them. 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He used speed, deception and cunning to win the day. His forces were prepared and  Hannibal,  because  he  had  lived  with  them  daily  in  their  privations  and victories, knew the minds of his men. He lived a philosophy that still resonates for military  leaders  today.  T.  E.  Lawrence  encapsulates  the  spirit  of Hannibal, the  genius,  “Nine‐tenths  of  tactics  are  certain  and  taught  in  books:  but  the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals.  It can only be ensued by instinct, sharpened by thought practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex …” (285) This is what von Clausewitz demands of the military genius.   Hannibal, as representative of the philosophy embraced and championed in the  dissertation,  might  seem  an  odd  choice  to  exemplify  that  philosophy  in contemporary  war.  If,  however,  the  point  has  been  sufficiently  made  that  all war, by nature, does not  change  temporally  then any commander who can be considered  a  military  genius  can  stand  as  a  prototypical  exemplar  for  all geniuses.    Many who claim war today is fundamentally different than in the past must make  the  case  that  humans  are  somehow  no  longer  part  of  the  equation; machines will be able to fight  independently and decide the outcome of future conflicts. This is not at all clear. Singer makes  this  compelling  and  cites  a  story by author and philosopher, Arthur C. Clarke.   Arthur C. Clarke may have been the science  fiction writer behind 2001  and HAL  the evil  supercomputer, but one of his most militarily instructive stories is called “Superiority.” Set in 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a distant future, the story is written from the perspective of a captured military  officer, who  is  now  sitting  in  a  prison  cell. He tries to explain how his side lost a war even though it had the far better and newer weapons.   “We  were  defeated  by  only  one  thing—by  the  inferior science  of  our  enemies,”  the  officer  writes.  “I  repeat,  by  the inferior  science  of  our  enemies.”  Clarke’s  future  officer explains that his side was seduced by the possibilities of new technology. It created a new doctrine for how it wanted war to be,  rather  than  how  it  turned  out.  “We  now  realize  that  this was our first mistake,” he writes. “I still think it was a natural one,  for  it  seemed  to  us  that  all  our  existing  weapons  had become obsolete overnight, and we already regarded them as almost primitive.”   While  his  side  builds  around  ever  more  complex technologies,  the  enemy keeps on using  the  same,  seemingly outdated but still effective weapons and strategies. When war comes, it doesn’t play out how the officer hopes. The side with technologic  superiority  can’t  figure out how  to apply  its new strengths,  while  the  inferior  side  takes  advantage  of  all  its enemy’s new vulnerabilities, eventually winning the war.   Many  think  that  this  problem  of  “superiority”  will  be  a 
central challenge to the American military in the future.   (212) (Emphasis added)  Von Clausewitz  scholar,  Stephen  J.  Cimbala  echoes  this  view,  “…  John Arquilla and  others  have  shown  how  information  warfare  does  not  necessarily  favor high‐technology states; netwar and other  information based strategies may be used  by  state  and  nonstate  actors  to  exploit  the  cultural  and  societal vulnerabilities  of  the  United  States  and  other  economically  developed democracies.      The  expectation  of  an  information‐rich  battle  environment  for our side and an  information‐poor one  for  the enemy may  itself be a source of considerable friction. The central concerns of these studies, in my judgment, are very much in the spirit of Clausewitz’s understanding of war and politics related 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CONCLUSION: THE AESTHETIC VERDICT ON WAR   This  dissertation  confirms  war  as  the  zenith  of  aesthetic  experience.  The treatise  demonstrates  the  pragmatic  nature  of  war  through  explication  of Dewey’s  aesthetic  philosophy.  Likewise,  the  coherency  of  von  Clausewitz’s philosophy  parallels  Dewey  as  it  too  leads  to  complete  development,  or flourishing, of the individual in a complex, ever‐changing world. Von Clausewitz sets  his  philosophy  in  the  context  of war,  but  his  philosophy  transcends  that milieu. The timelessness of the General’s philosophical concepts guarantees the appropriateness  of  these  concepts  in  today’s  inconstant world.    To  exemplify this  point,  this  paper  applied  von  Clausewitz’s  concepts  to  the  range  of contemporary  wars  in  which  the  demands  on  modern  warriors  are  often perceived as qualitatively different  from demands placed on  individuals  in the armies  of  the  early  1800s.  This  perception  lacks  credibility  and,  since  the 
methods and technologies of war are in continuous flux while the basic nature of war  remains  unchanged,  the  germane  nature  of  the  General’s  philosophy  to contemporary times remains unsullied and follows logically. Rather than simply asserting  that  the  concepts  of  these  two  philosophers  are  germane  in  the modern,  contemporary  context  of  war,  this  dissertation  shows  how  modern military  thinkers  actually  employ  the  Clausewitzian  philosophy  as  a  basis  for fighting  in  today’s  environment.  As  an  exemplar,  the  current  doctrine  of  the 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United  States Marine  Corps  is  offered  as  a  template  of  the  philosophy  of  von Clausewitz and, by extension, Dewey.   The narrative of world history, as noted at the beginning of this dissertation, can be envisioned as a narrative of war. War defines cultures and  individuals. The  first  arc  of  this  treatise  examined  the  nature  of  war  and  what  the philosophy of that nature entails for commanders and those who aspire to top military leadership positions. The genesis of this examination centered on John Dewey’s concept of experience and his philosophy of the aesthetic. For Dewey, the way one  forms a  relation with  the environment determines  the quality or meaningfulness of any experience. Only through a continual cycle of doing and 
undergoing  can  the  individual claim to have entered  into  the requisite  intense relationship  with  the  environment.  This  relationship  changes  both  the individual and the environment throughout the life of the relation until a stable condition  exists.  This  condition  represents  a  consummation  of  the  experience but,  notably,  not  a  condition  of  finality.  Upon  consummation,  the  experience becomes  bedding  for  future  experiences.  This  cycle  is  continuous  and,  if appropriately undergone, represents the aesthetic. Dewey understood that not all experiences become aesthetic. To have an experience—that is, an experience of an aesthetic nature—requires  full and active participation by the  individual and  must  be  a  continuous  “give  and  take”  relation  between  individual  and environment.  If  the  process  short‐circuits  prior  to  consummation,  the  event (experience)  cannot  be  called  aesthetic.  Only  through  an  aesthetic  life  can  an 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individual  be  fully  actualized.  Dewey  refers  to  the  person  who  has  fully participated  in  life  as  a  live  creature.  The  live  creature,  in  Dewey’s  parlance, offers a  lens  through which  to view von Clausewitz’s philosophy, especially as that philosophy demands a certain kind of existential status for his model of the individual  similarly  fully  engaged  in  the  world  …  that  would  be  the military 




live  creature  and  the  military  genius.  Both  philosophers  incorporated  these threads  to  develop  concepts  of man  fully  engaged  in  his  or  her  environment. This dissertation united these threads into a coherent whole. At the core of each philosophy  remains  a  similar  construct  for  the  complete,  integrated individual—the live creature and the military genius.     Finally, applying the Deweyan overlay to von Clausewitz’s philosophy, this discourse  addressed  the  question  of  whether  von  Clausewitz’s  philosophical view of war and leadership appropriately applies in today’s world, especially to contemporary  warfare.  To  determine  the  pertinence  of  the  Dewey/von Clausewitz view to contemporary war, this treatise invoked a current synthesis of  the  ideas  of  these  two  philosophers.  This  synthesis,  a  philosophy  for  war developed  in  the  late  twentieth  century  by  John  Boyd,  incorporated philosophical foundations espoused by von Clausewitz and Dewey.     Like  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz,  Boyd  develops  both  a  conceptual framework for thinking and a creative synthesis derived from one’s experience with the environment. Often couched in terms that appear different from those of  either  Dewey  or  von  Clausewitz,  Boyd  addressed most  of  the  same  issues faced by the two philosophers. More importantly, Boyd applied the concepts of creative  synthesis—akin  to  Dewey’s  aesthetic  and  von  Clausewitz’s  “inner eye”—to  develop  a  “complete”  philosophy  of  war.  Boyd,  like  von  Clausewitz, 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adamantly  claimed  his  philosophy  not  to  be  a  theory  of  war  but,  rather,  a philosophy  of  how  to  think  about  war.  Boyd  synthesized  many  of  the philosophical  concepts  of Dewey  and  von Clausewitz  in  his  two major works, “Destruction and Creation” and “Patterns of Conflict.” The Colonel incorporated the  concepts  of  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz  to  create  the  link  from  his  own philosophy to a practical and applied use in contemporary warfare. Once Boyd established  this  link,  the  claim became  obvious  that  the  philosophy  of Dewey and von Clausewitz is appropriately germane to modern contemporary warfare.   The range of wars being fought today—and those that may be conceived by the world’s most  creative military  thinkers—covers  the  spectrum  from  small group,  non‐state  activities—such  as  terrorist  actions—to  “all‐out” thermonuclear exchanges. To logically assert a particular philosophy as relevant to  contemporary  war  requires  a  common  element  that  inheres  in  every conceivable type of war.  After examining a subset of types of modern wars, this dissertation concludes that the nature of war remains unchanged from antiquity until today. To claim victory in any military conflict still requires “boots on the ground.” Consequently, modern war does not represent a conceptual paradigm shift but, rather, reaffirms that war today continually evolves while retaining its basic  nature  throughout  the  process  of  development.  Having  determined  the conceptual static” nature of war, establishing that the philosophy of Dewey and von  Clausewitz  can  practically  apply  to war’s  inherent  nature  remains  as  the 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final  determinant  for  the  claim  of  relevance  of  these  philosophies  to modern war.    Even  though  the  philosophy  espoused  by  Dewey  and  von  Clausewitz,  and synthesized  by  Boyd,  show  relevance  to  modern  warfare,  this  dissertation extended the idea to claim the philosophy is employed in today’s practical world of war;  thus exemplifying the pragmatic nature of  the Deweyan/Clausewitzian philosophy. This pragmatic claim rests on the fact the Deweyan/Clausewitzian philosophy,  via  Boyd’s  syntheses,  forms  the  foundation  for  The  United  States Marine  warfighting  philosophy  in  the  twenty‐first  century.  The  USMC warfighting  philosophy  informs  and  inspires  the  Corps’  primary  doctrinal document. Unlike many previous military proclamations of doctrine, the USMC philosophy  is  structured  upon  conceptual  ideas  concerning  the nature  of war rather  than  on  rules  for  how  to  fight.  Using  the  current  USMC  warfighting philosophy as a model  for  the practical application of  the use of philosophy  in modern wars, and having shown the derivation of this philosophy from Dewey and von Clausewitz (via Boyd), the assertion that Dewey and von Clausewitz are pertinent to contemporary warfare is logically supported.   The  explication  of  Dewey’s  aesthetic  philosophy  and  von  Clausewitz’s philosophy  of  leadership  espouse  a  certain  understanding  of  experience. Experience,  properly  understood  and  undergone,  constitutes  the  aesthetic.  A certain intensity in the relationship of the individual with the environment must 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i  This  dissertation  will  use  a  person’s  official  title  (capitalized)  alone  only  if  that  title  obviously refers to a single individual. For example, the term “the General” can only be understood to refer to Carl von Clausewitz. Likewise, “the Colonel” can only be understood to refer to John Boyd.  ii Von Clausewitz uses the terms “unlimited” and “absolute” to mean wars that are fought in a pure theoretical  sense without  interaction  from,  or with,  the  environment. He  says  such wars  are  only possible in the “abstract.” Real war requires constant interaction with the environment; thus, actual war can never be absolute or abstract.  iii  The  subsequent  chapter  of  this  dissertation  demonstrates  that  von  Clausewitz’s  experiential demands required for military genius are similar to demands espoused by John Dewey for the  live 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ABSTRACT To  comprehend  and  cope  with  our  environment  we  develop mental  patterns  or concepts of meaning. The purpose of this paper is to sketch out how we destroy and create  these  patterns  to  permit  us  to  both  shape  and  be  shaped  by  a  changing environment. In this sense, the discussion also literally shows why we cannot avoid this  kind  of  activity  if  we  intend  to  survive  on  our  own  terms.  The  activity  is dialectic in nature generating both disorder and order that emerges as a changing and expanding universe of mental concepts matched to a changing and expanding universe of observed reality.  
DESTRUCTION AND CREATION   Studies  of  human  behavior  reveal  that  the  actions  we  undertake  as individuals are closely related  to survival, more  importantly,  survival on our own terms. Naturally, such a notion implies that we should be able to act relatively free or  independent  of  any  debilitating  external  influences—otherwise  that  very survival might be in jeopardy. In viewing the instinct for survival in this manner we imply  that  a  basic  aim  or  goal,  as  individuals,  is  to  improve  our  capacity  for 
independent action. The degree to which we cooperate, or compete, with others is driven by the need to satisfy this basic goal. If we believe that it  is not possible to satisfy  it  alone, without  help  from others,  history  shows us  that we will  agree  to constraints  upon our  independent  action—in order  to  collectively pool  skills  and talents  in  the  form  of  nations,  corporations,  labor  unions,  mafias,  etc.  —so  that obstacles standing in the way of the basic goal can either be removed or overcome. On the other hand, if the group cannot or does not attempt to overcome obstacles deemed important to many (or possibly any) of its individual members, the group must risk losing these alienated members. Under these circumstances, the alienated members may dissolve their relationship and remain independent, form a group of their  own,  or  join  another  collective  body  in  order  to  improve  their  capacity  for 
independent action.   In a real world of limited resources and skills, individuals and groups form, dissolve  and  reform  their  cooperative  or  competitive  postures  in  a  continuous struggle to remove or overcome physical and social environmental obstacles.[11,13] In  a  cooperative  sense,  where  skills  and  talents  are  pooled,  the  removal  or overcoming  of  obstacles  represents  an  improved  capacity  for  independent  action 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for all concerned. In a competitive sense, where individuals and groups compete for scarce resources and skills, an improved capacity for independent action achieved by  some  individuals  or  groups  constrains  that  capacity  for  other  individuals  or groups.  Naturally,  such  a  combination  of  real world  scarcity  and  goal  striving  to overcome  this  scarcity  intensifies  the  struggle  of  individuals  and  groups  to  cope with both their physical and social environments.[11,13]   Against  such  a  background,  actions  and  decisions  become  critically important. Actions must be taken over and over again and in many different ways. Decisions must  be  rendered  to monitor  and  determine  the  precise  nature  of  the actions  needed  that  will  be  compatible  with  the  goal.  To  make  these  timely decisions implies that we must be able to form mental concepts of observed reality, as we perceive it, and be able to change these concepts as reality itself appears to change.  The  concepts  can  then  be  used  as  decision  models  for  improving  our capacity for  independent action. Such a demand for decisions that  literally  impact our  survival  causes  one  to  wonder:  How  do  we  generate  or  create  the  mental concepts to support this decision‐making activity? 
  There  are  two  ways  in  which  we  can  develop  and  manipulate  mental concepts to represent observed reality: we can start from a comprehensive whole and break it down to its particulars or we can start with the particulars and build towards a comprehensive whole.[28,24] Saying it another way, but in a related sense, we  can  go  from  the  general‐to‐specific  or  from  the  specific‐to‐general.  A  little reflection here reveals that deduction is related to proceeding from the general‐to‐specific  while  induction  is  related  to  proceeding  from  the  specific‐to‐general.  In following  this  line  of  thought,  can we  think  of  other  activities  that  are  related  to these two opposing  ideas?  Is not analysis related to proceeding  from the general‐to‐specific? Is not synthesis, the opposite of analysis, related to proceeding from the specific‐to‐general? Putting all this together: Can we not say that general‐to‐specific is  related  to  both  deduction  and  analysis,  while  specific‐to‐general  is  related  to induction and synthesis? Now, can we think of some examples to fit with these two opposing ideas? We need not  look far. The differential calculus proceeds from the general‐to‐specific—from  a  function  to  its  derivative.  Hence,  is  not  the  use  or application  of  the  differential  calculus  related  to  deduction  and  analysis?  The integral  calculus,  on  the  other  hand,  proceeds  in  the  opposite  direction—  from a derivative to a general function. Hence, is not the use or application of the integral calculus related to induction and synthesis? Summing up, we can see that: general­ 
to­specific  is  related  to  deduction,  analysis,  and  differentiation, while,  specific­to­
general is related to induction, synthesis, and integration.   Now  keeping  these  two  opposing  idea  chains  in  mind  let  us  move  on  a somewhat different  tack.  Imagine,  if  you will,  a domain  (a  comprehensive whole) and  its  constituent  elements  or  parts.  Now,  imagine  another  domain  and  its constituent  parts.  Once  again,  imagine  even  another  domain  and  its  constituent parts.  Repeating  this  idea  over  and  over  again  we  can  imagine  any  number  of 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domains and the parts corresponding to each. Naturally, as we go through life we develop  concepts  of meaning  (with  included  constituents)  to  represent  observed reality.  Can  we  not  liken  these  concepts—and  their  related  constituents—to  the domains and constituents  that we have  formed  in our  imagination? Naturally, we can. Keeping this relationship  in mind, suppose we shatter  the correspondence of each domain or concept with its constituent elements. In other words, we imagine the  existence  of  the  parts  but  pretend  that  the  domains  or  concepts  they  were previously  associated  with  do  not  exist.  Result:  We  have  many  constituents,  or particulars,  swimming  around  in  a  sea  of  anarchy.  We  have  uncertainty  and disorder  in  place  of  meaning  and  order.  Further,  we  can  see  that  such  an 
unstructuring  or  destruction  of  many  domains—to  break  the  correspondence  of each  with  its  respective  constituents—is  related  to  deduction,  analysis,  and 
differentiation. We call this kind of unstructuring a destructive deduction.   Faced  with  such  disorder  or  chaos,  how  can  we  reconstruct  order  and meaning? Going back  to  the  idea chain of specific‐to‐general,  induction, synthesis, and integration, the thought occurs that a new domain or concept can be formed if we can find some common qualities, attributes, or operations among some or many of  these  constituents  swimming  in  this  sea  of  anarchy.  Through  such  connecting threads (that produce meaning) we synthesize constituents from, hence across, the domains we have just shattered.[24] Linking, particulars together in this manner we can form a new domain or concept—providing, of course, we do not inadvertently use only those "bits and pieces"  in the same arrangement that we associated with one of  the domains purged  from our  imagination. Clearly,  such a synthesis would indicate  we  have  generated  something  new  and  different  from  what  previously existed.  Going  back  to  our  idea  chain,  it  follows  that  creativity  is  related  to induction,  synthesis,  and  integration  since  we  proceeded  from  unstructured  bits and pieces  to a new general pattern or  concept. We call  such action a creative or 
constructive  induction.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  crucial  or  key  step  that permits  this  creative  induction  is  the  separation  of  the  particulars  from  their previous  domains  by  the  destructive  deduction.  Without  this  unstructuring  the creation of a new structure cannot proceed—since the bits and pieces are still tied together as meaning within unchallenged domains or concepts.   Recalling  that  we  use  concepts  or  mental  patterns  to  represent  reality,  it follows  that  the  unstructuring  and  restructuring  just  shown  reveals  a  way  of changing  our  perception  of  reality.[28]  Naturally,  such  a  notion  implies  that  the emerging pattern of ideas and interactions must be internally consistent and match up with reality.[14,15] To check or verify internal consistency we try to see if we can trace  our way back  to  the  original  constituents  that were used  in  the  creative  or constructive  induction.  If we cannot reverse directions,  the  ideas and  interactions do not go together in this way without contradiction. Hence, they are not internally consistent. However, this does not necessarily mean we reject and throw away the entire  structure.  Instead,  we  should  attempt  to  identify  those  ideas  (particulars) 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and  interactions  that  seem  to  hold  together  in  a  coherent  pattern  of  activity  as distinguished from those ideas that do not seem to fit in. In performing this task, we check  for reversibility as well as check to see which  ideas and  interactions match up with our observations of reality.[27,14,15] Using those ideas and interactions that pass  this  test,  together with any new  ideas  (from new destructive deductions) or other  promising  ideas  that  popped  out  of  the  original  destructive  deduction,  we again attempt to find some common qualities, attributes, or operations to re‐create the concept—or create a new concept. Also, once again, we perform the check for reversibility  and  match‐up  with  reality.  Over  and  over  again,  this  cycle  of 




system—that  includes  the  arithmetic  of  whole  numbers—is  incomplete.  In  other words,  there  are  true  statements  or  concepts  within  the  system  that  cannot  be deduced from the postulates that make up the system. Next, he proved even though 








h/m is Planck's constant (h) divided by observed mass (m).    Examination  of  Heisenberg's  Principle  reveals  that  as  mass  becomes exceedingly  small,  the  uncertainty,  or  indeterminacy,  becomes  exceedingly  large. Now—in  accordance  with  this  relation—when  the  precision,  or  mass,  of phenomena being observed  is  little or no different  than the precision, or mass, of the  observing  phenomena,  the  uncertainty  values  become  as  large  as,  or  larger than,  the  velocity  and  size  frame‐of‐reference  associated  with  the  bodies  being observed.[9]  In other words, when  the  intended distinction between observer and observed begins  to  disappear[3],  the uncertainty  values hide  or mask phenomena behavior; or put another way, the observer perceives uncertain or erratic behavior that bounces all over  in accordance with  the  indeterminacy  relation. Under  these circumstances,  uncertainty  values  represent  the  inability  to  determine  the character or nature (consistency) of a system within itself. On the other hand, if the precision and subtlety of the observed phenomena is much less than the precision and  subtlety  of  the  observing  phenomena  the  uncertainty  values  become  much smaller  than  the  velocity  and  size  values  of  the  bodies  being  observed.[2] Under these  circumstances,  the  character  or  nature  of  a  system  can  be  determined—although not exactly— since the uncertainty values do not hide or mask observed phenomena behavior nor indicate significant erratic behavior.   Keeping in mind that the Heisenberg Principle implicitly depends upon the indeterminate  presence  and  influence  of  an  observer,[  14]  we  can  now  see—as revealed  by  the  two  examples  just  cited—that  the  magnitude  of  the  uncertainty values represent the degree of intrusion by the observer upon the observed. When intrusion  is  total  (that  is,  when  the  intended  distinction  between  observer  and observed  essentially  disappears  [3]),  the  uncertainty  values  indicate  erratic behavior.  When  intrusion  is  low,  the  uncertainty  values  do  not  hide  or  mask observed  phenomena  behavior,  nor  indicate  significant  erratic  behavior.  In  other words,  the  uncertainty  values  not  only  represent  the  degree  of  intrusion  by  the observer  upon  the  observed  but  also  the  degree  of  confusion  and  disorder 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perceived by that observer.   Confusion  and  disorder  are  also  related  to  the  notion  of  Entropy  and  the Second  Law  of  Thermodynamics.[11,20]  Entropy  is  a  concept  that  represents  the potential for doing work, the capacity for taking action, or the degree of confusion and  disorder  associated  with  any  physical  or  information  activity.  High  entropy implies a  low potential  for doing work,  a  low capacity  for  taking action or a high decree of confusion and disorder. Low entropy implies just the opposite. Viewed in this  context,  the  Second‐Law of Thermodynamics  states  that  all  observed natural processes generate entropy.[ 20] From this law it follows that entropy must increase in any closed system—or, for that matter, in any system that cannot communicate in  an  ordered  fashion  with  other  systems  or  environments  external  to  itself. Accordingly,  whenever  we  attempt  to  do  work  or  take  action  inside  such  a system—a concept and its match‐up with reality—we should anticipate an increase in entropy, hence an  increase  in confusion and disorder. Naturally,  this means we 
cannot determine the character or nature (consistency) of such a system within itself, since  the  system  is  moving  irreversibly  toward  a  higher,  yet  unknown,  state  of confusion and disorder.   What an interesting outcome! According to Gödel we cannot—in general—determine  the  consistency,  hence  the  character  or  nature,  of  an  abstract  system within itself. According to Heisenberg and the Second Law of Thermodynamics any attempt  to do so  in  the real world will expose uncertainty and generate disorder. Taken together, these three notions support the idea that any inward‐oriented and continued effort to improve the match‐up of concept with observed reality will only increase  the  degree  of mismatch. Naturally,  in  this  environment,  uncertainty  and disorder  will  increase,  as  previously  indicated  by  the  Heisenberg  Indeterminacy Principle and  the Second Law of Thermodynamics,  respectively. Put another way, we can expect unexplained and disturbing ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies, or apparent  inconsistencies  to  emerge  more  and  more  often.  Furthermore,  unless some kind of relief is available, we can expect confusion to increase until disorder approaches chaos— death.   Fortunately,  there  is  a  way  out.  Remember,  as  previously  shown,  we  can forge a new concept by applying the destructive deduction and creative induction mental  operations.  Also,  remember,  in  order  to  perform  these  dialectic  mental operations we must  first  shatter  the  rigid  conceptual  pattern,  or  patterns,  firmly established in our mind. (This should not be too difficult since the rising confusion and disorder is already helping us to undermine any patterns). Next, we must find some common qualities, attributes, or operations to link isolated facts, perceptions, ideas, impressions, interactions, observations, etc., together as possible concepts to represent  the  real  world.  Finally,  we  must  repeat  this  unstructuring  and restructuring until we develop a concept  that begins  to match‐up with reality. By doing  this—in  accordance  with  Gödel,  Heisenberg  and  the  Second  Law  of Thermodynamics—we  find  that  the  uncertainty  and  disorder  generated  by  an 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inward‐oriented  system  to  talking  to  itself  can  be  offset  by  going  outside  and creating  a  new  system.  Simply  stated,  uncertainty  and  related  disorder  can  be diminished  by  the  direct  artifice  of  creating  a  higher  and  broader  more  general concept to represent reality.   However,  once  again,  when  we  begin  to  turn  inward  and  use  the  new concept—within its own pattern of ideas and interactions—to produce a finer grain match with observed reality we note  that  the new concept and  its match‐up with observed  reality  begins  to  self‐destruct  just  as  before.  Accordingly,  the  dialectic cycle of destruction and creation begins to repeat itself once again. In other words, as  suggested  by  Gödel's  Proof  of  Incompleteness,  we  imply  that  the  process  of Structure, Unstructure, Restructure, Unstructure, Restructure is repeated endlessly in moving to higher and broader levels of elaboration. In this unfolding drama, the alternating  cycle  of  entropy  increase  toward  more  and  more  disorder  and  the entropy decrease toward more and more order appears to be one part of a control mechanism  that  literally  seems  to  drive  and  regulate  this  alternating  cycle  of destruction and creation toward higher and broader levels of elaboration. Now, in relating  this  deductive/inductive  activity  to  the  basic  goal  discussed  in  the beginning,  I  believe  we  have  uncovered  a  Dialectic  Engine  that  permits  the construction  of  decision  models  needed  by  individuals  and  societies  for determining  and  monitoring  actions  in  an  effort  to  improve  their  capacity  for independent  action.  Furthermore,  since  this  engine  is  directed  toward  satisfying this basic aim or goal, it follows that the goal‐seeking effort itself appears to be the other  side  of  a  control  mechanism  that  seems  also  to  drive  and  regulate  the alternating  cycle of destruction and creation  toward higher and broader  levels of elaboration.  In  this  context,  when  acting  within  a  rigid  or  essentially  a  closed system, the goal seeking effort of individuals and societies to improve their capacity for independent action tends to produce disorder towards randomness and death. On  the  other  hand,  as  already  shown,  the  increasing  disorder  generated  by  the increasing  mismatch  of  the  system  concept  with  observed  reality  opens  or unstructures  the  system.  As  the  unstructuring  or,  as  we'll  call  it,  the  destructive deduction  unfolds,  it  shifts  toward  a  creative  induction  to  stop  the  trend  toward disorder  and  chaos  to  satisfy  a  goal‐oriented  need  for  increased  order. Paradoxically,  then,  an  entropy  increase  permits  both  the  destruction,  or unstructuring,  of  a  closed  system and  the  creation of  a new system  to nullify  the march  toward  randomness  and  death.  Taken  together,  the  entropy  notion associated  with  the  Second  Law  of  Thermodynamics  and  the  basic  goal  of individuals and societies seem to work in dialectic harmony driving and regulating the destructive/ creative, or deductive/inductive, action— that we have described herein  as  a  dialectic  engine.  The  result  is  a  changing  and  expanding  universe  of mental  concepts  matched  to  a  changing  and  expanding  universe  of  observed reality.[28,27] As  indicated earlier,  these mental  concepts are employed as decision models by individuals and societies for determining and monitoring actions needed 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